Division recognized the 123d's facile envelopment of Hills X and Y and its subsequent seizure of Pugo as a stroke of rare good fortune. Now the Golden Cross was in possession of its first launching point, a base of operations capable of supporting an overland strike toward Baguio. The other infantry regiments were currently engaged in developing similar approaches but thus far their efforts had not yet crystallized. Of course sustained advance for the 136th Infantry was out of the question. Kennon Road was Northern Luzon's prime blind alley. Off to the west the 130th Infantry had just moved out on its sweeping end run. Forward companies were now at Aringay, girding for a move on Bauang.

Tiny Pugo abounded with strategic significance. If an infantry salient could be pushed three thousand yards northeast, medium artillery would be able to close in and bring 155mm howitzer fire upon enemy installations in Baguio. Light artillery could share in the mission if and when the wedge progressed an additional three thousand yards. General Clarkson notified I Corps of his desire to fully exploit this opening. He meant to advance across country from Pugo to Tuba and thence to Baguio in a major effort.

Corps issued its approval. At the same time General Swift expressed grave doubt that a 33d Division drive along the Pugo-Tuba route could bear fruit. He cited such factors as the tangled masses of rnountains confronting the 123d Infantry, the failure to locate the mythical Old Spanish Trail and the extreme difficulty incident to supporting and supplying a column committed over this section of the Caraballos.

Nevertheless, General Clarkson took immediate steps to implement his decision. Orders came down to the 123d instructing it to quit Pugo and head for Tuba without delay. If a supply route to spearhead elements could not be found, the Division would build one of its own.

Preliminary reconnaissance definitely scotched the legend of the Old Spanish Trail. Lieutenant Garrity's I & R Platoon, patrolling deep into enemy territory, reported only a narrow footpath running four Pugo to the edge of the mountain range. Once it entered the hills, the trail gradually grew less distinct and finally petered out completely. Division welcomed this information. It meant that nothing would be left to chance; combat units would be spared a wild goose chase. As a result, the 108th Engineer Combat Battalion was alerted to leave Pugo in support of the 123d Infantry. Its mission: to construct a road from Pugo supply distributing points to the forward companies. Extension of the road was to keep pace with advances of the column.

Lieutenant Colonel Hilton's 2d Battalion touched off the drive on 9 March. Shortly after dawn his force left Pugo in a column of companies, with Fox, Easy and George moving in that order. Company B of the Engineers was scheduled to pull out on its road-building job the next morning. Colonel Serff kept his 1st Battalion at Pugo in regimental reserve and employed the 3d Battalion in a mop-up of the low foothills surrounding Pugo. Little opposition was met during the first day's march through the sweltering Caraballos. A few snipers potshot at the long column but caused no casualties. Counterfire from Capt. James F. Gilreath's F Company accounted for ten Nips. At dusk, as the battalion dug in for the night, it was more than two miles past Pugo.

George Company, commanded by Capt. Otis B. Rowland, Jr., assumed point duties on 10 March when the battalion resumed its advance. Enemy action was again confined to occasional trailblocks and raiding parties. But as the battalion pushed its way deeper into the mountains the terrain grew progressively more rugged, causing a general slow-down of movement. Contact between units became a difficult proposition. Heat and hills combined to inflict several march casualties. That evening as the battalion went into perimeter, infantrymen could see engineer bulldozers hacking their way across the tree-covered slopes behind them.

On 11 March the tactical situation developed with startling clarity. Disorganized snipers and small raiding parties became a thing of the past. In mid-morning the battalion hit a well organized outpost line emplaced along the ridges facing it. In order to break through, Lieutenant Colonel Hilton was forced to go into the attack with heavy mortars and artillery furnishing fire support. Even after several key points in this enemy line were neutralized the battalion could not work up to its former rate of advance. Companies had to move over a series of exposed razorback ridges in preference to the heavily wooded gullies fifteen hundred feet below. Japanese were holed up on each razorback, making the 2d Battalion fight hard for every inch of ground. Pugo was now almost three miles to the southwest.

