LUZON was one of the hottest spots in the Pacific during the last days of March. The Jap had been crushed at Manila, the city he shamelessly pillaged and sacked in 1942; General Swift's I Corps was engaged in keeping him penned up in the mountains surrounding Baguio; the XIV Corps, under Lt. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, had overrun his southern strongholds in the Manila sector. Luzon had long been sliced along its middle and the enemy was slowly being reduced into a series of pockets. North of the Central Plain, however, where the I Corps sector was divided among the 33d, 32d and 25th Divisions, he still remained a powerful adversary.

Just as the Golden Cross faced the utmost in difficult terrain and fanatical opposition, so too did the other divisions comprising the corps. On the Villa Verde Trail, which splits the long axis of Northern Luzon, the Red Arrow Division was locked in a death struggle with a strong Nipponese force. Enemy artillery and mortars inflicted severe casualties on the 32d and their gains paralleled those of the 136th Infantry on Kennon Road. To the right of the 32d, the 25th had equally slow going. Maj. Gen. Charles L. Mullins' Tropic Lightning Division, working through canalized Balete Pass, also took a daily beating from Japanese heavy-caliber weapons. Action in the zones of all divisions was bitter. Advances were totaled in feet and yards, never miles.

Yamashita realized that if I Corps managed to fight its way into the Cagayan Valley-northeast of Baguio-the Luzon war would be all but over. The valley housed the nerve system of the enemy's northern force. His ammunition and food stockpiles lay in the fertile flatland; the road through the valley represented his principal line of traffic for reinforcements and supplies. Keeping a foothold in the mountains resolved into a life-and-death issue with the Japs. They had to hold or eventually perish.

Consequently, the Nip fought with all of his great courage throughout the Corps sector. He employed his artillery and mortars with more skill than ever before. He attempted to stem the American tide with the cream of his foot troops. Even to him, a decisive victory must have appeared impossible to attain, yet the vision of a stalemate in the barren mountains was enough to spark his efforts. With his back to the wall, the enemy still had dreams of one day sweeping out of the mountains and recapturing Luzon in a single dazzling counterstroke.

In late March the Corps commander reshaped the divisions' zones in it move to eliminate the possibility of the enemy-desired stalemate. Seeking to increase pressure along the Villa Verde, he directed that elements of the Golden Cross take over the Tebbo area from a regiment of the 32d Division. Tebbo was west of the trail and the troops tied up there were sorely needed by Maj. Gen. William H. Gill for his main effort. Once freed from flank security duties, this regiment could conceivably represent the balance of power in Villa Verde fighting.

General Clarkson alerted the 130th Infantry to move to Tebbo and relieve the Red Arrow regiment. On 28 March the 2d and 3d Battalions of "The Ripper's" force turned over their positions on the Naguilian road to the 129th Infantry and trucked from Naguilian to San Manuel, a hundred miles away, to take up the new mission. Frontline positions at Tebbo were located at the end of a deep salient which had been pushed northward along the Ambayabang River from San Nicolas through Lawican and Santa Rosa to the ridges south of Tebbo. The crude jeep trail that was maintained to supply the Tebbo elements followed the river bank and ended in a gap between two ridgelines cradling the Ambayabang, about 3,500 yards short of Tebbo. This gap leading into the valley housing Tebbo was called just that: The Gap.

Tebbo is a small mountain village at the foot of a huge barren hill shaped in the form of a half-oval. Town and hill peacefully nestle in the scenic Agno River Valley. The hill, which served as a picturesque backdrop for the deserted barrio, was pocked with Japanese caves and spider holes. It quickly earned the name of "Hand Grenade Hill" because of its oval shape.

Both Blackhawk battalions relieved 32d Division troops at 1850 on 4 April. Major Askren's 2d Battalion took over positions on high ground a thousand yards west of The Gap, while Lt. Colonel Minton's force defended a knob on a towering ridge east of the valley. This huge ridgeline was known as Skyline Ridge.

This latest disposition of 33d Division troops stretched the Golden Cross front from Naguilian to Tebbo, a flank-to-flank distance of sixty-five miles. The obstacles of terrain on Kennon Road, the Naguilian road and Pugo zones had already turned communication and supply into paramount problems. Extension of the Division zone pressed an even greater strain on these already taut lines.

A simple mission fell to Colonel Collins' battalions: Patrol and make full report of activity, strength and location of the enemy's Tebbo force. During the next four days riflemen from the battalions patrolled ceaselessly, meeting no organized bands of Japanese. Only four or five stragglers were sighted. Skyline Ridge was disturbingly serene.

Lack of Japanese activity at Tebbo posed a G-2 brain-twister. Intelligence information from higher headquarters disclosed that more than 1,200 enemy troops infested the area. The major part of the Japanese 16th Reconnaissance Regiment was reported to be defending the network of ridges surrounding Hand Grenade Hill. This regiment had a record of aggressive action. In early March it had been committed from Baguio to stop 32d Division advances through the Agno River Valley. It accomplished its mission. The Red Arrow men were forced to dig in and hold on Skyline Ridge. Despite this knowledge of previous Tebbo activities, the 130th Infantry reports read, "No enemy at Tebbo."

Only one conclusion remained. The enemy was using his Tebbo troops as a shuttle force, running from the Agno to dangerously pressed Japanese strongpoints and then back again once the pressure was alleviated or the strongpoint lost. A road running from Baguio through Itogon provided the Nips with a relatively secure route for these shuttle movements. Obviously then, at the time the Blackhawks assumed new positions in Tebbo, the Nips were off on one of these shuttle missions. Either that or they were able to conceal themselves from the prying eyes of two entire battalions.

While the 130th was at Tebbo, the 123d and 129th Infantry Regiments were finding tough sledding as they fought toward Baguio in the main effort against Yamashita's headquarters. Additional troops were needed to add impetus to the Division drive. General Clarkson decided to pull the Blackhawks back into the Battle for Baguio. With no enemy activity on Skyline Ridge, nothing could be gained by tying up a fresh, battle-wise force. Still, Corps had ordered 33d Division troops to man the inactive area. The Golden Cross CG issued orders to the 136th Infantry to replace the 130th on Skyline Ridge. Colonel Cavenee handed the mission to 2d Battalion, resting at Sison after weeks of heavy action along Kennon Road. A tour of duty on Skyline Ridge would give this combat-weary unit a chance to relax.

Two days after its relief on Kennon Road, Lt. Colonel Haycock's battalion trucked from its Sison rest area to San Manuel. A company of Filipino troops and a platoon from the Reconnaissance Troop were attached. Company F, commanded by Capt. Sheldon O. Suess, a forward observer party from Corps' 694th Field Artillery Battalion -which passed to the Bearcats from the 32d Division troops-one platoon of heavy machine guns from How Company, the recon platoon and the Filipinos were sent forward to The Gap to effect the relief. The battalion command group, and Companies E, G and part of H remained at San Manuel.

As soon as the relieving unit reached The Gap, elements of it branched off in different directions. Captain Suess led his company and the artillery party onto Skyline Ridge where a relief of the entire 3d Battalion was made. The cavalrymen, led by Lt. Irving Silverhart, and the Filipinos took over positions on the right side of The Gap where Major Askren maintained his headquarters. Lieutenant Silverhart fortified a steep hill rising sharply from the valley floor. This terrain feature levelled off at three points in its upward climb. Small flats at these level spots gave the impression that they ran perpendicular to the sharp sides of the hill. The Filipinos dug in on the lowest plane while Lieutenant Silverhart and most of his platoon took the intermediate location. An eight-man outpost fortified the highest point.

Lieutenant Colonel Minton and Major Askren led their battalions back to the regimental base at Aringay following their relief by 136th Infantry units. Captain Suess spent the few remaining daylight hours of 9 April in consolidating the Company F position. Sandbags were gathered and filled, barbed wire was tightened and moved to afford best protection. Booby traps were installed along all avenues of approach to the perimeter. Even in a sector reputedly as quiet as a church social Captain Suess meant to take no chances. A month on Kennon Road had taught his entire outfit that the Japs were trickier than a stageful of Houdinis.

