Save for the introduction to atabrine and the antics of Neptunus Rex, who refused to permit a global war to usurp his royal powers, the two-week voyage from Hawaii to New Guinea was without incident. The transports carrying the Division to the Southwest Pacific, large as they were, held too many troops to allow any appreciable degree of comfort. A blistering equatorial sun, added to overcrowded shipboard conditions, served to make the men more conscious of their humid surroundings. Some days, particularly those spent in the vicinity of the Equator, were so torrid as to be hardly bearable. Fortunately, the evenings were balmy and the majority of personnel deserted their stuffy compartments to sleep on the open decks during the run through the hot belt.

Finschhafen, situated on the tip of nose-shaped Huon Peninsula, was the terminus of the voyage for the 33d Division. A porthole view of their new surroundings was sufficient to convince the troops that the niceties of Western civilization were conspicuously absent from this huge tropical island. Finschhafen was not a city, town, village or hamlet. It was simply a name applied to a small native settlement and some Australian government offices reposing on a narrow strip of flatland between the waterfront and the jungles. All facilities, including those of the Army, were rude, temporary affairs. Dwellings consisted of pyramidal tents or thatched huts erected by New Guinea natives. The docks jutting out into Dreger Harbor, constructed of unpainted planks, were exposed to the ravages of the weather.

This unpretentious picture served as a stark reminder to members of the Golden Cross that they were embarking on a virgin phase in the Division's history.

Unloading was completed on 19 May. Now the 33d turned to its most important task of the moment: building a home for itself in this unbridled country until Sixth Army assigned it a combat mission. Semi-cleared areas lining Dreger Road, some fifteen miles from Base F at Finschhafen, were allocated the Division. Constant downpours and lack of engineering equipment hampered the Golden Cross in its construction efforts, but gradually stumps and vegetation were burned away, drainage ditches excavated and water points developed for bathing and laundering use.

Just the fact that the Division was in New Guinea in May 1944 seemed to strongly suggest that combat service could not be many months away. While General MacArthur's "war fought on a shoestring" had passed through Finschhafen some time before, combat operations were in full swing farther up the New Guinea coast.

Quarterbacked by MacArthur and Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, Sixth Army commander, American forces were leapfrogging from point to point along the northern shore: first Hollandia and Aitape on 22 April, followed by landings in the Maffin Bay-Wakde Island area less than a month later and finally, the 41st Division's invasion of Biak on 27 May.

General MacArthur's seven-league strides along the coast were not without remuneration. Biak was the climax of a drive which saw the enemy's New Guinea armies sliced into numerous segments, each piece contained in an individual, isolated pocket. American air and naval superiority precluded the chance of Nip reinforcement with troops from the East Indies or the Bismarck Archipelago. The Japanese, while strong in numbers, were fast becoming tactically impotent. Soon they would have to choose between capitulation or starvation.

II

Rain was the first enemy encountered by the 33d Division on New Guinea. It turned company streets and training areas into calf-deep bogs of mud, necessitating constant maintenance of drainage facilities.

Clothes and blankets quickly mildewed if stored too long between airings. Small arms required frequent attention; a short period of neglect meant the beginnings of rust and corrosion. Division engineers suffered more because of the downpours than any single unit. Charged with maintaining Dreger Road, engineer companies were forced to spend their days wading through mud in an effort to keep traffic moving.

As time went on, however, New Guinea rains became accepted as a matter of course. Daily routine progressed without interruption because of them, leaving the "rainy day" schedule a strictly Stateside innovation; the "clear day" schedule was the unusual. Division entry into the shooting war appeared imminent at this point. To offset the hindrance of weather much had to be done to keep the Division at a peak of combat efficiency. Training in basic subjects began at the end of May. In order to give artillery units more suitable areas in which to conduct firing exercises, all Division Artillery, under General Paxton, was dispatched to a new campsite at Fortification Point, forty miles up the coast from Finschhafen. Here, the terrain was comparatively open, allowing the artillery wider latitude in conducting training exercises.

Advanced amphibious training was the first major training operation assigned the Golden Cross. Much work had been accomplished along this line in the Hawaiian Islands, but there training had been restricted to shore-to-shore work. Now the 33d was scheduled to cover all of the amphibious phases: shore parties and other beach duties, loading of many types of craft and the execution of large-scale ship-to-shore landings by battalion landing teams. While Division troops were engaged in reviewing fundamentals, a sizeable group of officers and noncoms representative of all divisional units attended the Amphibious Staff and Command School at Milne Bay. General Myers, in direct command of the Division's amphibious training program, headed school personnel.

During the month of June the 33d was launched into the most distasteful assignment in its World War II history. Base F, organized at Finschhafen to receive and break down Stateside supplies for forward operational units, was hopelessly behind in its vital work. This impairment, caused by a severe shortage of port personnel, resulted in Dreger Harbor being crowded with scores of ocean-going vessels impatiently waiting to be unloaded. Theater policy gave base operations a high priority. It also empowered the base commander to employ all troops in his area, combat or service, if they were needed to accomplish this mission. Accordingly, General Clarkson was asked to supply several thousand men for an indefinite period to augment Base F's slim port forces.