Infantrymen did not have to be particularly astute to sense that each succeeding day would bring tougher campaigning and steeper mountains. When the battalion halted in late afternoon for a reorganization rifle companies got their first unimpeded view of objective No. 1.

Looming two miles to the battalion's front was a 3,000-foot-high mountain, so steep and bulky that it made surrounding terrain appear puny by comparison. Unlike others in the range, Hill 3000-so labeled because of its height-did not taper to a semi-pointed crest. Rather it was wide and gently sloping, giving the hill the look of a gigantic wart. Several long, tree-covered spurs rolled sharply down its sides. One, considerably longer than the others, lay directly in the battalion's path. It was admirably sited for defensive purposes, being able to serve as a buffer for the heart of the Japanese strongpoint atop the mountain. Terrain to east and west held no promise whatever.

To the right, or east, was a forbidding skein of mountains so sheer and festooned with tropical growth that they defied passage. Patrols operating on the flank of the column could not work through them. Looking past these approximately five miles, infantrymen sighted Mt. Santo Tomas, the highest peak in Northern Luzon. Standing more than 8,000 feet in height, Santo Tomas afforded the Japs excellent observation of both Pugo-Tuba and Kennon Road activities. On the opposite side the ground was equally impassable. Temporarily at least, maneuver became a meaningless word. There was only one way to Tuba. It led across Hill 3000.

At a conference of battalion staff members and company commanders held that evening Lieutenant Colonel Hilton outlined a plan of extensive combat patrolling, to remain in effect until the force had uncovered a weak spot on Hill 3000 or fought up to a foothold. Whenever possible the enemy was to be kept off balance through constant jabbing and probing of patrols. Operations were to commence the next morning, 12 March.

Unfortunately, these plans were never given an opportunity to jell. Word arrived at the battalion CP at dawn ordering Lieutenant Colonel Hilton to forego offensive activity until further instructions were issued. In a sudden move, Sixth Army Headquarters had halted advances of the entire I Corps. Enemy resistance in the mountainous areas around Manila had remained stout in the face of heavy Army pressure. General Krueger desired to crush this opposition before committing his forces too deeply in Northern Luzon. A secure Manila was vital to high-level planners. It was desperately needed as a supply base for future operations against the Japanese homeland. For this reason and his inability to reinforce the 33d if it became engaged in a major battle-General Krueger turned on the red light.

Sixth Army held the battalion in check until 26 March. However, Lieutenant Colonel Hilton did not waste a moment of this period. Small, fast reconnaissance patrols made entry into enemy positions and compiled data which later proved invaluable to the 123d's drive. Engineer road-builders caught up to the 2d Battalion. Howitzers of the 122d Field Artillery displaced to positions directly in rear of the infantry, prepared to bring fires on Hill 3000. Aerial reconnaissance by commanders became a daily occurrence, enabling them to look beyond their immediate objective.

Due to local circumstances, Division did not abide completely by Army's edict, for which General Clarkson assumed full responsibility. Toward the latter part of the idle period he permitted regimental commanders to exercise their own discretion in the matter of forward movement. Hilton's battalion was able to inch forward to more favorable terrain in the Hill 3000 area. The General's decision permitted Golden Cross troops in all sectors to keep up some offensive activity. As a consequence the enemy was unable to mass strength in front of the 33d's near-blunted spearheads, thereby saving American lives in future operation.

Front-line companies saw steady action now that the battalion was nearing Hill 3000. Night raids became a steady diet for Hilton's men. Reconnaissance patrols going out during daylight hours found increased interference. These evident preparations for a 2d Battalion attack annoyed the Japanese. Enemy outposts were greatly strengthened, ambushes became more commonplace.