Tebbo's tropical heat finally melted into the cool of night and quiet settled over Skyline Ridge. As the hours passed uneventfully the only sounds to be heard were the heavy breathing of infantrymen and the occasional click of an M-1 safety as the guard was changed. Fox Company slept well for the first time since being committed on Luzon. The fear and anxiety of combat were missing. Blackhawk patrols had likened Tebbo to a mausoleum. Absolutely nothing doing. It looked like a quiet sojourn in the mountains.

At 0100 a sudden roar of machine-gun fire split the black night. It seemed to come from everywhere. Fox Company snapped awake just in time to hear the belching of enemy mortars lend regular punctuation to the long beat of the Nambus. It took only a moment to read the score. From a small knob a hundred yards north of the perimeter, doughs could see tongues of red-and-white flame spitting from the muzzles of Nip machine guns. Fox Company troops immediately ducked back into the cover of their holes. It was impossible to remain exposed for more than an instant as mortar fragments sprayed all parts of the perimeter.

A "quiet" sector had abruptly turned into a holocaust. The enemy must have seen the one undermanned company relieve an entire battalion. Taking instant advantage, he had marshaled his forces under cover of darkness and driven home a surprise blow.

Fox Company was too stunned to offer immediate resistance. However, the crash of grenades raining on the outer line of emplacements a moment later shocked the men into action. Light .30s poured out answering fire, traversing along the protective wires. How Company's water-cooled guns turned on the Jap positions and tried to cut down the enemy fire at its source. Mortarmen dropped HE shells in close to the perimeter. The 694th Artillery observer made contact with his fire direction center at Lawican and called for defensive fires.

Sergeant Al Patterson, in charge of company communications, vainly cranked a dead EE-8 phone in an effort to get battalion on the line and notify Haycock of the company's plight. Next he tried the SCR-300, but it too was dead. Captain Suess took over at this point. He crawled to the artillery -610 radio and got the 694th FDC to relay his messages back to the battalion commander at San Manuel. Lt. Colonel Haycock promised assistance.

Even though defensive artillery and mortar preparations shredded the turf surrounding the small position, the tempo of enemy fire gradually accelerated. Soon the din was so great that the high-pitched crack of the Nambus and the more deep-throated answer of American machine guns blotted out all other sounds. Infantrymen in the outside line could suddenly see the whole hillside spring into life. The enemy had succeeded in weathering the protective supporting fires. Once past this curtain they rose to their feet, worked through the wire and stormed the position.

Captain Suess' men stood erect in their foxholes to ward off this thrust against the perimeter. Their M-1s crackled, grenades were pitched into the tightly packed Nip ranks. But soon the enemy worked in so close that it was impossible to use M-1s as anything but clubs. Rifles were reversed, bayonets removed from pieces and employed as trench knives. It became a hand-to-hand fight to the death. The screams of wounded and dying Japs echoed through the night. Fox Company fought back the "Banzai!" shouting Japanese to avoid being overrun. The encounter lasted until dawn when the enemy brought down a mortar barrage and withdrew under the blanket of fire.

Daylight brought many revelations. As Company F made its first visual reconnaissance it could see scores of dead Japs sprawled in the ten-yard stretch of ground between the barbed wire and the company position. But that wasn't all. For every lifeless Nip around the perimeter, three live and healthy ones had assumed positions of siege.

In the course of the night the enemy had thrown a cordon of troops around Company F. Japanese emplacements could be seen in all directions.

Company F was surrounded.

Other Division units in the sector fared as badly. The attack against Fox Company must have served as a signal for activity on the other side of The Gap. Coincident with the Skyline Ridge attack other Nips hit both Recon Troop perimeters. The larger group of troopers, halfway up the hill, managed to beat back all drives made in their direction. But the smaller unit, located near the crest of the mountain, had too little in the way of weapons to stand off an attacking Japanese platoon. Twice the Nips were stopped, but on their third attempt they overran the tiny Recon position. One trooper was killed, one lost in action, and the remaining six, all wounded, were forced to withdraw from the position and seek cover in a nearby gully. The Nips took over the ground and all of the squad's weapons; a 60mm mortar, an EE-8 phone, two rifles, two submachine guns, a pistol, and three carbines.

On Skyline Ridge, Fox Company found itself in desperate need of supplies and ammunition. A night of fighting had greatly depleted the outfit's store of small-arms rounds, mortar shells and hand grenades. Supply trains were dispatched from the battalion base at San Manuel but they could find no entrance to the surrounded company. Japanese troops had all avenues of approach zeroed in with automatic or crew-served weapons. An air drop was the only solution if Company F was to continue the fight for its life.

A C-47 loaded with the necessary materiel flew over Skyline Ridge that afternoon. Large quantities of the requested supplies were kicked out through the plane's cabin door, but only a few items landed within Company F's perimeter. Water, small-arms ammunition and mortar rounds were recovered by Captain Suess' men; the enemy got all of the food, radio batteries, and the sorely needed hand grenades.

Fully realizing the seriousness of the situation, Captain Suess utilized all his available support to see his company through this crisis. He called back to the artillery FDC and requested that an L-4 plane fly constant patrol over the ridge and relay any information on enemy activity to the company CP. The Cub pilot immediately left the San Manuel strip and appeared over the company a few minutes later. No sooner had his reconnaissance started than he spotted enemy movement on the reverse slope of a small knob near the Fox Company perimeter. He radioed Captain Suess: "I can see approximately forty Japs, with a machine gun and mortar, digging in about sixty yards south of you. Will adjust on them."

Captain Suess decided to pull the unexpected and follow up with a small attack of his own. As soon as the artillery barrage lifted, a six-man volunteer combat patrol from the company crawled through the wire and charged up the side of the knob. The very audacity of the attack made it a success. The patrol brought concentrated M-1 and BAR fire into the enemy group and then withdrew back to their perimeter. Again the liaison plane came in: "You got about thirty of them. The rest took off. That's the way to knock 'em off!"

Riflemen worked feverishly to improve their defense for the attack they knew would be coming once darkness closed in on Skyline Ridge. Each man deepened his hole. Crew-served weapons were more firmly sandbagged into place. Supplementary positions for all guns were constructed. The artillery radio, last surviving link of communications with friendly forces, was carefully emplaced, nothing but its aerial remaining above ground level. Came dusk. Fox Company waited. Minutes stretched into hours and still only an eerie silence hung over the ridge.

Then it came. With the same explosive fury of the previous night the enemy moved forward against the thin line. The flash of exploding demolitions and grenades cast a brilliant glow over the ridge.

"Banzai!" Japanese screaming in English and their own tongue again crawled through artillery and mortar concentrations. They penetrated the wire in several places. Rifle butts, knives and a few grenades were used once more to turn them back. Captain Suess left the company CP to shuttle his men between weak points in the line. Just when it seemed as though a group of Japs would be able to carry their salient along the diameter of the perimeter, Suess and a few men would rush up and blunt the Nip wedge. Heavy machine gunners, using a swinging traverse, augmented the efforts of the riflemen by raking the wire with point-blank fire.

Again the fight raged until morning. When the first slivers of light appeared the enemy withdrew, dragging away as many of his dead and wounded as he could safely carry. The perimeter was still intact, and the Nips had taken a brutal beating in their effort to annihilate Company F. More than 150 Japanese, piled up three-high in some spots, could be counted around the barbed-wire fence. Captain Suess had seven men killed and eight wounded during this one night of action.

Daylight brought the supply situation into sharp focus once again. Troops were hungry and thirsty. Wounded men rested quietly but medical supplies were necessary if they were not to die. Another drop was made at 1000 that morning, and was more successful than the one the day before. Company F recovered enough ammunition, water, food, morphine and plasma to enable them to stand another day of siege.

Immediately after the drop, weary infantrymen braced for a third attack. Captain Suess called Lt. Colonel Haycock by radio and was in the midst of assuring him that the company would not only survive but hold its ground when a single shot rang out. Company F's commander slumped forward, dead, blood trickling from a small hole in his forehead. Several months later the widow of the Rockford, Illinois, officer was presented with a DSC, posthumously awarded to Captain Suess for his leadership during the attacks of 9 and 10 April.

