BAGUIO'S capture precipitated an ironic situation in the 33d Division. "Take Baguio!" was the battle-cry that had echoed through the infantry regiments as tired doughboys peeled the Japs from

each bulwark in their vast defense in depth. The seizure of the summer capital was supposed to have been the climax for the Golden Cross: the reward for months of bloody campaigning along Kennon Road, Pugo Trail, and through the forbidding Galiano Valley. It was to have been the end-the mission accomplished. Still, at the precise moment that the flag was being raised over liberated Baguio, elements of the 136th Infantry were engaged in their most furious fighting in Luzon.

Baguio did not end it for the 136th or for the other regiments. Corps said there was more to be done. Rest for the weary was several fights away.

Nevertheless, the Division could take some measure of joy from the fact that the capture of Baguio started the Japanese on their downhill slide. Although a few enemy groups along the outskirts of the city resisted with their usual tenacity, evidences of a complete Japanese disintegration were unmistakable. When the Nips left Baguio they did so hastily and with a minimum of organization. Large stockpiles of supplies and materiel remained cached in the summer capital. Jap wounded were either murdered in their hospital beds by their own doctors or left to perish unattended. Yamashita himself-no longer the feared Tiger of Malaya but simply Filipino-dubbed "Old Potato Face"-beat a swift retreat from his "impregnable" citadel and sought refuge in the mountains lining the Cagayan Valley to the north.

Victory in Northern Luzon was in the air. Everyone could sense it. The enemy acted in the manner of a thoroughly beaten boxer, dazed and reeling, needing only a final blow to conclude the fight. In four months I Corps had reduced his five-year defense plan for Northern Luzon to a mockery.

Once Baguio was secured, General Swift dictated new missions to the 33d and 37th Divisions. Pursuit of the fleeing Japanese fell to the Buckeyes who quickly struck out for Trinidad, a city five miles north of the summer capital. The 33d was ordered to clean up enemy remnants around Loacan Airfield and scour the Antamok-Itogon vicinity for additional Nip survivors of the Baguio drive.

Colonel Serff's 3d Battalion, thus far denied a glimpse of Baguio, quickly combed out the Loacan zone while the 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, swept the area to the southeast, pushing down the rutted road that led from Antamok to Itogon. It was in this sector that the Golden

Cross added to its reputation as the "Money Division" of the Pacific. Numerous rich gold mines, annexed by the Japanese after the collapse of General Wainwright's 1942 defense, were scattered throughout the craggy hills surrounding these barrios.

Combat patrols were often forced to descend the shafts of these properties and probe the underground levels for Nipponese parties. Occasionally, small rifle and grenade actions occurred inside the mines. More often, however, 130th Infantry patrols found the levels strewn with the bodies of enemy troops. Some of these were suicides who preferred death to surrender, but the larger number were Japs who had been coldly butchered to facilitate the withdrawal from Baguio. Rather than retard the fleeing column, the enemy killed off his laggards and flung their bodies into the shafts.

In the course of Antamok-Itogon patrolling two of the largest gold lodes in the Philippine Islands were wrested from the Nips. One was the famous Balatoc Lode near Itogon, housing one of the richest veins in the Orient. The other, at Antamok, was the Consolidated Benguet Mine which had a 1940 yield of seventy-five million pesos in gold.

No one in the 123d and 130th Infantry Regiments was used to this sort of war. Enemy opposition was flimsy. The Nip defended no ground; instead he attempted to cover his withdrawals behind poorly organized rear guards. Consequently, Golden Cross troops caught many of them moving through the exposed valleys, oblivious to anything but escape. Patrols were able to work up to commanding heights overlooking these escape routes and throw plunging fire into the Japanese.

Doughs called the period from 29 April to 5 May a "gentleman's war." Trucks picked them up at their Baguio camps shortly after breakfast and carried them to an area of operations. M-7s, scout cars from the Recon Troop, or attached tanks always accompanied the foot troops in the event that unexpected opposition was encountered. There was never a day when a company emplaced on top of a hill could not sight small groups of Japs picking their way northward toward the Mountain Trail and Ambuclao. Golden Cross infantrymen would then unleash everything from carbines to 105s. At the conclusion of the day's hunt, trucks would be waiting on the nearest road to speed them back to their tents at Baguio.

Any possible counteraction against Baguio-even by suicide groups -was dispelled by the patrols and roadblocks of the 123d and 130th Infantry Regiments. As far as the enemy was concerned, Baguio was lost. His only hope of retaining a foothold in Luzon lay in making a stand north of the city.

Corps anticipated such a move. On 1 May an order reached Division headquarters alerting the 33d for an advance into the mountains north of Baguio. At this time it became imperative for Corps to free the 37th Division from the Baguio area. The 32d and 25th Divisions were nearing the ends of the Villa Verde Trail and Balete Pass, respectively, and their simultaneous entrance into the broad Cagayan Valley was expected momentarily. Once this breach was gained, General Swift desired a comparatively fresh division for the chase through the flatland. Shortly after the alert was received General Clarkson was summoned to the Corps CP at Rosales and given orders to relieve the Buckeyes at Trinidad.

Immediately upon his return to the summer capital, the Golden Cross commander issued Division Field Order No. 20 dated 2 May, directing units of the 1234 and 130th Infantry Regiments to take over the positions of the 129th Infantry. The relief was to be completed by 1200 on 5 May.

All units were in position at the appointed time: the 3d Battalion, 123d Infantry, back from Kennon Road, at Trinidad, and the 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, just south of Acop's Place. Their mission was defined as "vigorous combat patrols and reconnaissance in force in the Trinidad-Acop's Place sector." The Corps commander specifically forbade a Division drive. That was to follow at a later date.

One of the main arteries in the Northern Luzon wilderness is a narrow, winding dirt road known as Mountain Trail. Curling its way from Trinidad to Bontoc, the road finally emerges into the cultivated expanses of the Cagayan Valley. Throughout its length Mountain Trail is carved out of pine-covered hills and ridges. On the open side of the roadway the ground falls off precipitously to jungle-laden ravines hundreds of feet below, while the other extreme is evident on the closed side where the mountains sharply rise to mile-high levels.