This development not only caused a complete revision of previously accepted training schedules but threw living conditions at Finschhafen into a state of turmoil. New plans produced by the Division staff called for rotation of all troops on training and dock assignments. One RCT was to man the docks while the others implemented the training schedule. Port work became a 24-hours-a-day proposition for the units drawing this duty. It soon became commonplace to see some companies rise for "reveille" at 1300 and other groups bed down for the "night" at 0600.

From a physical standpoint, unloading boats was rugged work. In addition to the actual labor, details had to cope with the inconveniences of the climate. Daytime shifts worked against a broiling sun but were able to gain considerable rest during the cool nights. Crews on late at night worked under more comfortable conditions but had to get their sleep in the mid-day heat. Dog watches got a little of both. Although members of the 33d had no previous experience in this type of work, they quickly became proficient at it. Details were broken down into three sections: a hold crew to place the cargo on wooden pallets; a deck crew which manned the winches raising supplies from the hold; and a dock crew assigned to load cargo on quartermaster trucks drawn up alongside the ship.

Numerous material gains, which could not otherwise have accured, came from work on the docks. Frozen fowl occasionally replaced bully beef as the principal Division nutrient. Generators miraculously turned up and almost every company had electric lighting. Coca-Cola, as rare in New Guinea as a haberdashery, occasionally found its way into company menus.

In the thirty-three days from 26 June to 29 July the Division received everything promised it in the way of amphibious training. Facilities made available to the 33d were virtually unlimited. Three massive Australian APAs (attack transports), HMAS Kanimbla, Manoora and Westralia, each capable of carrying a battalion landing team, were committed to the Division during the training period. A flotilla of LCIs (landing craft, infantry), LSTs (landing ship, tank), and LCTs (landing craft, tank) supplemented the Aussie vessels. An instruction team was attached to the Division from SWPA headquarters to act in an advisory capacity.

Elements of the 123d RCT, operating by battalions, were the first to undergo New Guinea amphibious exercises. In order for a battalion to gain the maximum benefit out of the program it became necessary to augment it with an outside company to handle shore-party duties. In this way the battalion would be able to concern itself solely with landing techniques. First phases of training consisted of instruction in waterproofing vehicles and howitzers, proper methods of boarding and debarking from landing craft and a short refresher course on the cargo nets.

When dry-land instructions were terminated the battalions took to the water. Assault units were borne to landing beaches by LCIs while artillery pieces and trucks followed via LSTs. Practice landings were initially made on a beach near Finschhafen which formerly served as a camp for Sixth Army headquarters. The final stage of this phase was a wet run from Finschhafen to Fortification Point where assault units went ashore tactically and began a two-day ground problem. Shore parties actually unloaded LSTs and LCTs and established supply dumps which serviced the attacking troops.

Battalions next entered the APA phase. Small craft took the troops out to the transports, anchored several hundred yards offshore, for a three-day period aboard ship. Here the men learned how to raise and lower crew-served weapons, radios, wire reels and other unwieldy equipment from the APAs' decks to the LCVPs bobbing alongside. Countless hours were spent climbing up and down rope ladders leading from the mother ship to the landing craft. Rainy weather and rough seas occasionally made this work hazardous but personnel were required to carry on regardless of the elements. Shipboard accommodations were comfortable enough and the change from Division fare to Australian rations was welcomed.

Training was considered completed when the APAs weighed anchors and set sail for Fortification Point. Three miles off the Point, the men boarded LCVPs and went into the beach in waves. The usual tactical problem followed the landing. This one was of three days' duration, requiring negotiation of stifling kunai grass and stagnant swamps until the battalion's objective was secured. Umpires were on hand for this exercise and battalions were scored in accordance with their ability. A novel twist was accorded with the introduction of night raiders as part of the "enemy" detail. These groups succeeded in keeping assault units awake most of the night through the combined usage of sirens, catcalls, taunts, blanks and firecrackers. Upon completion of this exercise the battalion returned to Finschhafen for a tour on the docks, freeing another force for amphibious training.

Only one unfortunate incident marred the conduct of the amphibious course for the 33d. On the night of 20 July the Kanimbla, loaded with 130th RCT troops, slipped anchor a few hours past sundown and ran aground on a reef close to the Division headquarters beach. No one was injured although damage to the vessel required a trip into drydock the following day. Ironically, the ship beached within two hundred yards of the Division theater where Jack Benny, Carole Landis, Larry Adler and Martha Tilton were staging a show for the remainder of the Golden Cross. Hearing raucous laughter from the direction of the beach, men aboard the transport rushed from their compartments to the rail. However, the Kanimbla chose to drift aground directly behind the large stage. Her passengers could neither see nor hear the performance; they could just listen to the galling roars of appreciation.

New training doctrines were propounded once all elements of the 33d completed the amphibious cycle. Between tricks on the docks infantrymen resumed their Expert Infantryman tests, first started in the Hawaiian Islands several months before. Muddy terrain and typical New Guinea weather rendered requirements for the badge doubly difficult. Nevertheless the regiments were not permitted to deviate from them. Division's one concession was to allow troops to begin the mandatory 9- and 25-mile speed marches in the cool of early morning. All other physical fitness tests, combat courses, infiltration course, and compass marches were taken in the heat of day.

