In every combat operation undertaken by the 33d Division as a whole or by any part of it, plans were based primarily on the use of its infantry; other Golden Cross arms and services supporting. There can be no question that these elements played a vital part in the New Guinea, Morotai and Northern Luzon combat successes. While it is conceivable that in some minor operations the infantry was not dependent upon supporting units, in most instances there would' have been little chance of victory without the employment of all Division facilities.

108TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION

When the late Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell visited the Division in June 1945 during the mop-up along the Mountain Trail, he carefully surveyed the rugged, mountainous terrain marking the approaches to Tabio. Turning to General Clarkson, the then Army Ground Forces chief remarked that the steep hill masses constituted ground "worse than Burma." To the infantrymen up front who had viewed greater and lesser forms of the Northern Luzon scene since mid-February, the grizzled veteran of the China-Burma-India Theater was guilty of a gross understatement. He amended General Stilwell's remark to read "worse than anywhere."

Because of the enormous barriers created by the wild Caraballos, supplying forward units with necessities of war became the Division's paramount logistical problem. Discounting the ever-present need for ammunition, the infantryman still required a thousand and one other items to help him strip the enemy from his mountain retreat. Moving these tools of combat up to the spearheads was a war in itself. Road. building turned out to be the major campaign.

It took every vestige of fortitude, privation and self-sacrifice in the 108th Engineer Combat Battalion to force open lines of supply to the Infantry. Starting at Question Mark Hill where the engineers built a supply road rising eight hundred feet in a distance of two miles, their support contributed much to the outcome of the battle for Baguio. In the Question Mark fight Lt. Colonel Kane's troops did more than construct roads. Engineer parties hand-carried water to front-line infantrymen during the heat of battle and evacuated casualties under Japanese fire.

Later in the campaign when the drive toward the summer capital was first beginning to gain momentum, Golden Cross engineers, with a party of infantry, opened the key to the Agoo-Tubao road, permitting two battalions of the 123d Infantry to pour through and envelop Hill X. On this mission they rebuilt and replaced several demolished bridges, fighting their way from one structure to the next. On occasion this detachment actually operated in front of the infantrymen, particularly a mine-sweeping team which probed the shoulders of the road. While this team worked forward, Jap machine gunners and mortarmen harassed it from positions on the steep ridges overlooking the pass.

Next came the spectacular end run by the 130th Infantry. Again engineer support proved a vital factor in this successful operation. Baker Company engineers, grouped with a reconnaissance detachment out of battalion headquarters, pulled off one of the greatest coups of the Luzon campaign during the height of the flanking drive. While Colonel Collins' men swarmed into Bauang from the left side, the engineers advanced across the key Bauang bridge, disarming demolitions which could have reduced the structure to wreckage. Seizure of this bridge intact was a significant development in the fight for Baguio. It prevented a hitch in the 130th's supply line and enabled the regiment to race on to Naguilian before higher headquarters flagged it down.

When the 123d was sent through the mountains from Pugo to Baguio as one prong of the attack on the city, the engineers literally built the path over which the infantry travelled. Corps called the advance northeast from Pugo "impossible" due to the wild country, but the 108th Engineers put in a supply road over eight miles of this tortuous terrain. In some places the road rose as high as 4,400 feet above sea level. After the Japanese surrender, a member of Yamashita's staff called the Pugo-Baguio thrust the turning point of the Northern Luzon fight. He claimed that the erstwhile "Tiger of Malaya" never expected an attack along such a line, assuming that difficulties of supply would force even the most courageous units to turn back.

Engineers set examples of heroism which favorably compared with those of the infantry. Throughout the Philippine fighting they cleared fourteen major minefields, disposing of 234 individual mines. One of the largest of these was located on Kennon Road, just north of Camp Three. Riflemen from the 136th were all but stopped here until members of Charley Company, 108th Engineers, commanded by Capt. Frederick J. Lund, walked out ahead and disarmed the mines. In the course of this activity Lund's troops were heavily shelled by enemy artillery firing at close range.

Other engineer accomplishments include the installation of eleven airstrips for artillery liaison planes; construction of 57.9 miles of mountain roadway; maintenance of 165 miles of roads in Division hands at the time it was relieved from combat; construction and maintenance of twenty-two water points which yielded almost four million gallons for Division consumption; construction of twenty-five bridges, five of which were the Bailey type; repair of fifteen additional bridges, and the construction of thirty-five bypasses.