Intelligence reports compiled by the 37th Division indicated that a major enemy garrison had built a strong defense in depth in the eight miles of mountain separating Acop's Place from Tabio. For the 130th Infantry, the "gentleman's war" of Antamok-Itogon became a thing of the past. The regiment was faced with the same brutal mountains with rocky cliffs shearing their sides and the same twisted conglomeration of gullies and valleys that had drawn out the Battle for Baguio. But three principal differences separated Mountain Trail campaigning from the category of the Asin Tunnel and Question Mark Hill fights.

First of all, it wasn't the same old Jap. The enemy near Acop's Place was just as wily and cunning, but he lacked the supplies and materiel

which had enabled him to stall Division advances in the early days of the Luzon show. Secondly, the weather was more conducive to successful combat operations. In place of the humid, nauseating heat encountered prior to the liberation of the summer capital, doughs resumed the chase in the cool, rarefied atmosphere peculiar to Baguio. Troops entering the line north of the city augmented their combat loads with field jackets and blankets; an odd sight compared to these same riflemen a month ago who then carried nothing heavier than a poncho. The skyscraping evergreen country was generally cool during the day and exceptionally chilly after sundown.

Finally, there was a major difference in terrain. The lie of the land was such that each Japanese hill-holding force was virtually isolated. From 15 February until Baguio fell, the Nips invariably held the high ground not only confronting attacking doughs but dominating terrain on either flank as well. They could, therefore, fortify these points with a view to all-around defense. Not any more. Due to the deep, wide valleys running parallel to the road in the Mountain Trail area, the Jap could not bolster the defense of one ridge by placing troops on adjoining ridges. They were too far apart to be mutually supporting.

Now it was possible to concentrate on attacking in one direction without fear of reprisal along the flanks and rear.

The Acop's Place-Tabio ridge looked formidable. Long, low saddles cut horizontal swaths across it, breaking the entire terrain feature into a series of separate targets. Each knob was known to be fortified. It was obvious to regimental headquarters that when the advance was resumed, the ridge would assume high priority. For the sake of convenience in planning, each separate hill was given a name. The one closest to the regiment was named Pyramidal Hill with Flat Top, Naked Tree, Round Top, Chocolate Drop, Horizon Ridge, Totem Pole and Bald Top following in close succession.

Lieutenant Colonel Faulconer, the 2d Battalion commander, gradually supplanted his initial reconnaissance patrols with combat-recon groups up to platoon strength. Operating without the pressure generally applied by higher headquarters, these patrols had sufficient time to methodically rake through the Acop's Place hills. By 15 May elements of Companies E and F, led by Captains Unrein and Dellinger, with Recon Troop elements attached, had searched out Mountain Trail to a point three thousand yards northeast of their battalion base.

Patrol reports were both encouraging and depressing. As a fighter the Jap was only a shadow of his former self. He was poorly equipped, half-starved, and low in morale. But the enemy's constant ally-terrain -refused to desert him. Reconnaissance parties found the dirt road to be in foul shape. Huge logs, oversized boulders, mines, and landslides blocked forward progress. Fortunately, time was on the Blackhawks' side. With Division still waiting for Corps' "go ahead," it was possible to have supporting arms and services come up and clear the path for the anticipated infantry drive. Meanwhile, patrolling could continue.

Company B, 108th Engineers, attached to the 130th Infantry, sent up bulldozers and mine-clearing squads. With a platoon of infantry as security, and a tank following in the rear as added protection, the engineers were able to open Mountain Trail to vehicular traffic in a few days. While the engineers were sweeping the trail, Lt. Colonel Faulconer developed his battalion base at Acop's Place into an impregnable perimeter. Colonel Collins termed it "the strongest defensive position ever held by the regiment in Luzon" as he inspected sandbagged emplacements, clear fields of fire, and the maze of protective barbed wire encircling the position.

Even though they were still in combat, 130th Infantry troops did not find life at Acop's Place unbearable. Colonel Colins had company kitchens brought forward and set into the perimeter. Soon all troops were receiving two hot meals daily. Mail was carried up and distributed the same day that it arrived at APO 33 in Baguio. Covered pillboxes were speedily constructed and Blackhawk infantrymen were no longer at the mercy of the elements. Patrol requirements were rotated so that most troops could obtain adequate rest between assignments. And to top it off, the Nips wanted no part of the 2d Battalion's forbidding position. Occasionally a few made forays against the outer defenses but they were invariably beaten off with automatic fire.

Colonel Collins felt certain that his regiment would be ultimately charged with reducing the Acop's Place-Tabio ridge. While waiting for Corps to give the Division its head, "The Ripper" scheduled daily air strikes against the objective. Cubs flew reconnaissances over the ridge, selecting the strongest-appearing enemy installations as firstpriority targets. Artillery liaison pilots' finds, coupled with ground reports, were entered on Air Force charts and photographs. When the P-51s finally appeared for the actual strike, Golden Cross L-4s led them over the ridge and marked primary targets with white phosphorus grenades.

An air strike near Acop's Place drew more spectators than a carnival. As soon as the roar of the Mustangs approaching the target was heard, 2d Battalion riflemen swarmed out of their pillboxes and jostled each other for the best seats on the crest of the hill. Each Napalm or HE explosion brought cheers from the assemblage.

For the Blackhawks, this was combat at its best. Each crunch of an exploding bomb meant less Nips to contend with when they finally advanced against the ridge. Each shimmering sea of flame that followed the drop of Napalm meant less concealment for the enemy. When the Air Force finished their runs, 33d Division Artillery immediately took up the slack and maintained the high-explosive pounding. This was one time when the Jap was really taking it and had no answer to send over in reply.

The Corps order came through on 30 May: ". . . Secure high ground between Acop's Place and Tabio. Continue along Mountain Trail, keeping the road open, until Tabio is seized. . ."

After, weeks of planning, patrolling and pounding, the 130th Infantry needed nothing more than the word to go. The stage had long since been set. Morale was high; troops had shaken off the effects of the exhausting advance to Baguio.

D-day on Mountain Trail arrived the following morning. At the crack of dawn all firing batteries of the 124th Field Artillery Battalion turned their guns on Pyramidal Hill. Volley after volley thundered into the target. Lt. Colonel Talbott's 1st Battalion moved through 2d Battalion positions at Acop's Place shortly after breakfast and advanced toward the base of Pyramidal. War in Luzon was on again. The "armistice" was over.