Command of the force passed to Lt. Sidney Stein, the next ranking officer.

Battalion was not idle during Fox Company's fight for existence. On 10 April Companies E and G were given the mission of breaking through to the marooned unit. Trucks took both companies up to The Gap and from there they struck off into the hills on foot. Lieutenant Weatherwax, in command of Company G, planned to hit Skyline Ridge several hundred yards below Lieutenant Stein's position and then work his way along the ridge top until a junction was made. Captain Sherrard, commanding E Company, meant to follow a direct line from The Gap to the surrounded outfit's position.

Both E and G failed. Weatherwax's doughs had just set foot on the ridge when they were engaged by mid-range machine-gun fire. Heavy mortars, never before used on the ridges, opened up from defiladed positions and caught the company in the open. Weatherwax, a game leader, moved out past the scouts hoping to pull his troops along with him. His men responded, but the spark shone only briefly. Enemy fire superiority crushed every attempt to advance when George came to within six hundred yards of Company F. Company G was forced to withdraw with its twenty-one casualties.

Sherrard had no better luck. His force was observed by Skyline Ridge Japs as it was crossing the broad valley leading up to the ridgeline. Plunging machine-gun fire pin-pointed Company E in the valley and all attempts to advance were fruitless. Heavy mortar fire commenced to fall on Easy Company at this point and Sherrard and his troops were forced to turn back.

Since all efforts of the 2d Battalion to break through to marooned Company F had failed Lt. Colonel Haycock was left with a single choice. He radioed Lieutenant Stein to withdraw from the ridge that night, under cover of darkness. Plans called for mortars at The Gap and howitzers at Lawican to shell the enemy throughout the day, enabling Company F to mask its preparations for the move. A two-battery artillery concentration was to fall on three sides of the company from 1940 to 2000. At 2000 the trip back was due to begin.

Preliminary fires started on schedule. Medics with Company F readied the wounded for the long carry to friendly lines. Crew-served machine guns and mortars were destroyed with hand grenades as the steady barrage kept the enemy down and prevented observation into the perimeter. The two-battery concentration came through at the appointed hour. Fox Company's communications men destroyed the -610 radio one minute before 2000.

Silently the troops slipped through the wire in the rear of the perimeter and began the return march. All wounded-litter and walking-made the move, but the stretcher-laden column was forced to leave behind the bodies of its eight dead.

With the destruction of the artillery radio, no communication existed between battalion headquarters and Company F. The 136th Infantry literally had a "lost company." An air of tension was apparent at The Gap where Companies E and G and forward CPs sweated out the dawn. Even on Kennon Road where the 3d Battalion, 136th Infantry, had its hands full near Camp Three, doughs there offered a prayer that Company F would make its withdrawal without further mishap.

Fifteen minutes after Fox Company's rear guard cleared Skyline Ridge the Japanese inaugurated their third all-out attack in as many nights. But this time sharp enemy fires went without response. The Japs were baffled to find just the bodies of eight Americans when they crawled through the barbed wire and searched out the position. Had they chosen to follow Company F, the enemy might have been able to accomplish more in one brief attack than they had in two and a half days of relentless siege. Progress was slow. Footing was insecure in the inky night. Sgt. Pyrl Christensen, lead scout, was ordered to make frequent halts. The loaded line could walk only a few paces between rests. At last dawn came, lighting the way over the steep chain of spurs leading down from the ridge.

Regiment and battalion held hopes that Company F would reach friendly forces shortly after daybreak. Contact patrols were dispatched in all directions; commanding ground was manned by OPs searching the ridges and ravines for a glimpse of Stein's unit. But morning wore on to mid-afternoon and still no message, no sign of the missing company. Colonel Cavenee and Lt. Colonel Haycock, too filled with anxiety to wait for periodic reports to reach the CP, traveled from one high point to another, querying observers.

Fox Company was spotted as the broiling sun was ready to sink below the western horizon. Every man at The Gap let out a spontaneous cry of gratitude at the sight of the pitiful column stumbling out of a deep gully. Surgeons and medical technicians rushed out to intercept the company. Filipino carriers sprinted ahead to take over the load of the litters and to assist the walking wounded.

A nightmare was over. The return trip to The Gap had taken almost twenty-two hours of marching. Usually brusque Colonel Cavenee wept as the tattered infantrymen dragged themselves up to The Gap. He walked out to meet them, shaking hands with some, pounding others on the back. Trucks were waiting and the men were quickly driven back to San Manuel for rest, medical attention and re-equipping.

Now the Tebbo picture no longer posed a puzzle. It was obvious that the enemy moves to and from Tebbo were finished. They were here to stay. Both sides of The Gap were heavily fortified and Hand Grenade Hill, confronting the 136th Infantry, blocked forward progress. With appalling suddenness a major front of alarming proportions had developed in the 33d Division sector. And if early signs meant anything, the Japanese would fight to the death before permitting a new route to Baguio to unfold through the Agno River Valley.

More troops were quickly brought up to the new battleground. Major Ehrlich's 1st Battalion, resting at Camp One after weeks on Kennon Road, reached The Gap at dusk on 11 April. Troops were moved into position after dark. Company C joined E and G in developing positions on the right side. These units were aligned on a long, low ridge running parallel to Skyline Ridge and separated from it by a 1,200yard-wide valley. Able and Baker Companies dug in west of The Gap,

just below the high point formerly held by the eight-man squad from the Recon Troop. Guns of the 210th Field Artillery Battalion were brought up to Lawican to augment the fires of Corps artillery. The regiment busied itself in amassing sufficient power to actively respond to the Japanese challenge.

Supply and evacuation became critical problems as the Tebbo force doubled in size. A single regimental supply installation could not serve both the Kennon Road and Tebbo elements of the regiment. Major Joffre H. Boston, S-4, moved the greater part of his service troops to San Manuel, and left a small auxiliary base at Camp One to take care of the 3d Battalion. An agreement was worked out between Major Boston and 32d Division supply personnel whereby a Red Arrow base at San Manuel would receive 136th Infantry stocks of food, ammunition, water, medical supplies and other combat equipment. Service Company and 1st and 2d Battalion supply units were charged with transporting this materiel up to the Tebbo front.

This assignment in itself proved difficult. The supply line was nothing but the rough-hewn jeep trail used by the 32d Division when it first garrisoned the Skyline Ridge area. The rutted road led into the winding Ambayabang River seventeen times before reaching The Gap. Supply trains were open to fire during most of the 25-mile run. Grassy bluffs overlooking the route housed countless Nip harassing parties. These groups would bide their time until the trucks reached one of the fords and then move forward in an ambush. It took genuine fortitude to drive a supply vehicle from San Manuel to The Gap.

Evacuation posed an equally formidable difficulty. In addition to inviting ambush, the evacuation route provided a strength-sapping series of jolts to the wounded in the course of the four-hour ride to the 32d Division's clearing company. Until these problems were solved, there was little point in attempting to recapture the lost ground.

Regiment came up with a workable solution in both cases. Colonel Cavenee detailed his platoon of attached medium tanks to convoy supply trains forward, and then guard a combined ambulance-supply group on its return trip. Mounting 75mm guns and with .30-caliber machine guns ready to comb the hills and draws along the road, the tanks discouraged further enemy harassment of supply trains. The regiment lost nothing by committing its armor in this fashion. Steep terrain flanking The Gap blocked their employment as tactical support. Roadblocks erected at particularly exposed points on the road-manned by antitankers and battalion headquarters troops-assisted the tanks in eliminating enemy resistance.

Charley Company, 108th Medical Battalion, commanded by Capt. Louis F. DeGaetano, alleviated the medical problem. These medics were moved to a point five miles behind the front, where they set up an installation in a wide field near Sapinet. Captain DeGaetano's men discarded their normal role of collecting company and operated as a full-fledged, albeit small, field hospital. Major Karl Beck and Capt. William E. Hurt, surgeon and assistant surgeon for the Bearcats, incorporated their regimental aid station with Company C. Doctors Beck, DeGaetano and Hurt, assisted by Company C's technicians, stood ready to provide surgical attention to wounded who were too seriously hurt to weather the jolting ride to San Manuel. Beds and tents were prepared to house casualties such as malaria and exhaustion cases.