This counter-activity was cunningly executed. On one occasion, while the battalion was engaged in consolidating its positions, the Nips almost snared a George Company platoon. Only extraordinary heroism on the part of the platoon's lead scout, Pfc. John P. Hegarty, prevented serious damage. Hegarty's citation for the Distinguished Service Cross, awarded posthumously, tells the story:

Private Hegarty, a first scout, Company G, 123d Infantry, was moving with his platoon through enemy territory to reinforce another unit when he alertly discovered two enemy riflemen in a foxhole just off the trail. He killed them both. Although the presence of these two men indicated that a larger force was probably near, he fearlessly moved forward and soon drew heavy fire from enemy riflemen and machine gunners. However, he charged toward one of the machine guns in a gallant effort to knock it out. Firing as he advanced, Private Hegarty continued on in face of the heavy hostile concentration until another machine gun suddenly opened up, wounding him in the chest and stomach. Mortally hit and gasping for breath, he continued to fire, killing two more of the enemy and neutralizing their position. Private Hegarty's initiative and determination in the face of great odds aided materially in the successful completion of the platoon's mission. His dauntless fighting spirit was an inspiration to all those with whom he served.

II

Army gave the Division its head on 26 March. Orders to advance along all fronts immediately went down to the infantry regiments. In anticipation of the Army directive, Colonel Serff had been gradually increasing air strikes and artillery preparations on objectives confronting his 2d Battalion. Since 22 March Hill 3000 had taken a daily saturation of Napalm and high explosives. The mountain was somewhat weird in appearance now; flaming gasoline had burned long dark patches along its crest and 122d Field Artillery fire had obliterated numerous trees. However, patrols returning to the CP on the night of the 26th had little encouraging information. Enemy defenses were as powerful as before. Estimates of Japanese strength on the hill ran between one and two reinforced battalions.

Relatively rested, George Company was instructed to go into the attack on 27 March. Captain Rowland's troops had as their objective a small peak approximately eight hundred yards to their front. Lying in a wide horseshoe formed by 3000's longest spur and a shorter one to the west, this hill was of strategic import. Possession of it by his battalion meant that Hilton could bypass the Jap buffer position on the long spur and follow up with direct assault on the mountain. Surprisingly, Company G found little opposition throughout its approach march and subsequent assault. Captain Rowland had two men wounded in seizing his objective while five Nips were killed.

Once positions on top of this hill were established, artillery forward observers called for heavy defensive fires to forestall counterattack. In addition to perimeter fires, artillery and heavy mortars pounded known strongpoints on the two flanking spurs. Lieutenant Colonel Hilton refused to wait another day before reinforcing his gauze-thin salient. Anxious to maintain the initiative, the 44-year-old Chicagoan sent Company E forward to drive the wedge deeper into the enemy line. Ellingsworth's unit passed through G Company at midnight and, advancing without preparatory fires, pushed on two thousand yards to secure a low ridge at the base of 3000.

Easy Company walked on to its objective without firing a shot. Between 0400 and dawn the company feverishly labored to dig in, emplace its crew-served weapons and prepare to repel counterattacking Japanese. With the arrival of daylight, the enemy reacted violently. For the greater part of the day they directed heavy machine-gun and mortar fires at the company, punctuating this activity with frequent attacks. Only the accuracy of friendly artillery and mortars permitted Ellingsworth to retain his grip on the ridge.

No advances were registered on 29 March. Artillery fires and a morning-long air strike continued the pounding of key installations on the crest and slopes of Hill 3000.

On the 30th the 2d Battalion undertook a rapid extension of its holdings. Fox Company assumed the lead, driving from the battalion CP to a position more than halfway up the western spur. Combat patrols launched from this area managed to close in on Hill 3000 until they were scarcely a thousand feet below the crest and less than a half-mile from the mountain itself. Again the enemy refused to commit themselves in strength, choosing to counter Fox's infiltration with the same suicide raids conducted against Easy on the 28th. Artillery rendered these efforts no more successful.

This succession of swift thrusts, made at times and places where the Japanese least expected them, placed the 2d Battalion in excellent position for the climax attack. However, as was expected, the Japanese snapped out of their lethargy at this juncture. All-out attacks by Fox and George Companies were repulsed on the morning of 31 March with moderate casualties. Now, if enemy tactics forced Lieutenant Colonel Hilton to adopt a frontal slugging technique, the fight was liable to settle down into a long and costly one. A daring, radical solution was in critical demand.