Shells continued to smash the objective as the assault company began its laborious ascent to the crest. Heavy machine guns and mortars opened up at this point to augment artillery fires. As the lead scouts paused short of the summit, all fires abruptly shifted from Pyramidal to Flat Top, the towering knob just beyond the initial objective. A stream of riflemen came over the crest of the hill while the enemy was vainly fighting to throw off the shock action of the howitzers. Weeks of pounding had been too much for the Jap, and he could make only a token effort to defend his strongpoint. In a matter of minutes the entire enemy garrison went down before the infantrymen's small-arms fire. Pyramidal Hill came fast and easy.

Remaining daylight hours were spent in sweeping the draws and gullies running down the hillside. During this mopping up phase, other elements of the 1st Battalion drove up Mountain Trail, moving their line parallel to the foot of Pyramidal Hill. Flat Top was next. 'The Ripper" was anxious to prevent enemy reorganization. He pulled his 3d Battalion into the fight from its Baguio rest camp and had Lt. Colonel Blake's doughs take over 1st Battalion positions as soon as Pyramidal became 130th Infantry property. The attack was scheduled to be resumed the following day.

Flat Top received the same type of artillery concentration that had hit the Pyramidal Hill defenders. Plans of attack and fire coordination were identical. Item and King Companies, now commanded by Capts. John Crowther and Kennedy, respectively, took over spearhead duties. Again the tremendous effects of artillery fire allowed riflemen to walk onto the objective unopposed. If anything, the Flat Top defense was more feeble than the Japs' pitiful stand on Pyramidal. Major Ernest Kenny, regimental S-3, checked Flat Top off the operations map at 0930.

Combat for the day did not end with the capture of the second objective. With all companies active, the battalion swept down the ridge, going up and over each hillock in the manner of a Coney Island roller coaster. By dark Blackhawk troops had taken Naked Tree, Round Top and Chocolate Drop. Casualties for the day in the 130th Infantry were one killed in action, six wounded. The enemy lost sixty-one counted dead.

Horizon Ridge, next on the regimental agenda, appeared to harbor trouble. Artillery liaison pilots, reconnoitering from the air, radioed back to headquarters that the enemy had several machine-gun emplacements on Horizon Ridge, each sited to cover avenues of approach. Thick walls of sod-similar to the stone fences sprinkled throughout the New England countryside concealed enemy movements on top of the hill. Not only was the position surrounded by such barriers, but others had been erected which sliced through the position at odd angles. By moving along the bases of these walls, the Japanese were able to take covered routes in traveling from one point to another within the small fortress.

Kennedy's King Company was brought up to Chocolate Drop as soon as it was seized and alerted for the attack against Horizon Ridge. Artillery and infantry commanders worked out a fire-support plan designated to neutralize the skein of fence-like fortifications atop Horizon Ridge. Steady howitzer fire was to remain on the target until the forward platoons were within assaulting range. Then, at the precise moment that artillery fires were lifted, 81mm mortars would open up on the reverse slope. It was hoped that the switch from artillery to mortars would go unnoticed by the enemy and that the ridge could be occupied while they remained under cover.

Anxious to maintain the initiative, Lt. Colonel Blake sent the 3d Battalion forward at dawn in a column of companies with K in the lead. Love and Item followed in that order. The artillery-mortar switch worked to perfection. As the barrage changed from 105mm shells to 81s King Company stormed the enemy strongpoint. At last the groggy Japanese came staggering out of their foxholes toward their machine guns-but too late. They were mowed down in the open. Even if they had succeeded in working back to their pillboxes and bunkers their subsequent efforts would have been fruitless. Howitzer fire had destroyed or buried more than fifteen Nip machine guns.

While his company was combing through the walled-in position, Captain Kennedy noticed a group of Japanese converging on a small hill approximately three hundred yards farther up the ridgeline. The resourceful Oregonian decided to gamble on the possibility that these Nips were remnants and not part of a force assigned to defend the knob. Reorganizing his men, Kennedy took them forward, hoping to engage the enemy before they had an opportunity to develop the position. Observers at the battalion OP were dumbfounded to see a green-clad wave drive through the saddle separating the hills and quickly mount the crest. Fortunately, artillery and mortar FOs retained enough presence of mind to suspend their fires.

For a moment the command group could not determine whether the people in the saddle were advancing Americans or retreating Japanese. Their enigma was cleared up when Kennedy radioed Lt. Colonel Blake: "Have secured the rest of Horizon Ridge. Am now mopping up in gullies surrounding my position. No casualties." With this, orders came from battalion directing the rifle companies to halt all advances and fortify the newly captured territory. It was now late afternoon and dark clouds were beginning to close over the top of Horizon Ridge.

Ridge top advances had long since outdistanced progress along Mountain Trail proper. As the Japanese fell back, they dynamited the adjacent cliff side in many places, causing several huge landslides. Traffic was completely blocked. The Jap was clever in this respect. Weeks before, when he was alone in this sector, he registered 75mm mountain guns, located in the hills near Tabio, on every curve and dip in the road. When engineers and infantry came up to clear the trail, the Jap shelled them with accurate fire from these concealed pieces. Casualties were few, but one Nip round knocked out an engineer bulldozer.

Shortly after Lt. Colonel Blake's order to "dig in and hold," an artillery forward observer at the battalion OP spotted a column of troops running at full speed across a shallow cut leading from Bald Top to Totem Pole. The mustard-colored uniforms and unwieldy Arisaka rifles of the Japanese were unmistakable despite almost-opaque clouds enveloping 3d Battalion positions. It penetrated in a split second. counterattack!

An emergency call went to the artillery for fire on the cut. Lt. Colonel Carlson's 124th Field Artillery took this mission and rapidly adjusted on the target. Peering through his field glasses, the artillery observer could see Jap bodies blown clear out of the cut as they were caught by HE blasts. The' cut became a holocaust of bursting shells. A few Nips got out, but Company I, now alerted as to enemy intentions, brought them down with rifle and BAR fire.

Luzon was slashed wide open during the first week in June. In other division sectors of I Corps the 32d and 25th Infantry Divisions had finally managed to hack their way through Villa Verde Trail and Balete Pass. These two divisions spilled out of the mountains onto the threshold of the flat Cagayan Valley. Months of bitter fighting had sliced Yamashita's crumbling 14th Area Army into a series of pockets which stretched from Acop's Place on Mountain Trail to Aparri on the northern tip of the island.