To further speed evacuation, Major Beck recommended that a landing field for light aircraft be constructed right in the company area. Engineers came up and bulldozed a strip in a short time. Corps was contacted and L-5 ambulance planes were made available on call. In the ensuing days on Skyline Ridge many American lives were saved by the Sapinet station. Filipino troops under an American officer were assigned to defend the airfield and installations against enemy intrusion. Now the stage was set for the 136th Infantry to strike back.

In order to secure the left flank of The Gap it became imperative to regain the high ground lost by the cavalry outpost. Companies A and l were alerted for this mission. Shortly after midnight of 15-16 April, Company A moved out and secured a small knob below the Japanese' from which an attack could be launched. Captain Kissel's company swung around the base of the hill and prepared to attack in a southerly direction at dawn. Both companies attacked at daybreak. Baker Company ran into a dead end at once. Dropping down from the side of the objective was a sheer escarpment about thirty feet high. It could not be seen from the ground as it was concealed by a grassy spur jutting out of the hillside. Captain Kissel had no alternative but to back down the hill and start up again directly behind Company A.

Captain Cavender's company got no better results. The enemy spotted Able Company as soon as it began its climb. Machine-gun fire hemmed in both sides of the unit. Loath to continue a frontal attack because of its costliness, Cavender pulled back to his jump-off position and called for a barrage of artillery and mortar fire. All that day and night the company sat tight, waiting for the steady HE bombardment to loosen up the Japanese defense.

Cavender led his men forward again on the morning of 17 April. He had a new plan for this attack. Some three hundred yards behind the enemy, and on a slightly higher plane, was a small rocky pinnacle about ten feet high. If a few men could outflank the Nip force and squeeze into the crags on this narrow peak they would be able to throw effective fire into the enemy's rear. The resultant confusion would assist the remainder of the company to gain a breach from the front. Company A moved out a short distance from its original position and then engaged the enemy in a fire fight. T/Sgt. Fred Mitchell's light machine guns opened up on the enemy's Nambus and engaged them in a duel. Meanwhile, a squad from the 2d Platoon slipped out of the line and took advantage of the melee to branch off to the left flank.

Slowly the squad advanced along the side of the hill. Surprise was everything; detection meant isolation. But the enemy paid no heed to the group swinging around behind him. Every Nip weapon was turned against the rest of Company A. Finally the flanking squad reached the base of the pinnacle and swiftly sought covered positions among the crags. A moment later two BARS, two submachine guns, and a few - M-is opened up. The position was perfect. Every movement of the enemy garrison could be seen. Shocked Nips wheeled around searching for the source of this surprise attack. Some attempting to move away from this surprise fire were cut down by Company A. Others who sought to converge on the pinnacle were shot down in their tracks.

Japanese confusion was the signal for the main assault. Able Company infantrymen moved into the enemy position and mopped up the stupefied survivors of the vise. Eighty-seven Japanese were slain, most of them accounted for by the single squad on the pinnacle. Captain (;,vender lost two men: Sgts. Waldemar W. Walk and Arthur C. Keyster. Three men were seriously wounded. Equipment recovered on the hillside indicated that the enemy had committed his first-rank troops in this area. Break-down rifles and collapsible submachine guns offered unmistakable evidence that the dead Nips were members of parachute or glider units.

Able Company's drive cleared the west side of The Gap. This recaptured terrain was of vital importance. So broad was its area of observation that it was possible for Captain Cavender to adjust fire on Skyline Ridge. Company A's peak was much higher than the ridge manned by C, E and G Companies and observers could see over their heads to the big ridge.

Aggressive patrolling by small groups began on 15 April. On that date a 24-man joint C and G patrol, led by Lieutenants Winston and Weatherwax, pushed on to Skyline Ridge, first regimental units to set foot on the ground since Company F. The patrol managed to cross the wide draw unobserved. Upon reaching the base of the ridge, riflemen deployed into a wide skirmish line and began to ascend the hillside. It seemed odd that no alarm was sounded. The steep sides of Skyline Ridge were utterly bare of cover or concealment. Suddenly the troops from C and G rushed over the crest and fell prone into firing positions. Bunched up on a small spur leading off the opposite slope were thirty Japanese. A "commence firing" was given and in an instant rifles, BARS and submachine guns spoke up together. The enemy was too surprised to return a single shot. They were wiped out, almost to a man.

Other Nips reacted strenuously to this uninvited entrance. From emplacements farther up the ridge close to where Fox Company had been trapped-numerous machine guns turned their fires on the patrol. Jap knee-mortar squads cut around both flanks and began to lay in fire. Heavy mortars and concentrated fire from enemy riflemen came next. Rifle, machine-gun, and knee-mortar fire contrived to keep the C and G patrol pinned flat to the ground while the heavy mortars dropped a barrage just behind the thin skirmish line. The din set up by this terrific concentration was so great that the two lieutenants, only eight or ten yards apart, were forced to talk by radio in order to coordinate their actions.

Despite this small-arms and mortar bombardment the patrol remained in its position and actually maintained the initiative for a few additional moments. Sgt. Haskell M. Garrett, a Charley Company squad leader, spotted the muzzle blasts of the Nip heavy mortar section. Both guns were located directly behind the spur housing the forty Japs killed when the patrol first ascended on the ridge. Garrett shouted to his platoon leader for friendly 81mm fire. His request for fire was radioed back and a round was on the way in a few seconds. It fell at the correct range but some sixty yards left of the target.

Sergeant Garrett rose to his feet to sense the round and then called for additional shells. Finally he worked a round into the suspected position. Garrett then asked for six to come together. Jap shrieks of pain could be heard as the volley bit into the reverse slope. The blast of exploding ammunition was audible across the valley as the Japanese HE dump went up in a sheet of flame and gray smoke. From that time on the enemy mortars were silent. Sergeant Garrett, killed a week later on another patrol, received the Silver Star for his gallantry.

By this time, however, the light machine guns and knee mortars were pretty well registered on the patrol. Both leaders deemed a withdrawal advisable as the reconnaissance mission was already accomplished. Lieutenant Weatherwax radioed back for overhead machine-gun fire to cover the unit as it backed away from the enemy. As soon as the last man had crawled back over the crest, eight .50s and a like number of .30s placed fire on the ridge top. The mortars adjusted by Garrett shortened range and continued to fire. C and G made an uneventful return trip. Overhead fire did not cease until they reached the safety of their own positions. At the cost of two men wounded by kneemortar shrapnel, this patrol accounted for almost thirty Japs and at least one heavy mortar.

As a result of this episode, regiment was able to determine that the Japanese held all of Skyline Ridge, not just the portion occupied by Company F almost a week before. It was assumed that the enemy ran in troops and supplies from Baguio each night. On 19 April this belief was substantiated. Observers from the 2d Battalion notified the regimental CP that they could see supply trains and columns of troops coming onto the ridge from the direction of the summer capital. These moves were boldly carried out around mid-afternoon. Artillery FOs, at the various OPs, called for interdicting fire, but the extreme range for high-angle fire nullified the effect of the howitzers.

Corps' 105s were displaced forward in an effort to capture some of these remunerative targets. Colonel Cavenee directed that two guns he hauled up to The Gap at dawn, kept there in firing position during the day, and moved back to Lawican at dusk. They struck a bonanza the following day. A liaison pilot sighted a large enemy truck convoy far up the Agno River Valley near Dalupirip. He ranged in the howitzers and destroyed a large part of the column. Ninety Nips were estimated to have been killed. Immediately an entire battery from the 694th Field Artillery was permanently displaced up to The Gap.