Camp development matched strides with training during the first few months at Finschhafen. By mid-August the Division base bore little resemblance to the areas first occupied in May. Outdoor theaters and baseball fields had been graded and beautified by engineers and infantry fatigue details. Tents were pulled over supporting beams, giving the camp a more symmetrical appearance. Every man was required to construct a shelf running the length of his cot fastened to either end of his mosquito frame. Clothes and personal equipment were stacked on this shelf as though for a garrison inspection. This constant airing added to the life of clothing and web equipment.

Food got better as the stay at Finschhafen grew longer. Fresh meat, still rare, was no longer a novelty. Although shipments to the Division had been quadrupled, bully beef was in no danger of losing its place on the menu.

Special Services activities blossomed considerably between May and August. USO troupes which formerly played only for the Air Corps at Finschhafen now made the 33d Division a regular port of call. Softball leagues were revived. Each infantry regiment and Division

Artillery reorganized their dance bands. WACs were newly arrived in New Guinea and Special Services organized dances and socials with the Base F complement. At this stage sufficient planned entertainment was available for off-duty personnel so that they had more to look forward to than endless evenings of letterwriting.

Health of the command kept pace with all other local improvements. Malaria had never been much of a problem because of a carefully supervised atabrine program. Now jaundice and jungle rot-once fairly prevalent throughout the Golden Cross-were well under control. As the men became accustomed to the climate tropical afflictions of all types decreased in number.

While everything else was on the upswing, however, morale dropped steadily. Even though their dock duties were discharged in good humor, personnel found it difficult to understand why a combat division was forced to function as a group of port battalions. They felt that the winch and pallet were supplanting the M-1 and bayonet. Had Finschhafen been Hawaii or Fort Lewis the blow would not have been so hard to take. But this was New Guinea, everyone was screaming about a shortage of troops, action was in full swing a few hundred miles away yet an entire division was being subtracted from the operational picture. Why?

General Clarkson personally undertook to supply the answer. As in Hawaii when morale was low he toured the base, speaking to the men in battalion groups. He praised them for their performance of duty at Dreger Harbor; he lauded them for the commendable manner in which they, combat troops, had undergone the humiliation of working as ordinary laborers. Too, he reminded them that they were making a far greater contribution to the war effort unloading ships than they would as a training division. In closing, the Division Commander reassured his men that the 33d's day would come-but soon.

III

And soon it was. Not for all of the Golden Cross but for a healthy one-third of it. A short time after the Division was transferred from Sixth to Eighth Army control in mid-August, General Eichelberger tapped it for a special task force. The force was to be of regimental combat team size. It was to go in at Maffin Bay, roughly six hundred miles westward from Finschhafen, on 1 September. Current occupant of the sector, the 31st Division, was being pulled out for an invasion of Morotai. Selection of the combat team was left to the discretion of the Division Commander. He arbitrarily chose the 123d.

Most members of the combat team had heard of the Wakde IslandMaffin Bay zone. Just a few months before it was the scene of some of the bloodiest fighting in the New Guinea campaign. Maffin Bay became an active front on 17 May when Tornado Task Force-composed of 41st Division elements and the 158th RCT-made an amphibious assault and quickly secured a broad beachhead. Three days later part of this force backtracked to Wakde, a small island twelve miles offshore. After a bitterly contested landing American troops were finally able to secure a foothold on the tiny coral isle. More heated action occurred before this segment of Tornado swept across the island, killing several hundred Japanese and seizing vital Wakde Airdrome.

With that, higher headquarters pulled out the 41st and 158th RCT, substituting parts of the 6th Division as Tornado Task Force. Moving in on 6 June, the 6th suffered many casualties in its efforts to broaden and deepen the beachhead. The majority of these stemmed from the battle for Lone Tree Hill, a terrain feature which later served as an outpost for the 123d RCT. Shortly after Lone Tree Hill was taken, the 6th was alerted to move on Sansapor, 375 miles to the west. Next to assume the duties of Tornado Task Force was the 31st Division which relieved the 6th on 12 July. Its activity was restricted to constant patrolling and consolidation of the giant perimeter that circumscribed American gains in the sector.

As with the 6th, the 31st's Maffin Bay tour of duty came to an end when it was ordered to assault Morotai, in the Netherlands East Indies, on 15 September. Now the 123d RCT was to fill the Dixie Division's place as Tornado Task Force. General Myers, Assistant Division Commander, was placed in command of the combat team. Moving via LCIs and LSTs the 123d left Finschhafen on 25 August and reached Maffin Bay on 1 September.

Mission of the combat team was to insure operation of Wakde Airdrome and to maintain its security; to defend the perimeter and provide security for supply, dump and water areas used by ships loading and unloading troops and cargo at the Maffin Bay port; to aggressively patrol areas outside the perimeter to the extent necessary to prevent a surprise counterattack by the enemy; and to furnish labor details and equipment to expedite the loading of the departing division.