General Beightler's Buckeye Division, rested and poised for the drive up the fertile flatland that would administer the coup de grace to the erstwhile "Tiger," was pulled up to the southern entrance of the Cagayan Valley and given a free rein. Backed up by one of the most gigantic displays of power ever turned loose against the Japanese, the 37th Division was cutting through the Jap defenses like a hot knife through butter.

Nevertheless, the countless pockets scattered the length and breadth of Luzon held several thousand enemy. They remained capable of engineering large-scale harassments of lines of supply and communication. Actually, if no precautionary measures were taken, the Jap had enough left in men and weapons to swing around the rear of the flying 37th, and engage rear echelon groups which were supporting the spearhead elements.

Corps readily recognized the need for protecting the Buckeyes' naked rear and for liquidating Jap remnants. He enlarged the Golden Cross mission while the 130th Infantry was pushing northeast from Acop's Place to Tabio. The original mission, including the capture of Tabio. was to be continued, but in addition General Swift directed that Division elements break off Mountain Trail at the junction of the Bokod road and move east. Troops of the 6th Division were making a similar forward-lateral movement to the west. From a tactical standpoint, a junction between these two divisions would pen all Jap remnants into the Cagayan Valley sector where they would fall easy prey to the 37th Division.

Air reconnaissance disclosed that the Bokod road forked away from Mountain Trail at KP 21, a junction two and a half miles south of Tabio. From KP 21, the road followed the ridge sides through Panasan, Laboy, Inticak, and the Agno River Valley to the small Igorot barrio of Ambuclao. From there it skirted a long, scenic valley into Bokod. Aerial photos showed the Bokod Valley to be dotted with native shacks and lush with tropical fruits. Papaya, mango, and banana groves were in abundance on the valley's gently rolling slopes. Large rice paddies covered its floor.

Intelligence reports estimated that large numbers of enemy troops infested the Bokod Valley, attracted by the promise of food. Also, it represented a natural route of withdrawal for them. Travel on a road-even a poor one-was far more rapid and comfortable than a cross-country retreat.

Command and staff groups within the 130th Infantry quickly adopted an over-all tactical plan. Two battalions would drive toward Ambuclao from the west: one by way of the Bokod road and the other along the lofty ridgelines overlooking the road. The third was to be held back as a reserve force. It looked like a repetition of Mountain Trail tactics. The conditions of both roads was similar. Retreating Japs, en route to the Bokod Valley, had blown large gaps in the road and had also blasted the walls of the ridges causing landslides. Photos showed the road to be blocked in a score of exposed places. Even in the planning stage it became evident that supply and fire support would pose a terrific problem. The Bokod road could not take supply and artillery traffic. When the plan went into effect each eastward step would take the Blackhawks that much farther from supply bases. Too many steps and the line would snap.

Before actual accomplishment of the new task could be considered however, it was first necessary for the 130th Infantry to secure KP 21 and clean up the Tabio phase of the operation.

Antitank and Love Companies left the Horizon Ridge area on the morning of 4 June with Bald Top as their objective. Again well placed artillery fire transformed a tough job into a relatively simple one. The hill fell after a brief fight, yielding with it two of the 75mm mountain guns that had worked over engineer and infantry repair parties along Mountain Trail. KP 21 was plainly visible from the crest of Bald Top. Antitankers, commanded by Capt. Power Bethea, moved down to the trail following the fall of Bald Top and advanced on KP 21. Love Company set out for the same objective, employing a long spur running down from Bald Top to the junction as its avenue of approach.

Bald Top served as a guardian for KP 21. When it fell, the road junction defenses went down with it. The actual intersection was defended by exactly two Nips holed up in a large mud-and-log pillbox. As foot troops closed in on KP 21, two tanks rolled up to the front. One of the mediums stood back two hundred yards from the enemy emplacement and threw a point-blank salvo into the embrasure. Antitank Company walked on to the intersection.

With the junction in 130th Infantry hands, troops at the scene set out to consolidate their holdings. One company-Antitank-moved off the roadway and took over a piece of high ground north of KP 21. Company L began to scour out nearby ravines in search of stragglers. Sensing no further action on the road proper, both tanks continued up to the junction where the crews unbuttoned the hatches and clambered out for a smoke and a stretch. Three Japanese artillery rounds suddenly ploughed into KP 21, one making a direct hit on a tank and killing three men.

Enemy 90mm mortars took the artillery fires as an excuse to unleash a barrage of their own. Before the grayish haze of the explosions on KP 21 had cleared, mortar rounds began to pound Antitank positions just off the roadway. Efforts to locate the Nipponese guns were cut short when a foggy blanket descended from the skies and settled over all battalion perimeters. The mountain guns stilled their fires at the abrupt change in weather but the mortars continued to pour it on to Antitank Company until nightfall.

But now it was just a hop and a skip to Tabio. The desolate barrio nestled snugly on the reserve slope of a mountain mass due north of KP 21. Actually the twisted network of hills consisted of five distinct knobs stemming from the same long ridge. Tabio Ridge literally held the key to the city. It was the Blackhawks' final barrier.

An obvious route of approach for the 3d Battalion was to move up Mountain Trail, through KP 21, and then onto the ridge by means of a frontal assault. Lt. Colonel Blake rejected this plan. Its drawbacks were many. First of all there could be no element of surprise unless

the attack were made after dark. From the ridge, the Jap could count every blade of grass at KP 21. It would not take him long to anchor a defense in the path of the 3d Battalion. Equally important a consideration was the fact that the enemy had his artillery and mortars zeroed in on the road junction. Attempts to cross KP 21 conceivably could result in excessive casualties.

Instead, Lt. Colonel Blake rested his chance for success on a wide flanking maneuver. Company 1, with two platoons of guerrillas attached, assembled behind the crest of Bald Top on the morning of 6 June. Moving downhill to the east, the force crossed Mountain Trail a thousand yards below KP 21 and dropped into a huge, bush covered valley separating the Bokod road and Mountain Trail. Swinging wide to evade the scope of Japanese observation, the column skirted the walls of the valley until it reached a point below the Bokod road about a mile east of KP 21.