Activity around Skyline Ridge grew static on 21 April. The enemy seemed content to hold his strongpoint and wait for the 136th Infantry to inaugurate any aggressive moves. Occasionally he harassed C and G Companies with sporadic machine-gun fire and mortar fire, but that was all. Regimental units retaliated with mortar fire. Colonel Cavenee chose this lull to relieve his 2d Battalion, less Company E, and send it hack to San Manuel as I Corps reserve. In a redisposition of troops Company C moved over to the west side of The Gap, formerly held by Able and Baker, while Companies E, A, and B manned the long ridge across the draw from Skyline Ridge.

A week of defensive patrolling followed from these new bases. Then the regimental commander considered the time ripe to feel out the enemy in Tebbo and on Hand Grenade Hill. At this time elements of the other Golden Cross infantry regiments were actually engaged in Baguio City. Reports indicated that the summer capital would be in American hands within twenty-four hours. General Clarkson naturally desired Colonel Cavenee to effect a rapid breakthrough so that the entire Division could finally be mustered in one area.

Staff Sergeant (later Lt.) William Nielson, in command of the 1st Battalion Assault Group, was given the mission of probing the small barrio. He left The Gap with his unit on 28 April and started down the massive Agno River Valley towards Tebbo. Nothing happened until the platoon reached a broad area of flatland where the river suddenly cut across the valley floor. Large paddies, formerly tended by Igorot inhabitants of Tebbo, stretched out from the northern bank of the stream right to the huts that made up the barrio. The scouts crossed the stream at this point and after a few minutes of investigation waved to the remainder of the group to ford the river. Three Jap machine guns and four knee mortars chose this moment to commence their fires. Most of the assault group was caught in the stream. Two men were killed in the first bursts. Sergeant Nielson tried to outflank the fires and advance but was unable to do so without being detected. He called for artillery fire and then withdrew to The Gap.

Another attempt to penetrate to Tebbo was made the following morning by a Charley Company platoon led by T/Sgt. James Dickson. This unit met the same fate as the assault group. Gathering false confidence from the fact that no resistance developed as he approached the river, Dickson crossed in the same fashion as Nielson. His platoon too was caught in the middle of the Agno. Two more men were killed before the group was able to pull back out of machine-gun range.

Two quick failures were convincing proof that the job was too large for a single rifle platoon. The task was passed on to Company B. But Colonel Cavenee expanded the mission to correspond with the enlargement of the attacking force. Captain Kissel had orders to break through Tebbo and drive on to Baguio. He was reinforced and supplied with sufficient men and ammunition to cope with any situation arising during the northwest advance. One rifle platoon from Company C, and sections of heavy mortars and machine guns from Dog Company rounded out the assault force. An FO party, headed by Lt. Thomas Monsour, was prepared to provide artillery fire support. The Division pack train, made up of United States Army horses recaptured from the Nips near Sison, was used to haul crew-served weapons and heavy ammunition. Before the landing on Luzon these animals had pulled artillery caissons for the Japanese.

Kissel left The Gap on 1 May. For the third time in as many attempts no opposition was encountered until the forward elements spanned the Agno. Again the enemy waited until the attacking force was split into two sections before cutting loose with accurate machinegun fire. Company B tried to work across the open ground in twos and threes, but the nature of the terrain permitted the enemy perfect observation. As soon as the Japanese spotted movement they traversed several of their pieces to engage advancing troops. When this method of advance failed, attempts were made to go forward by fire and movement with the leading platoons deployed into wide skirmish lines. The result was the same. Company B could not locate a single enemy machine gun. Meanwhile, the long rank of doughboys afforded a splendid target to Jap gunners.

All attached resources were employed to force a salient. Lieutenant Monsour covered the far end of the valley with battery volleys; chemical 4.2 mortars and 81s brought fire on Hand Grenade Hill; heavy machine guns fired hundreds of rounds into the deserted barrio. Captain Kissel sent his support platoon around to the right during the barrage, hoping to catch the Nips napping. As soon as it crossed the river the platoon was intercepted by machine-gun fire and beaten back. All day long Baker Company stayed astride the river and took it, searching for some way to knock out the Japanese fires.

Colonel Cavenee, in contact with the company CP, finally ordered Captain Kissel to abandon the drive and return to The Gap.

The return march turned out to be a harrowing experience. Once darkness settled over the valley not a flicker of visibility remained. There was no moon, no stars; only pitch blackness. Lead scouts moved forward blindly. Once out of the valley the path hugged the side of a long ridge running from The Gap to the river. Occasionally the route trailed off into sheer drops. Men were reduced to crawling on hands and knees to avoid falling off the trail into a deep gully. Movement was slow, gaps developed in the column, a man could not see a yard in front of him. During one of the frequent halts an alert doughboy suddenly spotted some luminous limbs on a bush growing out of the ridge side. A fungus growth covering the bark gave them the phosphorescent glow of radium-dialed watches. They were quickly broken up and passed along the column. Troops inserted them inside the rubber camouflage bands at the rear of their helmets.

Officers opened their compasses and left the exposed dial dangling from the rear of their web belts. Pieces of the twigs were fastened inside the harnesses of the pack animals. Contact was maintained through the employment of these "beacons." Two horses slipped off the trail during the remainder of the trip, but all men and casualties made it back to The Gap without mishap.

Reverses at Tebbo were hard to swallow but they were soon absorbed in the fervor of preparations for the attack on Skyline Ridge. Once the main ridge was in regimental hands it would then become a simple matter to outflank Hand Grenade Hill and knock it out from the rear. Toward this end, General Paxton offered Colonel Cavenee all of the artillery support he could use. One artillery battalion, the 123d, was dispatched from Baguio to Dalupirip-a barrio north of Tebbo-with the mission of bringing 155mm fire on the reverse slope of Skyline Ridge. Impervious to high-angle fires from The Gap because of its near-perpendicular slope, the ridge side served as a haven for a large number of enemy troops. Corps relieved the 2d Battalion from its reserve when word was received that the regimental attack was imminent. With this comparatively fresh force to count upon, the 136th command group formulated its plan for the capture of Skyline Ridge.

Able and George Companies were nominated to spearhead the assault. Company A was to cut around the southern tip of the ridge, move up the slope and attack along the north-south axis of the ridge. Lieutenant Weatherwax's company was ordered to move directly across the valley from its present position and drive a wedge through the middle of Skyline Ridge. This accomplished, Cavender would then push on past Company G and take the old Company F position which was the regiment's first objective. Planners counted on employing the element of surprise to give the two companies a foothold on the ridge. The approach march was to be made during the hours of darkness. No preliminary fires would be laid down, although they were to be available on call.

At 0400 on 3 May the twin columns moved out. Silently they advanced across the valley and inched up the slopes of Skyline Ridge. When several yards short of the crest the men stopped and flattened themselves against the hillside, waiting for the first flicker of daylight to illuminate the terrain. Signals to attack were issued precisely at dawn. Still working quietly, the two companies completed their approach marches and then spilled over the crest. Before the Japanese could diagnose the situation both A and G had secured the long-denied foothold.

Enemy confusion was short-lived however. Machine gunners on higher ground turned their weapons to counter the intrusion and responded with long, accurate bursts of fire. In an instant all enemy forces on Skyline Ridge were marshaled against A and G. Two Nambus-one on high ground to its left-front and another to its right-front -hemmed George Company between lanes of crossfire. One of Weatherwax's scouts, Pfc. George Rollins, spotted a narrow tunnel running from both guns to a centrally located OP. Rollins got to his feet and ran through the bands of fire toward the OP. Five yards from it, he pitched a hand grenade through the small embrasure.

As soon as the grenade exploded, Rollins jumped into the emplacement. Two dead Japs lay in the bottom of the position. He moved through the tunnel to the gun on the left, crawling to within three feet of it before the crew detected him. Rollins quickly hip-fired twice, getting the two Japs on the gun. With that, he backed off a few paces and arched a grenade into the nest. Three more Japanese fell. Rollins then crawled back into the emplacement, peeled two of the dead enemy from the gun, grabbed the piece by its hot barrel and slung it onto the ridge for his comrades to see. He was later decorated with the DSC.