Even though the tactical situation was fairly static by this time, the 123d faced a critical problem as soon as it accepted responsibility for the area. One regiment of infantry had the near-impossible task of garrisoning a perimeter formerly held by a full division. Arrival of the 2d Battalion, 136th Infantry, at Maffin Bay on 4 September did not materially resolve this problem. General Myers was forced to abandon the broad defensive line held by the 31st Division and pull his installations much closer to the shoreline. East and west boundaries suffered corresponding reductions. The combat team's first days at Maffin Bay were spent in destroying vacated positions and constructing new pillboxes.

Once the re-aligned perimeter was completed, troops moved into semipermanent areas. One battalion was assigned the Lone Tree HillRocky Point sector which anchored the right flank of the perimeter.

A second battalion held the ground directly inland from the bay while another battalion was responsible for the Toem area, left flank of Tornado Task Force. The remaining battalion worked on the docks and was designated as reserve. A system of rotation was employed whereby all units took a turn at dock duty in addition to serving on all three "fronts."

At the time the 123d landed at Maffin Bay there were an estimated two thousand Japanese in the sector with 1,400 of them believed to be combat troops. Most of these were assembled about thirteen miles west of the perimeter at Sarmi Point. Enemy commanders kept harassing groups of varying size posted between their Sarmi forces and the 123d RCT. A Nip company was known to be dug in around the deserted Sawar Drome, five miles from the right side of the semicircular perimeter. Other outposts were deployed in depth between the Woske River-scarcely a mile from 123d pillboxes-and Sawar Drome. Smaller Jap groups operated in front of the perimeter in the Mount Aftawadona area where they attempted to keep open an escape route for defeated Hollandia remnants.

Outgoing infantrymen of the 31st Division gave combat team members precise locations where they were likely to run into trouble. " . . Stick on your own side of the Woske and you're as safe as though you were in your mother's arms. Cross the river and you'll really see some lead fly." However, it was inadvisable for the regiment to simply sit back and concentrate on holding the perimeter. A purely passive defensive attitude on the 123d's part would serve to alert the Japanese of Tornado Task Force's numerical weakness. It would invite attack. Therefore, active patrolling was instituted as soon as perimeter defenses were perfected.

Baker Company of the 123d and a detachment from the Reconnaissance Troop platoon attached to the combat team were the first Golden Cross units to see action at Maffin Bay. Company B was given the mission of patrolling the Sawar Drome area while the Troopers were to probe enemy defenses around Mount Aftawadona. Both groups had five days in which to complete their respective assignments. They left on the morning of 11 September. Each was augmented by forward observer parties from the 122d Field Artillery Battalion; native scouts who had worked with the 6th and 31st Division; and as many litter and rations carriers as they desired.

Neither force experienced difficulty during the first day of their respective patrols. Baker Company came under sporadic sniper fire shortly after crossing the Woske River but was able to dispel these harassing riflemen without suffering casualties. Reconnaissance Troopers met no opposition as they moved along the side of the river held by the task force, toward Mount Aftawadona. At 1000 the following morning, however, the cavalrymen bumped into a Japanese strongpoint. A few minutes after the patrol left its bivouac area at 0900 a native scout, travelling with the point, noticed fresh split-toed tracks going in the same direction as the patrol. He quickly called for the patrol leader, Lt. Lowell V. Doke, and showed him the enemy footprints.

Doke passed this information on to his men and then ordered the column to resume its march. At 0950 the native scout in the lead suddenly turned around and ran to the rear of the column. No amount of coaxing could persuade him to move forward. Realizing that the enemy was probably dead ahead, Doke motioned his men to leave the trail and conceal themselves. Then, with Lt. Dean B. Spencer, he began to crawl along the side of the trail. To the right of the trail and some twenty yards away was a small shrub-covered hill. Neither Doke nor Spencer could detect any sign of life on it. They concentrated on following the footprints originally picked up by their guide

Lieutenant Spencer was first to notice that these tracks broke off the trail and led to the rear of the hill. Just as he began to motion to Doke, a Nip machine gun opened up on the two of them from point-blank range. Doke was hit twice in the first burst but managed to roll into the heavy vegetation lining the trail. Spencer, miraculously unhurt, dove for cover and got the remainder of the patrol to move forward. Now Americans and Japanese both settled down into a waiting game. After forty-five minutes, two Japs, dug in on the side of the hill, rose for a quick glimpse of the situation. Tommy-gun fire killed them both.

At this time, the platoon rear guard told Spencer that they could see a group of enemy on the opposite bank of the Woske preparing to reinforce the machine gun on the hill. Slowed down because it was necessary to move Doke by litter, Spencer decided to pull back. Instructions given him at Maffin Bay specified that the Troopers were not to enter a fire fight but simply patrol the route to Aftawadona. Rounding up the carriers presented a problem but finally the column evacuated the danger area. Spencer sent a pigeon message to headquarters describing the situation. A 122d Field Artillery liaison plane dropped a return message ordering the patrol back to Maffn Bay.