Now came the test. Item Company had to cross the exposed Bokod road and veer toward the left flank of the enemy-held strongpoint. It was a tense moment back at the CP. Commanders literally held their breath waiting for a Nip machine-gun tip-off that the column had been sighted and intercepted. Minutes passed with no word from the company. The tension dissolved a moment later when Captain Crowther radioed in his report: "We are about to cross the road. Will call back for fire support as soon as we reach the base of the ridge. Believe that we are still undetected by the enemy."

Crowther split the force into pairs and threes and had each group cross the open road in a single rush. A few minutes later he called Lt. Colonel Blake: "Give us everything you've got back there. We're on the way." Heavy machine guns on Bald Top opened up first, spraying the ridge with long bursts. Then the hollow pop of mortar shells leaving the tubes could be heard as Company M's 81s began a shelling of all suspected enemy positions. Supporting fires reached their full fury when Golden Cross artillery sent rounds screaming into the ridge-side. M-7s also joined in the melee.

Now observers could see Item Company scouts move up on the enemy flank. Another call came from the company CP: "Cease fire. We're moving in." The scouts charged over the crest and the remainder of the column followed. Rifles, BARS and grenades went into action. Surprised Nips clawed their way out of crumbling emplacements in an effort to push Company I back from the ridge-top. Before they could bring any concentrated fire to bear on the Blackhawks they were wiped out. Crowther made his final call to battalion: "Hill secured. Twenty-four enemy killed. No friendly casualties." A bold gamble had paid handsome dividends. As soon as the adjoining knobs on the ridge were mopped up, Tabio would fall.

Battalion took immediate steps to protect its gains. Company L was summoned from Bald Top and given orders to proceed to Item Company and assist in holding the position. Lt. Colonel Blake and Colonel Collins felt that the Blackhawk foothold on the ridge would assume high priority when the enemy decided to counterattack. In an effort to bolster Crowther's position a company of Filipinos from the 1st Tarlac Regiment was sent forward to occupy a small hill rising midway between Item's perimeter and the CP. Occupation of this hill would preclude the possibility of an enemy cut-off of Companies I and L.

Staff Sergeant Howard E. Woodford, battalion S-2 sergeant, volunteered to guide the guerrilla group into position. He was instructed to lead the company to its position atop the hill and then return to the CP. It was mid-afternoon when the column finally got under way. Moving slowly, Woodford led his charges up a precipitous draw leading to his objective. Trees and vines blocked observation. Progress was difficult; even the sure-footed Filipinos had to struggle for balance during the steep climb. Sergeant Woodford finally sighted his objective.

As the column momentarily paused to re-group prior to moving on to the objective, three Nambus simultaneously opened up from point-blank range. One gun, in line with the axis of the guerrilla column, enfiladed the company while the others poured in fire from each flank. Panic seized the green, untried outfit. Most of them broke and scattered in the face of the machine-gun fire.

Woodford quickly sized up the situation. He got up from his instinctive prone position and charged full tilt toward the centrally located gun, working his M-1 as he ran. The Nips turned their fire on the 25-year-old Ohioan but he miraculously went unscathed. Sprinting up to the edge of the emplacement, Woodford flung a grenade into the embrasure. Turning around, he killed four more Japanese riflemen with M-1 fire. He quickly shouted for the Filipino bazooka team to join him on the hill.

Taking heart from this inspiring one-man stand, the guerrillas reorganized and the bazooka team went forward. Woodford then directed fire which put the flanking machine guns out of action. With' all Nambus silenced, the Jap defense turned from stone into dust. The company walked onto the knob and began to dig in for the night. Sergeant Woodford next sent a runner back to battalion with news

of the fight and a request for engineer tools and an SCR-300. When the messenger and the radio returned to the guerrilla position, Woodford checked in with the Mike Company mortars and asked for protective fires in the many draws leading down from his position.

Mortar registration was completed by dusk. When all defensive preparations for the night were finished, Woodford radioed a report back to the CP. He received orders to return to the battalion. The young sergeant replied by requesting permission to stay with the guerrillas until the following morning. As his men were still shaken from the suddenness of the afternoon's action, Woodford felt that a steadying hand would do no harm in the event that the enemy sought to retake the ground. His request was granted.

The anticipated counterattack materialized that night at 0200. Approximately seventy-five enemy troops rushed the frail perimeter in one fanatical charge. As soon as movement was detected Woodford got his battalion's mortars on the -300 and asked for fires around his position. In a matter of seconds the dull crunch of exploding 81s mingled with the sound of the Japs' shrill "Banzai!" battle-cry. But desperate Nips, crazed with hunger, braved the heavy bombardment and charged on through the outer line of the perimeter defense. A shower of grenades rained on the Filipinos.

Fragments from one of the first Nip grenades found Woodford. But realizing the vital need for leadership at this critical point, he crawled out of his foxhole and traveled from position to position within his perimeter encouraging his troops to repel the attack. The Filipino infantrymen, still awed by Woodford's daytime demonstration of fearlessness, again responded and shouted defiance at the enemy.

Sergeant Woodford noticed a large gap develop in the line during his dashes from one point to another. Japs seemed to pour through it. Crouched over his rifle and pumping shots as he advanced, the alert veteran of Bench Mark beat back the Nips with M-1 fire. At the outer edge of the perimeter Woodford found a slit trench containing the bodies of two guerrillas who had been bayoneted in the enemy's initial thrust. He dropped into the hole and prepared to tighten his line with rifle fire and grenades. For the next two hours guerrillas in flanking foxholes could see Woodford's M-1 split the darkness in answer to each enemy drive against him.

Just as they had attacked without warning, the enemy suddenly broke contact and ghosted away into the night about a half-hour before dawn. The entire company-green hands no longer-breathed a collective sigh of relief. Unable to restrain their admiration, the Filipinos whispered to each other of Woodford's heroism. But no sound was heard from the hole where Sergeant Woodford was last seen. Could it be that the American sergeant expected the Japanese to return?

At daylight Capt. Domingo D. Quibuyen, guerrilla commander, left his foxhole and checked the perimeter. He stepped over blood-covered Nip bodies as he headed straight for Sergeant Woodford's foxhole. Woodford lay sprawled in the hole, dead. Captain Quibuyen counted the bodies of thirty-seven enemy within a ten-yard radius of his emplacement. The Filipino soldier immediately established contact with the battalion CP and rendered a detailed report of the sergeant's unsurpassed intrepidity.