Colonel Serff, a constant front-line habitué since Sixth Army freed the 123d Infantry, supplied a decisive answer. Always an advocate of aggressiveness, the affable West Pointer ordered the 2d Battalion to make a night attack on Hill 3000. The regimental commander counted wholly on the element of surprise to reduce the strongly defended bastion. If the attack attained success, elements of the 123d would experience little difficulty in mopping up the draws, spurs and assorted strongpoints below the crest. Major Wolff's 3d Battalion was alerted to support Hilton's move. In regimental reserve, his force was currently advancing behind the 2d, nailing down the 123d's flanks.

Artillery redoubled its harassing fires on the afternoon of 31 March. Cannon Company M-7s, able to move along the engineer-built road, augmented the fires of Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's 122d Field Artillery. Several machine guns emplaced in caves on top of 3000 were taken under direct fire by the self-propelled guns. Liaison pilots reported that Capt. Stanley J. Patterson's cannoneers had destroyed seven of them.

Fires slackened with the arrival of darkness but flared up again at 2400 when Companies F and G-the attacking force-went into their approach marches. Advancing behind a rolling barrage, Fox drove northward toward the crest from its position near the left spur. Company G, assembled in the center of the horseshoe, branched off to the northeast, mounting the right spur a few yards below the point where it became welded to the mountain. Moving by stealth, the two companies were severely buffeted by the thick vegetation and precipitous terrain, but succeeded in escaping enemy detection. A few minutes prior to dawn both Gilreath and Rowland were on top of Hill 3000. Scarcely two hundred yards separated their forces.

Quickly they deployed into skirmish lines and poured into the Japanese stronghold. Thoroughly aroused at this point, the enemy waged a fierce fight, engaging F and G with all the fire power at their command. However, this was not enough to compensate for the advantage gained by the 2d Battalion's bold maneuver. Slowly but relentlessly, 123d infantrymen collapsed the enemy defense. Close combat continued without abatement until late afternoon when the heart of the Nip line was pierced. Unable to fend off F and G's final assault, the Japs gathered what casualties they could and retreated to the north.

Impending darkness prevented anything more than a cursory mop-up. The 2d Battalion, now reinforced by its support company, consolidated its position on Hill 3000. At dusk, Japanese mortars on the reverse slope of the mountain opened up on the unit. Catching some men in the act of digging in, this shelling accounted for a few casualties. Lt. Lorne R. Stanley, artillery forward observer with Company G, immediately sought to silence this damaging fire. With a wireman he moved two hundred yards in front of the perimeter in search of a point from which he could make fire adjustments. As Lieutenant Stanley was connecting his telephone, a Nambu machine gun cut loose, tearing the set from his hand and forcing him to withdraw.

Japanese activity was accelerated on 2 April after the usual night of harassing attacks. With daylight, the enemy began an unceasing barrage of heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. Stanley again voluntarily left the perimeter to locate the source. This time he managed to gain communication with the 122d's fire direction center. In the midst of an adjustment, two snipers working in from his flanks began to shoot at him. Hit by the first bullet, Stanley responded with his carbine, killing one Jap and chasing his comrade. While George Company, behind him, prepared to move out in the attack, Stanley brought his entire battalion on the Nip strongpoint containing the machine guns and mortars.

Now Rowland's men took over. Storming the knob, George Company quickly disposed of twenty-seven Japs. On the ground they found thirty-one more killed by artillery fragments. Three knee mortars and four light machine guns likewise had felt the impact of the howitzers. Lieutenant Stanley was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism and determination.

Hill 3000 was completely mopped up by 1600 of 2 April. Enemy dug in on the spurs put up bitter resistance but could not stop 2d Battalion riflemen who swarmed down upon them. In the final analysis more than two hundred enemy died defending the mountain at a cost of seven killed and fifteen wounded to the 2d Battalion. A prisoner taken a few days later stated that of two rifle companies and one machine-gun company holding Hill 3000 less than ten men survived.