Company B's experience was similar to that of the Reconnaissance Troop patrol. Charged with probing the area from the Woske west to Sawar Creek, the company met but a few stragglers during its first two days away from the Maffin Bay perimeter. However, on 13 September it was ambushed by enemy machine gunners just as it reached the barren bank of Sawar Creek. The lead platoon, commanded by Lt. Walter B. Roper, Jr., a replacement officer who had joined the Division at Finschhafen, received the brunt of this cleverly executed fire. Roper was the target for the first burst. He was instantly killed, the first 33d Division man to lose his life in World War II.

Overwhelmed by this surprise fire, members of his platoon were forced to move back and seek cover in the dense vegetation growing twenty yards from the creek. The enemy raked the company for a few minutes and then trained their pieces on Lieutenant Roper's body, obviously defying Baker to attempt a rescue. Light mortars were set up behind the company line but observers were unable to pinpoint Japanese positions. While the mortar shells were dropping on the far side of Sawar Creek, S/Sgt. Winfield R. Green, a Weapons Platoon section leader, bolted out of the thick grass and ran toward the lieutenant's body. Nip gunners sighted him immediately and engaged him, but despite the bullets that snapped into the dirt around him Green reached the dead officer, gathered him in his arms, and sprinted back into the undergrowth. With that, the company broke contact and returned to Maffn Bay, its mission completed.

Sergeant Green, later tendered a field commission in the Philippines, was awarded the Silver Star for his courageous act. He was first in the Golden Cross to be decorated for gallantry in action.

IV

Patrolling continued unabated throughout the 123d's stay in Dutch New Guinea. Most were of security nature; one- and two-day missions far out to the front of the perimeter. However, each company in the combat team went out on a five-day mission and invariably organized groups of enemy were encountered. Although the fighting did not approximate Luzon action in intensity, it was equally difficult in many respects. Maffin Bay was more humid than Finschhafen. Terrain there was mostly swampland, making every patrol a gruelling one from a physical standpoint. However, patrol operations brought the regiment to a battle-wise state, readying it for future operations where "attack" and not "patrol" would be the watchword.

Occasionally companies on reconnaissance found themselves forced into engagements where they had to commit all troops and supporting weapons against enemy units. These fights were marked by the same hand-to-hand fighting and night harassments that characterized later regimental operations. Perhaps the most hectic one involved Company C, commanded by Capt. Martin L. Marchant, Jr. This company fought the enemy for three days of its five-day patrol.

Charley Company had been ordered to reconnoiter Sawar Drome to determine enemy dispositions around the field. Bolstered by attachments from Company D, regimental medical and communications personnel, a forward observer party from the 122d, and sixty-five native carriers, the 250-man force left Maffin Bay on the morning of 28 September. A fleet of DUKWs transported the company from the main perimeter to a beach on the far side of the Woske River. Marchant's men debarked, assembled on the beach road which paralleled the shoreline 150 yards inland, and struck out for Sawar Drome. By 1600 Company C was but a short distance from the objective. Marchant moved his troops off the road and set up a perimeter intended to serve as the company's base of operations.

No activity transpired during the hours of darkness, but "routine patrol" ideas were rudely dispelled at dawn when the Japanese threw a 48-round artillery barrage at the perimeter. Evidently the company's position had been revealed the previous night when several of the carriers built small fires on the beach for cooking purposes. Although no casualties resulted from the heavy shelling, rounds detonated within ten yards of Lt. Hartwell K. Blake's 3d Platoon. Lts. Paul Giudice and Keith Setterington, forward observers, radioed for a liaison plane when the Nips first ranged in on their position. Its appearance brought about a rapid cessation of fires.

Two platoons were dispatched on patrol right after breakfast to find the best route to the western side of Sawar Drome. Lt. John F. Reardon's 1st Platoon operated south of the field while the 3d Platoon patrolled a trail on the northern fringe. Reardon-later killed in a Luzon plane crash-ran into immediate difficulty. One of his men, Pfc. Melvin Larsen, detonated a 100-pound aerial bomb which had been rigged as a land mine by the Japanese. Larsen was killed, Pvt. August Pufahl seriously wounded, while everyone in the platoon was badly shaken up. After reporting his casualties to Marchant, Reardon was ordered to return to the company CP. On the trip back an enemy ambush party fired on the platoon but heavy rifle fire killed one and put the remainder to flight. Casualties were evacuated to Maffin Bay via an LVT (landing vehicle, tracked) sent out by task force headquarters.

While the 1st and 3d Platoons were out on patrol Captain Marchant moved his company perimeter to a new location eight hundred yards eastward. Carriers were permitted-and encouraged-to cook their suppers at the old position. Six hours after the company turned in for the night the Japanese repeated their morning barrage. This time, however, Company C listened with enjoyment as the Nip rounds thundered into the vacated area.

All elements of Charley Company pulled stakes the next morning and started on the second leg of the patrol. No enemy was met throughout the day but the swampy ground south of the drome made progress slow and difficult. Wading through hip-deep water under the blistering sun fatigued most of the men and no one was sorry when Marchant signaled a halt at 1600. The perimeter for the third night was located in a semi-cleared grove less than a mile from the first night's resting place. Here, the company became engaged in its first after-dark fight.