Several months later the Medal of Honor was presented to the dead doughboy's father, Mr. Dwight D. Woodford of Barberton, Ohio.

While the attack against Sergeant Woodford's perimeter was at its height another band of Japs struck at the Item-Love position, several hundred yards to the east. Again night-long grenade duels took place, but here the Nip made no attempt to actually pierce the Blackhawk line. He sought only to mask the main effort against the guerrillas which, if it had been successful, would have imperiled all battalion installations:

Commanders expected the dawn of 7 June to usher in a monumental day for the Blackhawks. Progress of late had fulfilled even the most optimistic predictions. Casualties were extremely moderate, many objectives had been overrun, troops were rested and keyed to a fighting pitch, and coordination between arms was superb. To top it off, the enemy had taken a severe mauling in the seven days of Mountain Trail advances. All 3d Battalion men anticipated the accomplishment of the first mission by sundown. It was inconceivable that the battalion would fail to crack the thin defense around Tabio.

But no attack was made on 7 June. Weather-a constant ally of the Jap once he had been deserted by terrain-precluded a continuation of the steady dawn-to-dusk pressure. At 1000 the inevitable fog drifted in, heavier than ever before, and totally blacked out all objectives. Without visibility, supporting weapons could not be registered. Colonel Collins had no alternative but to postpone the scheduled drive. By advancing through the foul weather the Blackhawks would be meeting the Jap on his own terms: rifleman against rifleman. Golden Cross howitzers, tanks, mortars and machine guns would be relegated to an inactive role.

Doughs in all battalion positions relaxed once word of the postponement was handed down. At the CP north of KP 21 troops walked around the perimeter voicing opinions to each other on when the weather would take a turn for the better. Suddenly a shot rang out. Headquarters men stood transfixed for a moment wondering whether the shot was a Jap-fired wild round or an accidental discharge from within the perimeter. Then another shot split the stillness. Doughs And commanders alike dove for their holes. A single Nip had worked up to the edge of the perimeter and selected his targets carefully. Real damage had been done.

The first round caught Lt. Colonel Truxtun in the brain and killed him instantly. The popular commander of the 210th Field Artillery battalion had come up to the 3d Battalion area to personally direct artillery fires on Tabio. Major Balch, 3d Battalion executive officer, took the other bullet. He too suffered a head wound. Medics administered first aid to the stocky, slightly bald officer and immediately evacuated him to a field hospital. Major Balch lingered between life and death for several days but finally succumbed. Both men were mourned in the Division.

Pea-soup fog held sway over Mountain Trail for five solid days. During this period no attempts were made to continue on to Tabio. General Clarkson was in full accord with "The Ripper's" plan of moving only when full strength could be applied against the enemy. Neither wished to take unnecessary gambles with human lives.

Regimental headquarters put this interim period to good advantage. I'lans for a speedy completion of the secondary mission were given finishing touches. The 3d Battalion was notified that Tabio would be its show when clear weather broke over Mountain Trail. Colonel Collins had the 2d Battalion brought up to KP 21 during a momentary lull in the overcast. It was readied to branch off onto the Bokod road as soon as the word was given. Supplies continued to come up from Baguio and large stockpiles of food and ammunition were assembled.

Finally the fog broke. On 12 June "The Ripper" ordered advances in all battalion sectors. Lt. Colonel Blake's unit-reinforced by Company B-began its attack on Tabio in the late morning. Simultaneously the 2d Battalion moved out on the high ground flanking the Bokod road. Both battalions rolled up substantial gains by nightfall. The 3d Battalion was dug in just outside Tabio and Lt. Colonel Faulconer's force had spanned the ridges until they overlooked the barrio of Panasan.

Tabio fell at noon the following day in the face of an all-out attack. The enemy was literally buried beneath an avalanche of high explosives and then overrun by Blackhawk riflemen. As one riflleman put it, "The Nips crawled out of their shelters as soon as the barrage lifted and stood at parade rest." Not a single friendly casualty was incurred during the actual attack. General Clarkson ordered the 3d Battalion, 136th Infantry, then resting in Baguio, to relieve Lt. Colonel Blake's 3d Battalion at Tabio. Its mission consisted of mopping-up and long-range combat patrolling. The 130th Infantry battalion went back to Baguio for a rest.

As Lt. Colonel Blake took his men back to the summer capital, the 1st Battalion moved forward to join the fight. Colonel Collins sent it down the Bokod road to reinforce the 2d Battalion.

Blackhawks in the Bokod road sector found tough going. Enemy opposition was not an especially difficult problem. The Bokod road Jap was a far cry from the pre-Baguio Jap who was consistently well armed, high in morale, and in possession of near-impregnable positions. lie couldn't halt the battalion. But weather and terrain could. The mile-high mountains ranging the length of the road did much to substantiate the doughboy's belief that he was facing the most rugged terrain encountered in the course of Pacific warfare. Tropical rains poured down on the road daily, drenching men and equipment and reducing trails to sticky quagmires.

While the 2d Battalion was striking along the muddy ridges lining the road, Lt. Colonel Talbott's unit kept pace on the roadway below. Easy and Fox Companies spearheaded the ridgeline advances while Able and Charley Companies were charged with performing the same task for the highway force. Superior strength in men and weapons told at every turn. Numerous enemy pockets were encountered in morning drives, but all were smashed without undue difficulty. Blackhawks began to bag enemy prisoners for the first time in their combat careers. Both battalions passed through Laboy at noon. Pausing there only to re-group, they moved on and by 1700 stood poised to hit Ambuclao.

Gains along every front should have provided reasons for rejoicing. Instead, they were sources of grave concern. Mud and landslides had finally combined to close down the Bokod road. Supply lines were ruptured. Each forward step brought the regiment closer to a link-up with the 6th Division, but also clouded an already critical supply picture. If it was next to impossible to supply the battalions at Ambuclao now, what would happen when they moved up to Bokod ? The problem seemed to be insoluble.