Company G had little difficulty in smothering the other gun, outflanking it from the enemy's now unprotected side. This position had been the heart of the enemy defense on the central part of the ridge. With both machine guns destroyed, the Nips were unable to halt the company's assault. Knee-mortar men and snipers continued to oppose Weatherwax's troops, but by 1100 most of these had been eliminated. George Company's drive had cut the ridge into two segments.

Cavender's force found sterner resistance to the south. Three tall knobs, laterally spanning the southern part of the ridge, blocked A Company's route of advance. Each was mutually supporting and occupied by machine guns. Attempts to envelop the left and right knobs had proven costly and unsuccessful. Lt. Joseph H. Schneider, a lanky New Yorker commanding the 1st Platoon, voluntarily organized a company assault team composed wholly of BAR men. He then led this makeshift group in an assault against the center knob. A shower of grenades followed by the simultaneous outburst of six BARS permitted the team to mount the slope without casualty. Once on top of the knob Schneider walked to the point of the attack and staged a one-man display of courage that was mainly responsible for clearing the hill.

He moved from one spiderhole to another riddling Nips with pointblank bursts of BAR fire. When his ammunition was finally expended he rejoined the company, gathered up an armful of grenades and resumed his former tactics. His troops followed directly behind him, wiping out survivors. Other elements of Company A then climbed the center knob and launched attacks from this point which resulted in the seizure of the two remaining obstacles. Schneider too won a DSC.

By the time the three disputed points were secured and fortified, it was too late in the day for the company to undertake further offensive action. Instead, Captain Cavender consolidated his gains and established a perimeter around the three knobs. He intended to resume the attack at dawn. Battalion headquarters sent a carrying party up to Company A shortly before nightfall with ammunition and water. Led by the unit's mess sergeant, S/Sgt. James Evans, the Filipino supply train walked into a barrage of 90mm mortar fire when it was fifty yards from Able's position. Several carriers were killed and Pfc. Melvin Jones, a cook, was seriously wounded. A few Filipinos dropped their burdens and began to run back into the valley. For a moment it seemed as though the panic would spread, but Evans calmed the remaining carriers and kept the supply train under control. The company got its supplies.

Able attacked on schedule. At dawn the infantrymen moved out with two platoons abreast and the third held back in support. Desperate resistance became apparent at once. Artillery and 4.2 mortars brought fires down in front of the company but every position had to be taken with rifle and grenade. By 1200, however, Company A managed to fight to within one hundred yards of the Company F position. Here, Sgt. Roger E. Brown, in command of the 60mm mortar section, set up his pieces in battery and gave the objective a twentyminute shelling. The 2d and 3d Platoons, led by Lts. Kenneth Lanman and Harold Witherspoon, rushed the position as soon as supporting fires ceased. After a sharp hour-long hand-to-hand fight the company seized the commanding ground on three sides of the objective.

Baker Company, kept out of action since its 1 May fight at Tebbo, was sent forward as soon as Cavender radioed battalion of his success. Together with the 1st Battalion Assault Group, Kissel's riflemen engaged in general mopping up. By 1630 action on Skyline Ridge was confined to ferreting out stragglers and sealing caves. Counted Japanese dead on the Able Company objective totalled sixty-nine. Seven light machine guns, one heavy, five mortars and a 47mm antitank gun had been captured. The two-day operation by A and G accounted for close to two hundred enemy soldiers.

But the seizure of Skyline Ridge did not end operations in this sector. One additional terrain feature prevented regimental domination of the Agno River Valley, Skyline Ridge and Tebbo. Unnamed by the 136th, this ground was in the form of a high ridge running perpendicular to Skyline Ridge. Its western tip almost formed a right angle with the northern edge of Skyline Ridge. This terrain served as a key point in the enemy defense line. Several weeks before, when the Japs shuttled between the Tebbo area and Baguio, they travelled via this commanding ground. Only a shallow saddle separated it from current regimental positions. High point on the enemy-held terrain was Mount Ugu, a 5,000-foot-high peak located on the eastern half of the ridge. All through the Skyline Ridge battle it had been valuable as an enemy OP.

Just before sundown on 4 May Companies A and B were relieved by Easy and Fox. At 0900 the following day the 1st Battalion, less Company C, was withdrawn and sent to Tebbo as I Corps reserve. The 2d Battalion, with Charley Company attached, now composed the infantry force in the Tebbo zone. Lt. Colonel Haycock deemed a re-disposition of troops advisable in light of the manpower shortage. Weatherwax's unit and Company F, under Lt. Raymond A. Harms, were kept on Skyline Ridge. Easy Company and the battalion antitank platoon built a perimeter across the valley from Skyline on the first ridge held by the regiment. They were designated as the support force. Company C remained on the high ground west of the Gap charged with maintaining battalion flank security.

With Skyline Ridge safely in regimental hands, Colonel Cavenee was free to plan the final attack. Heartening news had reached him on 3 May just before A and G Companies undertook the assault on the ridge. General Clarkson had ordered the 3d Battalion, 130th Infantry, from Baguio to effect a junction with the 136th Infantry at The Gap. This battalion was to be attached to the regiment upon its arrival.

Like everyone else, Lt. Colonel Minton's Blackhawk battalion ran into the Tebbo stumbling block. Arriving at Hand Grenade Hill at 1700 on 4 May the force tried to move on through the Agno River Valley but the lead company was halted by machine-gun fire. Due to the lateness of the hour, the battalion commander was forced to draw back his forward elements, go into a perimeter, and plan for an early morning reconnaissance. At dawn a single rifle platoon went out to probe the position, hoping to obtain information which might prove helpful in planning the drive. This group employed different tactics than its predecessors. The men climbed to the top of the ridges overlooking the valley and made all forward movements over this high ground. When they came abreast of Tebbo, they dropped off the ridge and into the strongpoint.

No Nips or sputtering machine guns were there to greet them. Several dead enemy-probably killed by Baker Company four days before-and three idle machine guns were the only signs that Hand Grenade Hill had ever served as an enemy bastion. A natural supposition was that the Japanese formerly manning this point had been withdrawn during the night to reinforce the Mount Ugu ridge. Additional reconnaissance turned up a round concrete-and-steel pillbox located on the edge of a draw near the oval-shaped hill. This single installation commanded the entire valley floor. Guns firing from it obviously were the same ones which had contained the advance of 116th Infantry elements. Lt. Colonel Minton moved the battalion through the valley when he was notified that the enemy had abandoned Tebbo. He arrived at The Gap at 1100 on 5 May.

Sudden changes in the weather made it imperative that the regiment follow an immediate course of action. Daily tropical rains were swelling the waters of the Ambayabang to near-flood levels. Supply trains were experiencing increasing difficulty in fording the winding stream. Carriers employed by the Division, who were natives of the Tebbo district, told the regimental commander that the fast-rising river would spill over its banks within two weeks. This prediction prompted Colonel Cavenee to hasten preparations for an attack on the Mount Ugu ridge.

Everything at the regiment's disposal would have to be committed in one huge assault. It had to be all or nothing: once the fords across the Ambayabang became impassable the 136th Infantry would be forced to leave the sector. With this in mind the Bearcat CO named just the hill mass forming the western end of the ridge as the regiment's final objective. Knowing the enemy's capabilities, Colonel Cavenee decided to make the attack at three-battalion strength. Consequently, the 3d Battalion, 136th Infantry, resting in Baguio, was alerted for a move to The Gap to join the 2d Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 130th Infantry. Major Ralph Pate-acting as battalion commander in the absence of hospitalized Lt. Colonel Hulbert-loaded his men on trucks on the morning of 9 May. After a 120-mile trip that took it down to Bauang, thence south to Binalonan, across the plains to San Manuel and finally up to The Gap, the battalion reported in at 1600.

With all ground commanders present, the colonel was able to issue his attack order. On 12 May the 2d and 3d Battalions, 136th Infantry, were to move forward in the main effort. The 2d Battalion, less Company F, was to jump off from Skyline Ridge and secure the southern half of the objective. Major Pate's troops were given the mission of cracking the northern half. They were to go into the attack from positions on a small ridge due west of the target area. Companies C and F received orders to advance on the enemy's rear and create a diversion. It was hoped that the Japanese would interpret the C-F move as an all out effort and shift a considerable part of their defense to meet it. The 3d Battalion, 130th Infantry, was named as reserve.