Among the documents removed from the bodies of dead Nips was one written on 1 April by an irate company commander. Reflecting his complete disgust at being out-maneuvered, it read:

It is determined that the enemy infiltrated into our positions with a lightning attack. Tell me, what made it possible for this enemy to thrust a dagger into us? No, you need not explain. You and other platoon leaders and men are a bunch of cowards-shuddering at the sound of enemy artillery fire and aerial bombardment. Furthermore, you men are sleeping. Be alert! However, if you men counterattack the enemy with lightning ferocity, the enemy will be completely wiped out. Remember your responsibilities! The regimental and battalion commanders are much concerned about this present situation. Do not rely on the other companies to do your part. You damned fools!

Combat success on Hill 3000 resulted from the close coordination of infantry, field artillery and engineers. The low doughboy casualty rate attests to the effectiveness of Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's redlegs. Luckily, the Japanese did not employ their own mountain pieces against the 2d Battalion, using them instead on the hapless 1st Battalion which was engaged in a bloody fight to break through Galiano. Members of this unit were receiving an average of almost a hundred rounds daily. Due to engineer perseverance, the supply tie-up anticipated by Corps never materialized. Sweating and battling their way forward in the infantry's wake, Lieutenant Colonel Kane's road-builders kept a steady flow of materiel streaming to the front line.

III

Hilton's unit was withdrawn for a rest on the afternoon of 2 April, the 3d Battalion assuming its position on Hill 3000. At the same time, Company B, 108th Engineer Combat Battalion-which had constructed the road out of Pugo-reverted to 130th Infantry control. Able Company, normally attached to the 123d, relieved it at the foot of Hill 3000. Major Wolff, commanding the 3d Battalion, dispatched combat and reconnaissance patrols toward the regiment's next objective, Mt. Calugong. Located two miles north of 3000, Calugong differed only in the respect that it was a thousand feet higher. It had the steep slopes, broad crest and heavily indented defiles characteristic of Hill 3000. From documents captured on 1 April, Wolff knew that the mountain was manned by elements of the Japanese 64th Infantry Regiment reinforced with several artillery batteries.

While patrols searched the approaches to Calugong, the engineers pushed their road directly up the sheer southern slope of Hill 3000. With a route in, two batteries of the 122d were able to displace forward to positions on the mountain top. M-7s also rumbled into place on the crest, prepared to bring direct howitzer fire against Mt. Calugong.

Company K, commanded by Capt. Raymond J. Rush, led the 3d Battalion column as it struck northward toward Calugong on 10 April. Little activity transpired during the first day of march; the hills were crowded with snipers but the company was able to make good time. By sunset King was at the base of a series of twisting razorback ridges leading to Calugong. To supply this company it became necessary to employ Igorot women as rations and ammunition carriers. Materiel could advance by vehicle only as far as Hill 3000 where the engineer road had its temporary terminus. Once delivered at the truckhead, supplies had to be hand-carried to rifle companies. Throughout the Calugong operation, these women performed valiant service. Ambushes, snipers and trailblocks failed to stop them. At the first sign of enemy activity, Igorot men, moving with lighter loads, dropped their burdens and headed for cover. The women serenely advanced, confident that their armed guards would see them through safely.

After an uneventful night, Captain Rush led K Company forward in an attack along the ridgeline. When halfway up, he ran into a carefully organized enemy strongpoint emplaced across the ridge. Patrols advancing ahead of the column were stopped cold. As the company followed in an assault formation it too was halted by this literal wall of steel. Two machine guns on the right side of the ridge formed the nucleus of the Japanese installation. Concealed in high grass, these Nambus had clear, enfilading fire lanes. Artillery and heavy mortars supported the Nip defenses.

Rather than withdraw, Rush elected to dig in under this heavy fire. Friendly artillery tried to reach the two key machine guns but failed due to the close proximity of the weapons to King troops. Again on 12 April the company attacked and again overwhelming fire superiority forced it back. Company K went into its old perimeter for the night and prepared to assault for the third time at dawn.

As the force prepared to move out on the 13th, the first scout of the lead platoon, Pfc. Vernon H. Fairchild, volunteered to advance alone and determine the precise location of the two key machine guns. Purposely exposing himself to draw fire, Fairchild evaded the opening bursts and circled along the ridgeside toward the right gun. When five yards from it he cut loose with point-blank submachine-gun fire, disposing of three Japs operating the piece. He then rushed the second gun fifteen yards away and killed its two gunners and a rifleman in an adjacent foxhole. Calling to his platoon to follow, Fairchild resumed his spectacular assault. During the close combat that followed he was shot through the head by an enemy rifleman. Although he lost an eye, Fairchild recovered from his wound. He received the DSC for his courageous assault. King Company secured the position.