Efforts were redoubled to determine an efficient method of servicing the fast-moving battalion columns. Artillery liaison pilots flew daily photo missions over the Bokod road hoping that ground commanders could locate an overlooked approach. Interpretation of these photographs indicated only that the low valleys near Ambuclao and Bokod would make ideal drop areas in the event that the two battalions had to be supplied by air. This knowledge was small consolation.

In a last-ditch attempt to keep the forward elements rolling, Colonel Collins took to the air on personal reconnaissance. He sought the same thing as other observers: a road or trail that followed the Bokod road into Ambuclao. The regimental commander vaguely remembered a narrow trail that branched to the east from Mountain Trail. He had spotted it during the fighting around Tabio. Quickly he instructed Lieutenant Brisely, his pilot, to head for the Tabio area. If nothing else, at least this trail represented a live possibility.

The light L-4 dipped below the clouds hovering around the barrio. After several minutes of orientation, Colonel Collins finally spotted an almost indistinguishable thread winding down the side of a high ridge. Brisely throttled down the Cub and slowly followed the trail as it cut to the east. As each mile unfolded beneath the wings of the small craft the regimental commander's hopes were buoyed. At last "The Ripper" spotted the eastern terminus of the trail. It ended at Ambuclao.

As soon as he jeeped back to his CP, Colonel Collins sent for the I&R Platoon leader. "The Ripper" told him to take the platoon and scout out the trail from beginning to end. Hours later this patrol arrived at 1st Battalion positions at Ambuclao and radioed its report. The leader strongly recommended that the new route supplant the slide-pocked Bokod road as the regimental supply line. He claimed that the ground was firmer, affording better footing. Another factor cited by the leader was the observation that the trail route was several hours faster than the road. Regiment capitalized on this information at once.

Several hundred carriers hauling thousands of pounds of vital supplies and impedimenta, left KP 21 for Ambuclao on the morning of 15 June. Two rifle companies of Filipino troops accompanied the train as security. But unfortunately the Ambuclao battalions could not wait for the supply column to reach their position. Higher headquarters was demanding a rapid completion of the mission. No delays would be countenanced. Regiment had no choice but to order an advance despite the fact that 1st and 2d Battalion rations were dangerously low.

An air drop was scheduled to temporarily alleviate the food situation Fifth Air Force C-47s roared over the Ambuclao Valley on 15 June, even as the Filipino carriers were plodding along the trail route to the barrio. Regimental supply personnel flying with the airmen kicked out case after case of ammunition and K rations. Ordnance recovery was excellent but just a scant amount of food crates were located. As the 2d Battalion was scheduled to assume spearhead duties past Ambuclao, it received first priority. Lt. Colonel Faulconer's men were fully supplied while the 1st Battalion went on two-thirds ration. The situation was further complicated when the carriers pulled in that afternoon. They were completely exhausted from their rugged trip and unable to make their return until the following day. Consequently, they were forced to break open the same cases of rations that they had hauled forward for troop consumption. Dreams of a ration stockpile vanished.

During these developments the 2d Battalion left Ambuclao. Slight resistance was met after crossing the twisting Agno River but all fire fights were of short duration. The Nips simply faded before crushing fire superiority. After digging in for the night some four thousand yards from Ambuclao, the battalion commander reported to the regimental CP that 140 Japanese had been killed in the day's campaigning. One Blackhawk had been fatally wounded but there were no other casualties.

One of the largest dumps captured by the Division in Northern Luzon was seized by the 130th Infantry during the day's operationsa Nip motor pool of more than fifty vehicles. Located some two thousand yards east of Ambuclao, the park held everything from heavyduty trucks to a sleek, shiny Buick sedan. Souvenir hunters had a field lay. A search unearthed such choice pickings as a neatly pressed Jap general's uniform, complete with ribbons. Far more thrilling a discovery was the sight of several sacks of rice in the pool's deserted field kitchen. Doughs built small fires and cooked the food in their steel helmets.

At this stage of the campaign Blackhawk leaders were genuinely Alarmed over the food and evacuation difficulties. As the spearhead advanced toward Bokod company commanders grew increasingly fearful of casualties. Except for on-the-spot first aid, a litter case had to be hauled clear back to Ambuclao before he could receive adequate medical care. Additional air drops and carrying parties had managed to bolster the ration situation at Ambuclao, but there was no way of getting needed supplies up to the spearhead. The number of Filipino carriers was limited. It took them a full day for a round trip from Mountain Trail to Ambuclao. If they were used to continue on to Lt. Colonel Faulconer's force, the Mountain Trail-Ambuclao line would suffer.

Captain Charles A. Campbell, in command of Regimental Headquarters Company, came up with the solution to these problems. He organized the famed "Ambuclao-Bokod Transit Company," a "corporation" dedicated to bringing supplies from rear area to front line. Captain Campbell worked out a relay system of transporting food that included the use of wrecked Jap jeeps, worthless trucks, and a herd of carabaos. It worked in this fashion: a food-laden carabao would waddle down the Bokod road from Ambuclao until the first landslide was encountered. There troops would unload the animals, work the boxes over the roadblocks, and into a Jap jeep or truck. From here, rations would be hauled to the next slide where they were removed from the vehicles, again carried over the obstacle and then reloaded on a carabao or another vehicle. The system was slow and not very dazzling, but it worked. The big drawback, of course, was the limited amount of supplies that could be transported in this fashion.

Advances continued and by dusk of the 16th, the 3d Battalion was within striking distance of the Bokod Valley. That morning the 1st Battalion had cleared Ambuclao en route to reinforce the drive on Bokod. Reports from Lt. Colonel Faulconer indicated that the Bokod attack would take place the following morning. Air liaison officers told the battalion commander that they would "bomb" the Bokod Valley with ration boxes at 1000 if the 2d Battalion held it by that hour. Otherwise the drop would have to be postponed until the objective was in Blackhawk's hands. That evening in his nightly huddle with his company commanders, Lt. Colonel Faulconer stressed this point in issuing instructions for the valley attack: we take the valley by 1000 and we eat; we foul up and we starve.

Hungry doughboys needed no additional incentive. The mere thought of a cardboard box full of food-even corned pork loaf with carrots and apple flakes-did more for esprit than a pep talk from General MacArthur. The battalion struck hard and fast at dawn.