For its superb performance of duty in Northern Luzon the 108th Engineer Combat Battalion was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation by the War Department.

DIVISION ARTILLERY

"Your artillery follows us like flies. We can run, we can dig, we can hide, we can answer with the fires of our own guns but still your shells fall upon us like the rain. From the beginning we knew that we could never match the American artillery in meting out destruction." This amazing statement-amazing because until the last days of the battle for Baguio the enemy kept his field pieces on high ground and never lacked for compensating targets-was made by a Japanese prisoner taken at Asin.

At one time or another every infantryman in the 33d Division had given heartfelt thanks for the presence of Golden Cross 105s and 155s. But as a tribute, this simple statement tops the countless laudatory phrases and letters of commendation conferred upon the redlegs for their work in the Philippines.

Since 5 March 1941, when the Division was brought into federal service, the infantry elements had witnessed numerous demonstrations of raw artillery power. During the training phase troop commanders continually stressed the importance of artillery as it affected the doughboy. But the foot soldier reserved decision. He had to see it in action before committing himself. He had to see whether it would lessen his dirty job. He received his first orientation on Luzon in February 1945.

Bloody Question Mark Hill had been stalemated for two days before massed artillery fires were brought to bear on the crest. Infantrymen had taken a merciless beating from the entrenched Japanese; they had sustained more than a hundred casualties, with thirty-two killed in action. Artillery represented their sole salvation. Three full battalions were alerted to support the 130th for its final attack. The day prior to the scheduled attack, each gun was brought on target individually. When jump-off time neared the artillery gave the infantry twenty minutes of relentless preparatory fires. To the restless riflemen, waiting for the signal to advance, it appeared as though the unbridled fury of the barrage would shear the crest from the hill.

With the cessation of fires three companies rose from the ground and stormed up Question Mark toward the Japanese strongpoint. Instead of the lethal bands of machine-gun fire which had shredded them two days before, assault units found a shocked and helpless enemy, too shaken by concussion to offer organized resistance. In exactly thirty-two minutes every Nip on the hilltop had been wiped out and every crew-served weapon was either seized or destroyed. Friendly casualties on Question Mark: one man killed and nine wounded, four or five by their own errant grenades.

Official Japanese casualty figures for the Luzon campaign testify to the effectiveness of Golden Cross howitzer fire. Between 15 February and 30 June the 33d Division was credited with killing 14,342 enemy troops. General Clarkson has repeatedly declared that a minimum of fifty percent of these were the direct result of artillery fire. In most military quarters fifty percent is a rather conservative estimate, still, settling for that figure, artillerymen can claim credit for more than seven thousand Nip dead in a single campaign.

Colonel Collins summarized infantry respect for artillery results in a letter written to General Paxton from his Mountain Trail CP. It follows:

HEADQUARTERS, 130th INFANTRY APO 33
23 June 1945
SUBJECT: Effectiveness of Artillery

To : Commanding General, 33d Division Artillery, APO 33

1. On the morning that I left KP 21 and headed toward Ambuclao and Bokod you asked me, "Do you ever find many dead Japanese?" Since you had fired a good deal of artillery in the vicinity of Ambuclao, you were particularly interested in what we might find there. At that time I informed you that though we of the Infantry thought the artillery accomplished much good, it was seldom that we found evidence of its results unless we followed in its wake. Of course, the Jap, if given time, will properly dispose of his dead.

2. During our advances through the Agno River Valley and from Ambuclao to Bokod we found definite indications of the power of artillery concentrated on one target for a long period of time. The valley was literally a Valley of Death. Including 300 Japs actually killed by the 130th Infantry, there were at least 1,000 bodies strewn along the valley floor. All along the road leading into the valley were dead Japs; we counted at least 150 on the roadsides.

3. In the Bangao area there had been a direct hit on a Jap CP the night before we closed on the location. When we reached the CP we saw arms, legs, torsos and heads scattered for yards around. In addition, the Japs at Bangao, pounded all night by 155 mm howitzer fire, had little fight left in them and it was a simple matter for us to mop them up.