Jap harassing parties located the perimeter about an hour before midnight. They made no immediate effort to attack but instead walked around the installation several times conversing with each other all the while. On the stroke of midnight, however, two enemy patrols consolidated forces and assaulted the company position. A few stayed in the rear to provide covering fire while the majority tried to crawl into the Charley perimeter. Marchant's men answered the invasion with well directed grenades and an unceasing barrage from the 60mm mortar section. Additional enemy now came up manning two Nambu light machine guns. Withering fire swept Company C. Machine-gun bullets smashed Marchant's SCR-300 and shredded many of the ponchos which had been put up as rain shelters.

Mortarmen, under Lt. Gregory A. McNally, increased their fires while riflemen on the edge of the perimeter aimed at the muzzle flashes of the Japanese pieces. Pfc. Ed Ledward's BAR silenced one Nambu while mortar fire forced the other to withdraw. Artillery fires were brought around the perimeter a moment later and dropped intermittently throughout the night. Five enemy bodies were found a few yards from the installation at dawn. Charley Company did not suffer any casualties in the course of the fight.

At 0800 on the fourth day Company C resumed its reconnaissance. Another half-mile was covered without incident, bringing the force to within sight of its objective. By this time food supplies and water were beginning to dwindle so Captain Marchant decided to forego further patrolling and begin the trek back to Maffin Bay. As a preliminary to the move, Marchant established contact with a liaison plane requesting information on enemy activities between the company and the Woske. In reply he was advised that three Nip light tanks and an undetermined number of infantrymen had just been observed searching the ground occupied by Charley Company three nights before. Minutes later the pilot radioed Marchant notifying him that artillery fire had knocked out two of the tanks.

Riflemen of the 2d Platoon, under Lt. John B. Lord, formed the advance guard for the march home with Sgt. Howard Johnson's squad out in front as the point. Now familiar with the terrain, the company was able to make good time through the swamps and jungle on the southern edge of Sawar Drome. Upon reaching the beach road, Johnson spotted a single Nip running from the old perimeter to the road. A glance to the other side of the road disclosed a few of the enemy trying to conceal themselves in the tall grass adjacent to the road. Johnson, who was later killed in the Luzon campaign, silently deployed his squad and called for Lieutenant Lord.

His report convinced Lord that an ambush was directly ahead. Company C's mortars were promptly sent forward. and set up to fire at minimum range. Lieutenants Giudice and Setterington made contact with artillery gun positions and asked that battery fires be given upon their signal. When mortars and artillery reported that they were ready to fire, Marchant gave them the order to open up. This sudden bombardment, landing squarely upon the enemy without warning, threw them into panic. Many ran from their places of concealment onto the exposed roadway where infantry fires quickly mowed them down. Combined infantry-artillery fires accounted for nineteen Japanese dead.

Still, Charley Company could not account for the one remaining tank observed earlier in the afternoon. A short time later, however, the artillery plane again called Marchant with the news that the tank had been located. Looking up from the FO's radio, the company commander could see the pilot dive his plane at the beach and then describe small circles around an area on the waterfront, which was only a few yards from the old perimeter. Captain Marchant detailed Blake's 3d Platoon to close in on the enemy frontally while he took a small group around on the left flank.

While Marchant was carrying out the envelopment, the 3d Platoon came under fire from three machine guns dug in around the lone tank. Blake built up a firing line and for several moments an intense fire fight ensued. Meanwhile Captain Marchant and a handful of men had reached a small, shrub-covered knob to the right of the Nips. Pfc. Glenn Weimer covered the closest enemy machine gun with BAR fire, causing it to suspend operation. Marchant, on top of the knob, was handed a rocket launcher by Sgt. William Fell. He fired three rounds at the hastily entrenched tank, scoring direct hits with two of them.

The two remaining enemy Nambus were knocked out promptly. Sgt. Elijah York, leading a mortar squad in support of Marchant's effort, dropped three rounds on one emplacement, practically obliterating its occupants. A rifle grenade fired by T/Sgt. Frank Rauch got the other gun. Rauch later lost his life in the Philippines. Darkness was now minutes away so Marchant thought it advisable to postpone a search of the area until the following day. He reorganized his company on the road and moved it to the mouth of the Woske where another perimeter was established.

Marchant, Blake and twenty volunteers returned to the scene of the fight on the morning of the fifth day. They hoped to find the tank still mobile so that it could be loaded aboard an LCM and brought back to Maffin Bay as a war trophy. However, one of Marchant's rockets had disabled the ignition system and it was impossible to get the tank in motion. Lieutenant Blake destroyed it with incendiary grenades. Although reconnaissance of the beach disclosed no enemy bodies, signs existed that at least six Nip met their deaths defending the tank. Torn, bloody clothing and bits of flesh were strewn around the tank and the machine-gun positions.

At noon Charley Company troops loaded on DUKWs for the trip back to the Maffin Bay perimeter. Their five days of reconnaissance had resulted in the deaths of twenty-six Japanese.

Patrols operating west of the Woske during the next few weeks met increasing enemy resistance. These reconnaissance parties did not have to penetrate as far as Sawar Drome before coming under enemy fire. Since Charley Company's successful patrol Jap commanders at Sarmi had apparently decreed an extension of the airfield's defenses. Organized groups of Japanese thoroughly covered the area from the drome to the west bank of the Woske. Occasionally they carried automatic weapons to the river bank and fired into three Company A pillboxes which outposted the western side of the task force perimeter.