Action in other parts of the battalion sector closely paralleled Company K's. Item, under Capt. Courtney R. Shirley, and Love fought their way over similar terrain against the same fanatical opposition. Calugong developed into a far bloodier battle than the one for Hill 1000. Jap artillery, mercilessly hammering the companies as they hacked their way over the gnarled razorbacks, caused numerous casualties. Counterbattery fire was placed against all suspected gun locations but to no avail. This fight was a complete battalion effort. Every unit was in the line, wholly involved in its own miniature war. On 17 April Companies K and L collaborated in a battalion attack which gained a grip on Calugong for the 123d Infantry. This engagement was described in the following article published in the Infantry Journal. It was written by Colonel McAnsh, Division Chief of Staff, who witnessed the action

Calugong was merely a shell of its former self after this one crippling attack. Again on 19 April King and Love effected a joint assault. Launched behind an intense barrage provided by the 122d, this one carried the battalion to the crest of the mountain. In the ensuing mop-up more than a full-strength enemy company was annihilated. Wolff immediately pivoted on Calugong and sent Company L driving eastward. Captain Crenshaw's troops were ordered to seize Hill Charley, a 3,500-foot-high escarpment roughly a mile away. Crenshaw was able to close on his objective rapidly as the enemy offered no resistance. Dusk found Love Company halfway up the side of Hill Charley. Here it paused for the night.

With dawn, Company L resumed its climb. Surprisingly, it was able to walk right to the crest of Hill Charley without interference. However, this lack of opposition was part of a clever Japanese trap. While the company was digging in, enemy artillery which had previously adjusted on the mountain, laid an accurate, murderous concentration on Crenshaw and his men. Nip howitzers raked every square foot of the barren crest, quickly killing four infantrymen and wounding another twenty-two. Withdrawal was Love's sole alternative. Counterbattery fire silenced Jap guns sufficiently to permit Crenshaw to back off Hill Charley and pull back to Calugong where he contacted the rest of the 3d Battalion.

The combat-weary 3d Battalion was withdrawn from Calugong on the morning of 21 April to rest up for the climax attack on Baguio. Lieutenant Colonel Hilton's 2d Battalion came forward from Pugo and relieved Major Wolff's unit on position. After a day of familiarization with the terrain, reinforced patrols from Easy and George Companies pushed for Hill Charley on a reconnaissance in force. Easy followed the same route taken by Crenshaw on the 19th and 20th, but the Company G unit, commanded by Lt. Sidney Werlin, beat its way across-country and prepared to ascend the southern slope of Charley in conjunction with the Easy effort. At the conclusion of the operation, Captain Rowland, Company G commander, submitted a narrative report. Part of it is quoted below:

Company G contacted an enemy outpost on the east slopes of Calugong and wiped it out. The march across the valley separating Calugong and Hill Charley was made without event. This time the crest of the objective was not unoccupied. Enemy riflemen, mortars and machine guns were deployed in strength along the top, giving the hill all-around protection. Easy, hitting the western side, neutralized opposition along that flank before Werlin's men reached the peak. Both then went into coordinated attack which smashed resistance on the crest. The enemy was forced to retreat to alternate positions on the northern slope. Although E and G were in complete control of the mountain top, they could not clear the northern side. Lieutenant Werlin had his men dig in to await crew-served weapons coming up with the remainder of Company G. I came up with other platoons an hour before dark.

Two-man prone holes were constructed and reinforced with six-inch logs cut from a nearby patch of woods. As daylight faded away, the Japs brought down their artillery. No casualties occurred but all company communications were completely knocked out. Once the moon set at 0400 the Nips tried their usual infiltration tactics. They were beaten off with artillery and 60mm mortar fire. Lt. Donald Regelman's 2d Platoon left the perimeter at dawn to overrun remaining enemy positions. Losses sustained during the night had weakened the enemy considerably and Regelman was able to mop-up without too much trouble.