4. For close support, I think that the best chance we had to use and observe it occurred on the Mountain Trail during the drive to Tabio. For the first time we had all the artillery we desired and in every instance troops succeeded in mounting the objective and seizing it while the Nips were still groggy from the shelling. As one man put it, "They were so befuddled that they lust crawled out of their holes and stood at 'Parade Rest'."

5. I think that all along our men have appreciated the value of artillery fire, but never more than in the Mountain Trail operation. More important, they have learned to follow right behind it with confidence and take full advantage of its shock action on the enemy.

ARTHUR S. COLLINS, Jr. Colonel, 130th Infantry Commanding

Division Artillery men are proudest of two records set on Luzon. The first is that they went through the campaign without ever losing a field piece to the enemy. Counterbattery fire, night infiltrations and mass suicide attacks all placed heavy pressure against Divarty perimeters yet they were unable to account for a single howitzer. Second, no infantry unit in the Division ever fought outside the range of Golden Cross artillery. No matter how long or difficult the displacement, the artillery always managed to accompany the infantry into battle.

Resourcefulness keynoted artillery activities throughout the war in the Pacific. No better example of this exists than the work of the Air Section in Luzon. Few people had more friends in the 33d than the artillery liaison pilots. Eleven in number, they accomplished the work of fifty men. They dropped supplies to small patrols operating well in front of the Division line. Whole battalions on the move were oriented by pilots providing "protective" cover. Platoons in the attack received immediate information on strength and disposition of enemy forces occupying their objectives.

Commanded by Major Richard F. Bortz, the Air Section exemplified cooperation between infantry and artillery. Battalion and company

commanders planning an advance were always given a chance to first survey the terrain from the air. Patrol leaders received the same consideration. Engineer parties, dispatched on reconnaissance for prospective road or bridge sites, had their leaders ferried over the hills via L-4.

More beneficial than anything else, however, was the Air Section's effect on infantry morale. To riflemen up front, the sight of a Cub plane cruising overhead was cause for rejoicing. It meant immediate relief from Japanese artillery fires. Enemy gunners, realizing that operations in the face of this observation could only bring counterbattery fire, promptly ceased activity. Mountain guns were hastily wheeled back into caves and outside camouflage buttoned into place. Nip barrages thereafter were generally reserved for dawn and dusk-before the L-4s came out or after they had retired for the night.

Every pilot in the section received the Silver Star and Air Medal; awards in which the infantry heartily concurred.

Closely allied with the Air Section was the 33d Division Artillery Photo Detachment. With no allowances made for it in the tables of organization, this unit filled a need not only for General Paxton's force but for the Division itself. Five men composed this group, employing Air Force cameras begged and borrowed at all stopping points between the Hawaiian Islands and Lingayen Gulf. Throughout the 33d's fight in the Philippines the Photo Detachment kept a constant flow of pictures streaming to ground commanders and G-2 and G-3. Troop leaders, and intelligence and operations chiefs were thereby given an accurate concept of terrain long before they were committed to it.

Every photo mission was flown over enemy-held territory and often at altitudes below three hundred feet. Frequently, bands of Japanese, cognizant that they were out of artillery range, engaged the Cubs with machine-gun and rifle fire. Most planes assigned to photo missions returned home bearing the scars of combat on wings and fuselage. During the Luzon campaign forty photo missions were flown, more than a thousand aerial shots made, and some 7,400 prints distributed among commanders, staffs and front-line troops.

Whether it be pictures or howitzers, it is axiomatic that artillerymen love to shoot.

Not satisfied with serving and maintaining twelve firing batteries, General Paxton's men took on an additional battery during the final stage of the battle for Baguio. Like the Photo Detachment, this too was non-TO. Behind the Division's forward line, rusting away in captured materiel dumps, were six Japanese howitzers. Offensive minded as always, the grey-thatched artillery commander could see no reason why these valuable weapons should remain idle to be combed over by rear-echelon souvenir hunters. He detailed Capt. Darrell T. Hill, a native of San Antonio, Texas, to organize a small artillery cadre, augment it with as many Filipino soldiers as he could handle and then train the entire conglomeration on the captured guns.