Troops of the assault forces spent 10 May deploying into favorable positions. Artillery FOs used the time to register in concentrations. Guns at The Gap combed the forward slope and top of the steep ridge while medium artillery at Dalupirip raked the reverse slope. A patrol from Company G was sent toward the ridge on reconnaissance when registration was completed. Oddly, the unit was able to penetrate to within fifty yards of the 2d Battalion objective without drawing fire. It seemed evident that the Nips chose to mask their resources and play a waiting game. Lt. Colonel Haycock, readily recognizing the wisdom of these tactics, followed suit. At his nightly company commanders' conference he decreed that no offensive activity was to take place the following day: no patrols, no artillery fire, movement of individuals to be restricted to a minimum. It would all add up to additional surprise on the morning of 12 May.

Major Pate was forced to adopt a different scheme. With his troops newcomers to the territory, he had to get as much information about the enemy as possible in a one-day period. Company K sent two platoons toward the ridge to jab at the enemy flank. Japs there were quick to take up the fight. Machine-gun and mortar fire denied Company K an intimate knowledge of the ground. Actually, so intense a fire fight developed that a platoon from Love Company was forced to help Company K break contact and withdraw to 3d Battalion positions.

Meanwhile, what of Companies C and F, the diversionary force? In order to reach the Japanese right flank, they were forced to cross Skyline Ridge near its southern tip and then advance northward for some 2,500 yards. Their area of operations was far removed from any other in the regimental zone of action. Captain Fox began to advance toward his forward assembly area on 10 May. Leaving the west side of The Gap at 1200, he established contact with Lieutenant Harms and Company F on Skyline Ridge at dusk.

As it was too late for further movement, the companies were satisfied to move down the reverse slope of the ridge and go into bivouac. At dawn of the 11th, they resumed their march. All day long the forces slogged northward along the base of the ridge, moving farther away from friendly troops with every step. The extreme heat slowed the advance and prostrated many of the men. Those who escaped the ravages of the blistering sun were reduced to a state of fatigue by the rugged terrain. Bands of enemy stragglers repeatedly harassed the column and pitched battles often occurred before they could be wiped out. Finally, at 1700, the two companies stumbled onto their assigned position, just below the Japanese flank. Captain Fox and Lieutenant Harms agreed to construct a single perimeter at the base of a long, sweeping spur which rose to their common objective.

Nip raiders armed with two knee mortars selected this time to commence harassing activities. From positions close to Mount Ugu they were able to observe the last thousand yards of C and F's advance. When the enemy saw the two companies halt, shed equipment and prepare to dig in, they moved down one of the draws flanking the spur and poured fire into the unprotected troops. Quickly the men dispersed along the grassy hillside. T/Sgt. Peter Zaleskas mounted his three 60mm mortars on the open ground and adjusted counter-battery fire by sound ranging. Luck was with him, and his guns silenced both Nip mortars after a five-minute duel. With this threat removed, the doughs were now free to dig in. Foxholes were excavated just a little bit deeper, machine gunners selected fields of fire with the utmost care and the mortars were meticulously emplaced so as to cover every avenue of approach to the position. Everyone expected an active evening.

Shortly after sundown the enemy hit all sides of the two-company perimeter. Knee mortars stayed back this time and blasted the position while Nip riflemen crawled forward and grenaded the outside line of emplacements. C and F, thousands of yards from any help, dared not pull back. A spirit of desperation guided their defense and the enemy failed to break through the circular pattern of fire formed by a section of 60mm mortars and four light machine guns. After two hours of relentless pressure the Japanese evidently realized that a continuation of their present tactics would cost them more men they could afford to lose. They gathered their dead, pulled back to higher ground and spent the rest of the night harassing the perimeter with machine-gun fire.

While this course of action did not increase American casualties, it did provide the Japanese with a distinct advantage. Periodic fire kept Companies C and F in a constant state of tension. Rest, desperately needed, was denied them. There would be no period of recuperation to shake off the weariness accumulated during the approach march. Also, their dawn attack would be carried out without the benefits of preliminary artillery fires. By engaging Companies C and F as soon as they arrived in the area, the Japs prevented attached FOs from laying down either protective fires or preliminary concentrations on the objective. When they were finally dispersed, it was too late for observer parties to begin registration.

At dawn of 12 May all units went into the attack. Easy and George Companies drove against the right side of the Japanese line while the 3d Battalion sliced in on the left. As no artillery or mortar barrage had announced the 2d Battalion move, the Nips were taken by surprise. Companies E and G had already fought through the difficult network of emplacements before the enemy could muster any coordinated resistance. By that time Weatherwax and Sherrard held the upper hand. The two companies smothered Nip counteractivity before it was well organized. Beaten Japanese suddenly broke and scattered. Many were shot down as they attempted to fall back to a supplementary position, but others made the safety of the nearby gullies. Battalion was notified at 1030 that its objective was occupied.

Companies C and F were creating the anticipated diversion during this phase of the battle. During the march up the spur to their objective, Charley's scouts could observe several squad-sized groups of Nips clustered around the crest of the ridge. When they saw the company commit itself to a route of advance, the enemy suddenly scattered to numerous emplacements on the ridge top and along its sides. Company C, still advancing, came to a deep cut which crossed the spur about two hundred yards short of the objective. It was decided here that Fox Company would stay in support on one side of the cut, while Company C went down into the deep draw and then up to Skyline Ridge.

As the company moved out of the cut, it deployed into an assault formation with the 2d and 3d Platoons abreast followed by the Weapons Platoon and then by the support platoon. Slowly the skirmish line walked up to the crest of the ridge. Not a shot was fired. Scouts moved to within five yards of the objective and still hit no resistance. One more step and then the enemy acted. Just as the first men were about to set foot on top of the objective, six cross-firing machine guns suddenly spat out their fires in a single tremendous burst. Mortars, a 20mm dual-purpose gun, and a barrage of grenades added to the uproar. Company C was crucified in its tracks.

The first fusillade enfiladed the assault platoons. Nine doughs fell dead and a like number were wounded. Frontal fire raked through the remnants and caught the Weapons Platoon and Company F, far back on the spur. Mortars and machine guns were knocked out as they lay cradled in the arms of gunners and assistant gunners. Harms' unit had four men killed and nine wounded before the troops even had time to hit the ground.

There was no fire support, little leadership. Artillery hadn't received an opportunity for pre-attack registrations on the objective; now the FO tried to range in, but he was unable to locate any of the smoke shells fired by his battery. Back at the cut, the fifteen men in the 1st Platoon could not be committed without some sort of support. If they advanced up the spur toward the casualties, they too would be decimated by the vicious cross-fire. Wounded riflemen went unattended. Pfc. Lawrence Rich, sole aid man with the leading elements, was killed by a grenade as he tried to drag one of the casualties to safety.

Staff Sergeant Gerald Obenauf and Lt. Melvin E. Lindgren, assault platoon leaders, were killed by machine-gun fire. Their seconds-incommand, Sgt. Lester Hansen and T/Sgt. Edward J. Szurgot, each suffered serious wounds. Only Captain Fox and Lieutenant Winston, his executive, were left to carry out command functions. P-38s circling overhead suddenly added to the confusion. One of them-mistaking the company for enemy-dropped two 500-pound bombs on the battered troops. Fortunately, the half-ton of HE landed in a gully about sixty-five yards from the company and the walls of the small ravine absorbed all of the shrapnel and most of the concussion.

Captain Fox, with the company CP near the cut, ordered Lieutenant Winston, up front, to make a withdrawal. Taking several members of the 1st Platoon, he scaled the cut and went back to Company F. Once there he tried to work Lieutenant Harms' men into positions from which they could support the move off the spur. However, as soon as the doughs raised themselves from the ground and attempted to assume supporting positions, they drew fresh outbursts of fire from the enemy. In a few seconds the volume of this fire grew so heavy that Company F was forced to back down the spur. Fox and the C Company riflemen tried to rejoin their force, but by this time the lip of the cut was completely covered by Japanese machine gunners.