Orders were sent from battalion headquarters directing E and G to move off Hill Charley toward Machine Gun Hill, a mountain of similar appearance About .a half-mile north of us. Easy passed through George, promptly crossed the deep gully separating Machine Gun and Charley and went into the attack. They were beaten back and G went forward to lend assistance. After lengthy artillery and M-7 concentrations were thrown against the objective, the two company force again assaulted but with no more success. Company G withdrew to Charley for the night while Company E went into perimeter between Hill Charley and Mt. Calugong.

The enemy installation was kept under intermittent harassing fire throughout the night, and shortly after daylight Company H heavy machine guns were brought up to cover another attack against Machine Gun Hill. George Company tried to cut around the objective and take it from the rear but precipitous slopes scotched the plan. Finally one platoon from Company E advanced frontally against the target and formed a base of fire while Werlin and Regelman knifed in from its flanks. Supporting fire paralyzed the Nips and we were able to make this one good. By 1200 Machine Gun Hill was ours. We dug in here for the night.

IV

Fox Company was not committed in the latest advance toward Tuba but experienced equally bloody action while the rest of the 2d Battalion fought over Charley and Machine Gun Hills. Gilreath was sent northwest from Calugong to Mt. Lomboy, a map distance of three miles. He had orders to eliminate a Japanese garrison dug in along a high ridge overlooking the Galiano Valley. From this position the enemy had been constantly harassing the 130th Infantry supply line running through the valley to Asin. General Clarkson had personally ordered t his move, recognizing a Calugong-Lomboy drive as an excellent opportunity to assist the 130th's effort. The Division Commander had a clear view of the intervening terrain from his Calugong observation post. Company F left on this mission on the morning of 22 April.

Gilreath had little trouble locating a route which led to the eastern base of Mt. Lomboy. He reached the foot of the mountain a few minutes after 1200. However, the rapid advance across the wild country had reduced his command to a state of near-exhaustion. The day had been oppressively hot and the water supply had given out during the tortuous trek. Re-supply was impossible since the merciless rays of the sun had dried up the creeks and streams flowing through the mountains. Enemy reserves, halfway up Lomboy, chose this time to open up on the company. Before Fox could neutralize this fire and disengage, it had taken several casualties. Colonel Serff radioed Gilreath advising him to switch his attack to a second tree-covered bastion 1,500 yards north of Lomboy.

Without pausing for rest the company veered off to its new objective. A thousand yards from it the 1st Platoon, under T/Sgt. Clarence Davis, contacted the first of several small delaying forces. Overrunning these, Fox Company, now thoroughly drained of strength, mounted the ridge and stumbled toward the crest. Three times Gilreath's men were stopped but on each occasion they managed to summon enough spark to push aside the enemy. Gathering itself for a single mighty surge, the company made its first assault successful: their poor physical condition would have precluded a second one. The hill was taken after a brief grenade duel. Parched and tired, the half-numb infantrymen dug in on the ridge top.

That night at 2200 the enemy launched a vicious counterattack against the north side of the perimeter. Light machine guns and 60mm mortars repulsed this drive but the Japanese returned in full fury a few minutes later. Charging past automatic weapons the Nips broke through the north side of the position, killing or wounding every man in that area. Troops rushed from other sections of the perimeter to plug this gaping hole. For three hours the battle waged back and forth, almost all of the fighting with bayonets, trench knives and grenades. Slowly Company F regained control of the situation, killing most of the invaders and forcing the rest to flee. Other assaults followed but were beaten back before they reached the perimeter. In the morning the gaunt riflemen arose from their foxholes and continued the mop-up of the area.

Meanwhile, the fight was all but finished along the Pugo-Tuba trail. Stripped of Hill 3000, Mt. Calugong, Hill Charley and now Machine Gun Hill, the Japanese defense split at the sides like a saw-dust-filled dummy. Infantry assault had smashed the enemy's holding units. Artillery and air strikes had crushed his reserves and rear area installations. As E and G Companies left Machine Gun bound for Hill 4980, two miles southeast, they saw the terrific effects of prolonged artillery and air bombardment. Scores of Nip dead littered both sides of the trail. Draws and gullies serving as assembly areas were piled high with shell-torn bodies.