Headquarters desired to capture an enemy prisoner, if possible, and determine exactly how many men the Nips had transferred from Sarmi to the Woske River sector. This mission fell to the 33d Division Scout Team, a hand-picked unit organized for assignments such as this. Composed of men from every regiment in the Golden Cross, the Scout Team had been trained under the famous Alamo Scouts, Sixth Army's private infiltration force. It had been active since the 123d took over the Maffin Bay perimeter, penetrating enemy lines at points beyond the reach of the rifle companies. Lt. John L. Durant, formerly a platoon leader in the 123d Infantry, commanded the team. Second in command was Lt. Francis E. Peebles of the 136th Infantry.

Given a free hand in planning the mission, Durant felt that an ambush placed across the Woske represented the best chance of taking one of the enemy alive. To reinforce the Scout Team on this delicate assignment, Colonel Serff attached to it one platoon of riflemen from Company F, led by Lt. Raymond R. Utke. Durant's scheme called for his Scout Team, composed of eight men besides Peebles and himself, to actually lay the ambush. Utke's platoon was designated as a supporting force, assigned to cover the crossing of the Woske and the setting of the trap. Orientation of troops began on 18 October as soon as Durant's plan had received regimental approval. Execution of the plan was scheduled for the morning of the 20th.

Moving stealthily, the 31-man patrol managed to ford the Woske at its mouth without alerting enemy sentries. At 0500, an hour after the river crossing, the ambush was in place. Durant had selected a spot about three hundred yards west of the Woske and some seventyfive yards in from the shoreline. He deployed his team in bunkers and high grass which lined both sides of a narrow beach trail. Utke's men stayed a few yards closer to the Woske, prepared to reinforce the ambush party upon Durant's signal. For five solid hours ambush party and support maintained a tense watch, waiting for a Nip patrol to walk into the jaws of the trap.

When no Japanese appeared by 1000, Durant, disgusted with the turn of events, decided to advance toward Sawar Drome and set another ambush along a more travelled route. Utke and five Fox Company men moved out as the point, followed by Lieutenant Durant and the Scout Team and the remainder of the infantry platoon. Barely two hundred yards were covered before an enemy party, following Durant's move along the beach, quickly organized an ambush of its own and enfiladed the American column with machine-gun fire. Several knee mortars opened up simultaneously with the automatic weapons.

Durant's men were caught flatfooted. Zeroed in on the open beach, all they could do was hit the ground and attempt to roll away from the machine guns' beaten zones. Lieutenant Peebles, bringing up the rear with fifteen F Company men, managed to withdraw his force and turn some answering fire against the enemy. This diversion enabled forward elements to break contact and race for the Woske. Five dead were left behind, including Lieutenant Durant who had been killed by a mortar fragment. Utke and Peebles both suffered wounds as did nine other members of the ill-fated force.

Offensive activity slackened somewhat after this abortive effort. It did not flare up until 11 December when King Company crossed the Woske. Once more fierce resistance greeted the intruders. Although Company K accomplished its reconnaissance mission it did so at the cost of two men killed and ten wounded.

King Company's patrol was the last five-day mission run by the 123d Infantry. All infantry units had now been out on extended patrols and had accumulated much knowledge of jungle operations and of their tricky enemy. Patrolling settled down into the "routine" categoryclose-in security patrols-until 25 January 1945 when elements of the 93d Division relieved the combat team. However, the 123d's experience, slight as it was when compared to other Tornado Task Forces, did not come gratuitously. From 12 September, when Lieutenant Doke of the Reconnaissance Troop became the first casualty, until 4 January, when the last battle casualty was sustained, the regiment had 10 men killed and 55 wounded.

But the 123d had something to show for this bloodshed. Its members now had an esprit that could have never been engendered in garrison. Its commanders had gained confidence and experience from the numerous skirmishes with the enemy. It had learned that infantry without artillery is impotent and that a combat team was only as strong as its weakest link. It considered itself ready for bigger things.

With the absence of the 123d RCT from Finschhafen, dock details swamped the remainder of the 33d. Larger crews were requisitioned from the artillery units stationed at Fortification Point to offset the loss of General Myers' force. Training activities were seriously impaired but nevertheless the Division managed to implement a program calling for a review of basic jungle warfare techniques. Most work was carried on in regimental training areas although occasional platoon problems were conducted at Fortification Point. The curriculum centered on "old reliables" of jungle combat: use of flamethrowers, squad problems, hand-to-hand fighting and reduction of enemy pillboxes.

An unfortunate accident occurred during this period which caused the 130th Infantry to lose the services of its commander. On 19 September Colonel Coulter was seriously wounded as he demonstrated pillbox reduction methods to one of his squads. While on a routine inspection tour of training areas that morning the colonel stopped to observe a fire team knock out a mock installation. He saw a base of fire form and pound the coconut-log supports of the box with heavy BAR and M-1 fire while a grenadier crawled toward the embrasure from the left flank. The grenadier moved in too cautiously and flung his grenade from a too great a distance.