At the same moment that Easy, Fox and George Companies were engaged in clearing the valley the first ration plane appeared over the drop area. Without any ado rations were kicked out of cabin doors and medical supplies parachuted to earth. This precipitated an amazing situation. While one part of the battalion continued to run down and kill the enemy, another part of it set out on recovery missions. These recovery parties actually killed more Nips than the attacking units. If possible, the Nips were even hungrier than the Blackhawks and the sight of the food-filled crates was an irresistible temptation to them. Many abandoned their defense duties and ran toward the boxes. They were shot down or captured as they struggled to pry open the wood and wire containers. Bokod was secured at 1800. Lt. Colonel Talbott and the 1st Battalion pulled into the valley at that time.

General Clarkson had been a spectator to all Bokod road actions from jump-off time at Ambuclao until the valley was taken. The Division Commander usually spent three or four hours in the air each day observing operations with his pilot, Major Bortz. That evening he dropped a message to the regimental forward CP which read: "Congratulations on the fine results obtained by the 130th Infantry. I watched your entry into Bokod this morning. Nice going! Let us know what you need and we'll do all we can to shoot it along to you."

Both battalions spent the 18th and 19th mopping up stragglers scattered throughout Bokod and Inticak. The once-mythical food stockpile was now becoming a reality. Recovery parties generally went out reinforced with automatic weapons, for they would invariably find several Japanese clustered around the drop area. These drops soon became a Special Services function as well as a supply operation. They were the sole source of entertainment in Bokod. As soon as the planes came over everyone trained his eyes on the doors. When barbed wire was parachuted down, jeers came from the audience. Ammunition brought boos. But food! The sight of K rations floating to earth was reason for huzzahs and raucous laughter. Commanders brightened at these humorous demonstrations. They showed one thing anyway: days of privation had failed to blunt morale.

Leg-weary riflemen of the 1st Battalion were recommitted to the fight on the morning of 20 June. Lt. Colonel Talbott's doughs had the mission of striking north from Bokod at dawn and securing Daklan Airstrip some 3,800 yards away. "The Ripper" hoped that acquisition of the strip would permit aerial evacuation of all future casualties.

Charley Company, under a new commander, Lt. Joseph J. Kutys, and Able Company, led by Capt. Alfred P. Massoud, were detailed to attack astride a hilly trail running on a north-south line. Lt. Russell A. Campobello's Company B was to parallel the advance several hundred yards off to the right. The enemy fought a superb delaying action in an attempt to save Daklan. He was again his old incensed self; nothing like the meek Nips who abandoned their guns to charge after American rations. As A and C Companies rounded each bend in the trail they were met with streams of point-blank machine-gun fire. Casualties were sustained as the Nip refused to back up.

Like all others in Luzon, these trail skirmishes were up-hill fights. But now the Jap was ripe to be taken from either side. He had neither men nor guns for all-around defense of his trail blocks. Slowly A and C doughs worked in from the flanks and knocked out each of the blocks. The resistance ended as abruptly as it began when a Company C platoon overran a machine-gun nest and suddenly found itself on the high point of the trail. Directly below lay Daklan and the airstrip, peacefully nestling in an emerald-green, saucer-shaped valley. The picture held the silent serenity of a Sunday afternoon on Beacon Street. Baker Company turned off onto the southern rim of the bowl while Able and Charley deployed into wide skirmish lines prior to sweeping across the valley. Not a shot was fired as the battalion completed its search of airstrip and farmland.

Although it was not known at the time, Daklan was to be the 130th's final combat objective. Yet it was here that they came closest to losing their regimental commander. Colonel Collins came within an ace of having an airstrip for his tomb.

En route to Daklan behind the 1st Battalion, the regimental command group received a message from General Clarkson directing that Colonel Collins report to the Division CP immediately. When "The Ripper" got the message, he decided to continue on to Daklan, call for a Cub to land on the strip and then fly back for his conference with the Golden Cross commander. This way, the entire trip would take only a few minutes compared to the two-day march which was necessary if he chose to return by way of Ambuclao. Lieutenant Brisely, patrolling overhead, was ordered to come down and pick up the colonel. The pilot countered with the request that someone first check the strip for firmness.

Colonel Collins left his party at the edge of the field and walked out to the landing area alone. For several minutes he stamped up and down the area looking for loose spots or holes. When none were discerned he called across to his radio operator to notify Brisely that the strip appeared safe. No sooner were the words "come on in" transmitted to the Cub than two Jap machine guns dug in on the slopes of the valley centered heavy fires on the strip. "The Ripper"-lone man on the strip-quickly hit the dirt as bullets churned up the turf a couple of yards away. Brisley, already hovering a few feet above the field, gunned his ship and climbed off into the sky. CP personnel ducked into a small ditch running the length of the field.

The colonel slowly turned his body until he faced the ditch. Then he crawled through the fires toward this scant cover. As he tumbled to temporary safety a mud-covered, grinning doughboy slyly inquired: "'fell me, Colonel, how was it out there?" Colonel Collins glanced at his companion in the ditch and muttered, "Brother, sometimes a fellow feels as big as an elephant."

it wasn't until noon of the next day that the machine guns were located and knocked out of action. From 21 to 25 June the 1st and 2d Battalions operated long-range combat patrols around Daklan in a systematic search for stragglers who had evaded the columns as they marched on the airstrip. Opposition was nil. Ninety-one Nips were killed and two captured during this three-day period. The 130th suffered a few wounded. On 25 June the Division's mission was completed when a platoon from Company B, led by Lt. Robert H. McCauley, contacted a 6th Division company between Bokod and Kayapa.

Good news greeted Colonel Collins when he arrived at General Clarkson's headquarters. Effective 30 June the entire Division was to be taken off an operational status. On 26 June the 1st Battalion moved back to Ambuclao. Lt. Colonel Faulconer's unit followed a day later. By this time the Bokod road was open from its branch-off point on Mountain Trail to Ambuclao. Trucks were waiting at Ambuclao to carry the battalions back to Baguio. Every unit in the Division was in a summer capital rest camp by 30 June.

War in Northern Luzon was over for the Golden Cross. Question Mark, Aringay, Bauang, Pugo, Galiano, Asin, Kennon Road, Skyline Ridge, and a thousand-and-one assorted hills slipped into the limbo of the past. Bigger things were on the Division agenda. North of the Philippines lay Japan, last stop on the road back.