Hill pitched into the assignment with contagious enthusiasm. He and his men, by common consent, immediately christened the new unit J Battery-J for Jap. Next they attempted to convert their six nonfunctioning pieces into four which were capable of joining the fight. All reconditioning work was necessarily done by the trial-and-error system.

Sergeant Edward Dobbie, battery mechanic, tried almost every type of recoil fluid in Division and Corps ordnance before finding one which blended with the guns. Cpl. Charles Melnik, J Battery's motor sergeant, furnished prime movers by breaking down four wrecked enemy trucks into two mobile ones. Nip radios, wire and telephones were slowly restored to working order. Filipinos training on the pieces kept pace with the improvement of equipment. Finally, J Battery was given its first fire mission. When the howitzers were emplaced and a protective cordon thrown around gun positions, every man in the battery was armed with Japanese ordnance. Rapid-firing Nambus supplanted Browning light machine guns and BARS; Arisakas replaced M-1s and Nip grenades were used in place of the standard American "pineapple." The theme was carried out to the extent that Filipino gun crews used captured Jap fish and rice for the main part of their diet instead of the regularly issued C and K rations.

Early fire missions were restricted to long-range harassments. After scores of these J Battery was permitted to fire in support of ground actions. In view of the criticisms directed against enemy ordnance by senior commanders, the results achieved by this novel unit were surprising. Their effectiveness was remarkable. Lt. Charles Nye, battery reconnaissance officer, succinctly summed it up with the observation that "it isn't the guns, brother, it's the technique."

Golden Cross infantry held no patent on intrepidity. Exclusive of the Medal of Honor, artillerymen shared in all other awards for heroism made to members of the Division. Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Soldiers' Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal and Purple Heart-Divarty troops received them all. In the words of General Paxton, artillery's highest award was "the calm confidence of the slugging doughboy as we pulled our shots back in darkness to within fifty yards of his foxhole to wipe out a group of infiltrating Japs."

However, infantry alone did not monopolize on this "calm confidence." Artillerymen too have employed their howitzers to beat off Nip attacks against their own positions. Prime example of this is the experience of Able Battery, 123d Field Artillery, near Galiano.

Ordinarily, light artillery is a trifle closer to the front than the 155s, but in this case A Battery's mediums had been drawn up close behind the 130th Infantry to place fires on Mount Bilbil. One night at about 0200-the Japs' favorite hour for dispatching their night shift-an enemy group of platoon size managed to cut around the 130th's open flanks and veer in between the infantrymen and the artillery perimeter. Once the enemy located the howitzer positions they closed in for an attack.

While a few Nips cut telephone lines leading back to battalion headquarters, others fearlessly threw themselves against the installation in an attempt to break through and destroy the guns. As soon as the assault materialized, redleg machine gunners on the fringe of the perimeter answered it with sustained bursts of fire. With the enemy's "Banzai!" battle cry ringing in his ears, the battery commander, Lt. Philip Schmidt, decided upon a radical course of action. He radioed Major Carl Ziegler, S-3 of the 124th Field Artillery, then on duty at the fire direction center, and requested immediate supporting fire from 124th pieces.

Staff Sergeant Robert Anderson quickly calculated firing data and measured the deflection shift to the new target. Capt. Archie J. Grieg's Baker Battery was given the fire mission. Working at top speed, B Battery crews shifted trails and made ready to throw out the first rounds.

Schmidt had Baker adjusted in four rounds. Japanese perplexity at this turn of events was certainly no greater than that of Major Ziegler or the B Battery artillerymen. Regardless of the unorthodox procedure, Lieutenant Schmidt's strategy paid off handsome dividends. The enemy was forced to withdraw back to the hills and Divarty's record of safeguarding its weapons went unblemished.

Artillery contributions to victory in the battle for Baguio were varied and valuable. Never was the infantryman let down. Through swamp, rice paddy, mountain and jungle a tight, coordinated supporting arm backed him up as he drove the Japanese from the summer capital. In addition to the awesome toll of personnel exacted by Golden Cross artillery, General Paxton's force definitely accounted for the following materiel: 33 field pieces, 45 machine guns and heavy mortars, 63 ammunition dumps and 37 vehicles. Rifleman or cannoneer, it made little difference who received credit for the victory. Both branches earned a common respect as fighters who molded a powerful combat team between them.

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