Colonel Coulter halted the exercise without delay. Taking the grenade from the apprehensive doughboy the regimental commander requested the riflemen to again open up. While fire ripped into the pillbox the 49-year-old West Pointer rushed in from the side. Just as he rose to throw the grenade a ricocheting M-1 bullet tore into his right shoulder. Colonel Coulter was rushed to the 237th Station Hospital at Base F. Surgeons there found that the bullet had touched a nerve causing a partial paralysis of the colonel's arm.

Hopeful that the Maryland career soldier would stage a rapid recovery, General Clarkson appointed Lt. Col. Arthur S. Collins, Jr., 1st Battalion commander, to take temporary command of the Blackhawks. A month later, when it became apparent that Colonel Coulter was too badly hurt to rejoin the regiment, young Lieutenant Colonel Collins assumed permanent command. From his hospital bed Colonel Coulter wrote a message to the regiment which was inspiring in its humility. It read:

HEADQUARTERS, 130th INFANTRY
A. P. O. 33

26 October 1944

MEMORANDUM
TO: The Officers and Men of the 130th Infantry

Today, after over two years association with you, I have been relieved from assignment to this regiment.

I have never sought promotion or decoration, neither of which I have felt I deserved. My proudest title and the one in which I gloried was "Colonel, 130th Infantry."

To have led you in combat would have been the culmination of forty-two years of longing and thirty-one years of preparation. For some reason God has denied me this, my greatest wish. His will be done.

My one solace in my unhappiness is the fact that I recognize in your new commander an officer of far greater ability than 1. All that I have lost is small in comparison to what the regiment has gained. I feel that my removal was the means of creating the vacancy for him to fill. You should face the future with greater confidence now that he has taken his rightful place.

To one and all I wish God's blessing and a safe and speedy return.

CARLETON COULTER, Jr.
Colonel, 130th Infantry

Major Ernest D. Jessup replaced Lt. Colonel Collins as commander of the 1st Battalion. Collins, now a regimental commander at the tender age of twenty-nine, was reputedly the youngest man to command a force of this size in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations. A 1938 graduate of the Military Academy, the dynamic Bostonian had joined the 130th in April 1942 as a captain. "The Ripper," as he was known in radio code, fast became a worthy successor to Colonel Coulter.

October 1944 saw the Pacific war split wide open. Subsequent disclosures brought out that the 33d Division hopes for early operational commitment were split along with it. Leyte was invaded on the 21st by the Sixth Army as the first step in the re-conquest of the Philippine Islands. General MacArthur had originally planned to invade via Mindanao but spectacular air and naval successes brought about a change of plans. Chief deterrent to an assault of the Leyte-Samar area had been the profusion of enemy power known to be housed in this sector. However, Third Fleet carrier strikes and Fifth Air Force forays reduced this core of strength in a ridiculously short period. When asked his views on Admiral Halsey's recommendation that Mindanao be abandoned and an invasion of Leyte substituted immediately, MacArthur promptly agreed.

Plans for the Mindanao operation, known as King I, had called for the 33d Division to spearhead the move back to the Philippines as part of I Corps. Target date had been set for 15 November 1944. Planning for the operation had begun in August at I Corps headquarters at Hollandia. Lt. Col. William M. Haycock, Division G-3, and Lt. Col. Leslie R. Ireland, G-4, had been attached to Corps at that time to handle operations and liaison details for the 33d. Because of the top secret classification given the operation, Golden Cross troops were blissfully unaware of the momentous undertakings progressing around them.

Loading schedules specified that the 123d RCT would embark at Toem while the rest of the Division staged at Hollandia. A rendezvous at sea was to consolidate the two forces.

At Sarangani Bay, on the southern coast of Mindanao, the invasion fleet was to land elements of the 33d and 43d Divisions. Had the operation come off, the 130th Infantry would have gone in at H-hour with two battalions abreast on the right of the 43d. Its assigned mission was to secure the beachhead. At H plus 20 the 136th Infantry was scheduled to land behind a wave of tanks, pass through the 130th in column of battalions, and seize the Division's initial objective: a mountain six miles north of Sarangani Bay. The 123d RCT was designated Corps reserve, slated to come in on D plus 1.

Small solace was derived from the thought that much of the materiel and supplies unloaded by the Division went into Leyte behind the assault waves. Most men in the Golden Cross began to feel that the Division was World War II's forgotten unit. They began to call themselves the "4F" Division-the Finschhafen Freight Forwarding Force. A few months before, things hadn't taken on this appearance. Finschhafen was a name that still smacked of the jungle wars; fighting was transpiring at Hollandia, Aitape, Maffin Bay and Biak. The men could feel a kinship with the doughboys operating in these sectors. But Leyte! Now the war was two thousand miles away. From a strategic standpoint the Southwest Pacific campaign was finished.

Another six weeks went by before the Finschhafen Freight Forwarding Force ceased operations. On 4 December orders arrived at the Division CP directing the Golden Cross, less the 123d RCT, to break camp at Finschhafen and move on short notice to Morotai. Mission: reinforce the garrison on the island. Classification of the move: administrative.

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