Lieutenant Winston and fifteen men were left on the bare slope together with the casualties who had been unable to crawl to safety. Their mission was already accomplished; Companies C and F were never expected to actually seize ground. Only one thing remained to be done: rescue the wounded from beneath the muzzles of Nip machine guns and break contact with the enemy.

Luckily, most of the men were armed with automatic weapons. Three or four carried BARS and a similar number had submachine guns. A base of fire was set up on the ridge side. Targets were still ill-defined, so volume of fire necessarily had to substitute for accuracy.

All pieces opened up on the group leader's command. Nips in defensive positions, diagnosing the situation, responded with fire, but they could not immediately gain the superiority that had been theirs throughout the action.

As the fire fight raged, a small team of doughs backed out of the line, cut around to the side and then crawled out toward the casualties. The two- or three-man rescue team had to brave Jap guns going out and coming back. Progress was painful, but a man was dragged back on every trip. As soon as a casualty was collected, he was hauled back to the defilade afforded by the cut in the spur. Some of the walking wounded there then took the casualties and carried them to safety through a gully which led down from the cut.

This procedure went on until almost 1300 when the last of the litter cases reached the cut. Many of the rescue group themselves sustained wounds bringing in the casualties but all kept on with their task. Pfc. Howard K. Robbins was hit in the hand and stomach by machine-gun fire. Sergeant Hansen suffered a bullet wound in the side when his platoon was first ambushed, but refused to withdraw until every casualty had been evacuated. Even though he could barely walk, Sergeant Hansen personally saved the lives of at least three men.

Breaking contact with the enemy posed a problem. To simply cease fire and run for the cut invited slaughter. Moving almost imperceptibly, the men on the firing line began to inch their way to the rear. Then, one at a time, they pulled out and dashed for the cut under covering fire provided by those remaining on the line. Again a few were wounded, but these were able to proceed without assistance. Everyone got out.

Captain Fox meanwhile had radioed back for medical assistance. A Cub plane took off from Sapinet with plasma, morphine, dressings, and litters. The pilot arrived over the position just as the last casualties were coming out of the escape route. Filipino carriers had been dispatched from the 2d Battalion CP to serve as litter bearers. They reached Company C at 1330.

The diversionary force took fifty-three casualties. Company C had twelve dead and twenty-three wounded, approximately fifty-five per cent of the company's front-line strength. Harms' troops suffered four dead and a dozen wounded. Of the three-man artillery FO party, two were seriously hit. As soon as Captain Fox reported that evacuation was taking place, he was ordered to lead the two companies back to the 2d Battalion CP. Once there, Company C was sent back to San Manuel while Fox Company stayed on Skyline Ridge as battalion security.

Activity was intense on the 3d Battalion front during these developments. At 1400 on 12 May I and L were still locked in a fight along the left flank, unable to penetrate the Japanese line. Captain Nussbaum's Company K was committed from reserve at this time while Company E moved across the ridge top and hit the Nips from a second direction. Under pressure from four rifle companies, the enemy defense wilted. Major Pate reported all objectives taken at dusk.

Japanese infantrymen made their final offensive thrust that night. Fifty of them-believed to be the force that intercepted C and F Companies-moved down the ridge after dark and attacked Company G's position, the closest American installation. Fighting raged for three hours, but Weatherwax's men scattered the raiders with heavy casualties.

All elements of the regiment began extensive mopping-up operations at dawn. Assault groups took over the leading role in this phase of the fight. They traveled from one cave to another, first searing its interior with flame and then sealing the entrance with TNT charges. Riflemen covering avenues of departure liquidated scores of stragglers trying to flee northward. The ridge was cleared of enemy troops at noon, 13 May.

After three solid months of action and thirty-four days in this area, Colonel Cavenee's regiment was now free to enjoy a well earned rest in Baguio. All troops abandoned the sector on the afternoon of the 14th. Lt. Colonel Minton's 3d Battalion, 130th Infantry, moved back to the summer capital on foot, taking the same route through Tebbo which it had used when marching down from Baguio. Corps' 694th field Artillery Battalion-a worthy partner of the 136th Infantry uprooted its howitzers and rode back to I Corps headquarters at Rosales. Regimental elements mounted trucks at The Gap and took the circuitous route to the mountain city through San Manuel, Binalonan and Bauang.

Individual acts of gallantry were commonplace during the fight for the two ridges. Of the thirty-nine awards of the Distinguished Service Cross won by members of the Golden Cross in World War II, thirteen are for Skyline Ridge actions. Only three of these are posthumous awards: one to Captain Suess and the others to Lieutenant Lindgren and Pfc. Bernard F. Grimmeke of Company C. Lieutenant Lindgren's came for silencing a machine gun during the abortive diversion on 12 May, while Grimmeke received the decoration for killing nine Japs as lead scout of a small reconnaissance patrol. This action occurred on 19 April. He was killed by a sniper's bullet three days later while on another mission.

Members of the 1st Battalion earned seven of the thirteen DSCs. Company C doughs received five and the remaining two went to Company A. Lieutenant Winston, Private First Class Robbins, and Pfc. Howard E. Cooper joined Lieutenant Lindgren and Private First Class Grimmeke as recipients of the Nation's second highest award. With the exception of Grimmeke's, all actions leading to the awards occurred on 12 May during the ill-fated diversion. Cooper collaborated with Lieutenant Lindgren in wiping out a Jap Nambu-being wounded three times in the process-while Lieutenant Winston and Private First Class Robbins were credited with rescuing many of the litter cases from the edge of the Japanese strongpoint.

In Company A, Pfc. Ralph Snell and Lieutenant Schneider earned the DSC. Snell had much to do with the success of Able's climax drive along Skyline Ridge on 4 May. During the assault on Fox Company's old position, his platoon was stopped by frontal machine-gun fire. Snell wiped out two guns to allow his platoon to advance. He accounted for one with point-blank BAR fire and the other by bringing 60mm mortar fire upon it even though he had never before adjusted mortars. The thick-set Illinoisan got the second weapon after he had been painfully wounded by a rifle bullet.

Technical Sergeant Harry G. Kepford, S/Sgt. Urban J. Dykstra and Private First Class Rollins comprised Company G's representatives among the 136th Infantry DSC recipients. Kepford-awarded the Silver Star on the Kennon Road-further distinguished himself on 12 May during the 2d Battalion attack on the Mount Ugu ridge. When his platoon was temporarily halted by fire from a well emplaced enemy strongpoint, Kepford walked out ahead of his scouts and personally killed ten Japanese. He also destroyed one machine gun. With this barrier removed, his company was able to advance and quickly seize its objective.

Dykstra, a machine-gun section leader, was cited for heroism on 11 April during George Company's drive to reach marooned Company F. When Dykstra saw one of his gunners hit by mortar fragments during the height of the attack, he raced across a strip of heavily shelled terrain toward the idle piece. The sergeant was wounded twice en route, once in the arm and again in the leg. Despite his serious wounds, Dykstra restored the weapon to operation, pouring fire against the enemy until he collapsed from loss of blood.

Two awards of the Distinguished Service Cross went to Easy Company men. Sgt. Herbert Clayton, company communications sergeant, earned his while on a combat patrol on 10 May. In the course of the patrol, Clayton's group was ambushed by a Nip machine gun firing at close range. Clayton rushed past the riflemen and charged the fastfiring gun, killing its crew with a single grenade. He then manned the weapon, using it to mow down a squad of Japanese preparing to attack his patrol's exposed flank.

A rifle squad leader, Sgt. Julius B. Olson, received the Distinguished Service Cross for wiping out an enemy installation during Company E's 12 May attack. His action came at a critical time. Easy troops, forming the point of the advance, were stopped cold by a seven-man strongpoint built on a knob in front of the battalion objective. After several men had been hit attempting to neutralize this enemy group, Olson moved up on the small hill and killed all seven of the enemy with rifle fire and grenades.

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