Only a few snipers shot at the 2d Battalion as it mounted the slopes of 4980. From the crest, which was secured unopposed, George Company spotted an old logging trail which led right to Tuba. Battalion told Rowland to follow it when notified of this discovery. Tuba was reached at 1700 on 25 April.

The "high road" was now behind the 123d Infantry. Two miles to the northeast, ready for the taking, lay Baguio.

V

At 1200 on the following day the commanding officer of Company G received this message from Colonel Serff:

Employ Company G (reinforced) for reconnaissance in force to Mt. Santo T6mas and to commanding ground adjacent to Baguio-Santo Tdmas road. This force will occupy Mt. Santo T6mas in the event of nil or light resistance. If enemy is in strength this force will contain it and report strength and location.

Captain Rowland's after-action report gave this account of the operation:

Company G numbered eighty-eight officers and men at this time. Rations had completely dwindled and it was necessary for the 3d Battalion-which closed on Tuba the previous night-to give us a one-day supply of food. The company was reinforced for this reconnaissance with a platoon from Company E, commanded by T/Sgt. (later 2d Lt.) Charles E. Gaines. We moved out at 1400 hours and proceeded to the junction of the Tuba Road and Baguio-Mt. Santo T6mas road without drawing fire. Here we split up and combed the ridges on both sides of the road. On one ridgeline an abandoned 90mm gun was captured with ammunition and instruments undamaged.

As the force neared a sprawling valley running perpendicular to the road, lead scout Charles LaVoie spotted five Nips ambling down the road in single file. The enemy noticed the company at the same time and LaVoie was forced to open fire. This alerted the Japs manning two hills to our right front-each one flanking an old house just off the road. T/Sgt. Eugene C. Lobodzinski's 1st Platoon went forward to investigate the closest hill and Lieutenant Werlin's men headed for the hill behind the house. Before either mission was completed machine-gun and mortar fire was received from the two terrain features. We silenced their machine guns but it was too late in the day to attempt to take the positions. Company G pulled back out of range and prepared positions for the night.

George Company spent the following day patrolling the two strong points. Rations were now exhausted and water was not available. Requested battalion to furnish both and two tanks or M-7s for close support before we proceeded on the mission. Water and rations came up just before dark. On 28 April at 0800 two light tanks and two M-7s, commanded by Lt. Stanley J. Balfrey, reached our perimeter.

Lieutenant Regelman's 2d Platoon, with the LMG section attached, advanced on the closest hill at 0800 on 29 April. Its mission was to secure this piece of ground so that the remainder of the force could safely proceed along the road toward the peak of Santo Tomas. When Regelman radioed that he was in position to attack, the main body, accompanied by one M-7 and the two tanks, pushed across the exposed valley. The 2d Platoon quickly established a foothold on its objective. While it had the enemy engaged, the 3d Platoon cut off the road and mounted the second hill. One tank was able to advance and it blasted several caves and gun positions with point-blank 37mm fire.

Action lasted from 0900 to 1300. More than seventy-five Japs were annihilated on the two hills and in the valley. Company G sustained three dead and eleven wounded.

A company of Philippine Army troops joined the force on the 29th. Employing it to protect our flanks, we continued the march along the rough mountain road. Tanks were halted by the terrain and it became necessary to leave them behind. At an elevation of 6,200 feet-a small plateau a few hundred yards from the summit-we paused to reorganize. A decision was made to use this area as a base of operations. The 1st Platoon went out ahead to search out the Rest House on the very top of Mt. Santo Tomas. At the same time, the 2d Platoon followed a narrow road westward to Cubayo, a small barrio on the mountainside. Both groups had little difficulty in reaching their objectives. The only Japs encountered were stragglers who foraged for food in groups of two and three. After disposing of these enemy troops, the two platoons rejoined the company.

George immediately began its march to Baguio, meeting the rest of the 2d Battalion on Kennon Road west of the city.