Luzon commanded the attention of the world in January 1945. In keeping with his vow made in 1942 following the fall of Bataan, General MacArthur had returned. Though the routes from Buna to Lingayen had been three years in the making, American forces were now entering the climax phase of the Pacific War. Recent successes, principally the Battle of Leyte where more than 110,000 enemy troops had been slaughtered, slowly swung the balance of power away from Japan. Luzon would be the most indicative campaign of the entire conflict. Victory here presaged a foreseeable final victory. Anything less could mean a drawn-out stalemate.

Now, after almost four years of preparation, the 33d Division was ready to become a part of the Pacific "big picture." Eighth Army headquarters made it official on 16 January by ordering the Golden Cross from Morotai to Luzon. Upon landing at Lingayen, the Division was scheduled to come under Sixth Army control. Date of departure from the Moluccas was set for 26 January.

After the usual feverish period of re-equipping and loading, the Division convoy, composed of APAs and LSTs, cast off from Gila Peninsula on the prescribed date. Four days out of Morotai the fleet of troop carriers picked up the 123d RCT convoy sailing north from New Guinea. For the first time since 1 September 1944 the 33d Division was assembled as a consolidated unit.

On 6 February the convoy put in at Leyte Gulf to take on fuel and water. As the vessels idly swung at anchor, men crowded the rails, eager for a glimpse of the recent battleground. Beaches where the 7th, 24th and 96th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division had landed the previous October were plainly visible. One could see a gutted mass of coconut trees beyond the beach stand in spectacular symmetry, their fronds sheared by naval gunfire that had prefaced the assault. These testimonials to destruction coupled with the peaceful silence hanging over the beach and water combined to form an incongruous picture.

Lingayen Gulf was reached at dawn of 9 February. The ships slowly steamed in column up the 65-mile-long gulf and dropped anchor a short distance from the shore. Troops were informed that they would remain on board overnight while landing plans were coordinated with authorities on the beach. With nothing to do but ready weapons and equipment, the men took advantage of this lull to study their new "home."

To the south lay the much talked-about Central Plain of Luzon. In orientation lectures on the Philippines given during the New Guinea stay this broad expanse of flatland had been stressed as a possible Division zone of action. Golden Cross troops, trained in jungle warfare, had looked forward to engaging the enemy on the plain; not in an anticipatory sense but confident that American superiority in weapons would shorten the campaign and reduce casualties. Their confidence was borne out-but not by the 33d. Sixth Army forces had driven south from the gulf shortly after landing and by 9 February Jap resistance had been pushed back to Manila. The plain had already been seized.

That left but one area in which the 33d could be tactically committed: the towering, tree-covered mountains which suddenly rose from the end of the Central Plain and stretched northward as far as the eye could see. They were forbidding in appearance, their peaks covered by eddies of mist and fog. Dense palls of smoke rolled off many of their slopes as aftermaths to recent bombing attacks. It was an awesome sight for some, but the infantryman inwardly shuddered. He knew that before he left this island he would have to walk and fight over the majority of those mountains. It was Morotai again, but this time with 7,000-foot-high hills.

Debarkation began on the morning of the 10th, D plus 32 on Luzon. Unloading progressed without incident and by dusk the combat elements of the Division had closed into assembly areas. Here they pitched temporary camps while waiting for orders to move into the fight. All men were immediately brought up to date on the current tactical situation on the island.

Following the D-day landings which were met with sporadic small arms and mortar fire, a "flying column" made up of the 37th Division and 1st Cavalry Division was formed to swarm down the Central Plain. While these divisions were forging a path to the gates of Manila other Sixth Army divisions kept the bulk of Japanese forces contained in the mountains north and east of the plain. This had been the mission of I Corps. The 25th Division was sent on a straight drive across Luzon while the 43d Division and 158th RCT pivoted at the beach and edged into the foothills of the Caraballo Mountains. Although bypassed groups and defeated remnants managed to work back into the Caraballos, Jap commanders were prevented from counterattacking from this high ground.

Division was attached to I Corps on 12 February, receiving its initial commitment orders at the same time. Field Order No. 11, Headquarters 33d Infantry Division, was published at noon of the following day listing the Division mission and those of subordinate elements. It read in part:

33d Inf Div:

(1) Passes to control CG, I Corps effective 0800, 12 Feb 45.

(2) Relieves elements of the 43d Inf Div and 158 RCT in the PozorrubioRosario-Damortis areas.

(3) Upon effecting relief of the 43d Inf Div the 33d Inf Div will continue missions assigned the 43d Inf Div as follows:

(a) Secure key terrain within its zone of action.

(b) Push vigorous reconnaissance N of Camp 1-Rosario-Damortis road and E of Pozorrubio-Bobonan-Camp 1 road to determine enemy strength and dispositions.

(c) Utilizing forces available rapidly and completely eliminate enemy pockets of resistance remaining in rear areas.

(d) Be prepared to re-dispose forces along high ground N of Camp 1Rosario-Damortis road and E of Pozorrubio-Bobonan-Camp 1 road in order that present positions may be held by minimum forces.

Troops of the 123d Infantry were first in the Division to assume front-line duties. Leaving an assembly area at San Fabian, Colonel Serff's men took over positions on the high ground north of the Damortis-Rosario road held by the 158th RCT. They accomplished the relief on the afternoon of the 13th. The 3d Battalion, under Major Sanford I. Wolff, anchored the left flank, holding high ground a thousand yards north of Damortis while Major James L. Cregg's 2d Battalion moved on to commanding terrain midway between the two barrios. Rosario, right flank of the regimental line, was held by the 1st Battalion, led by Lt. Col. Charles F. Coates.

A day later the 130th Infantry left San Fabian en route to positions on the 123d's right. Colonel Collins' Blackhawks spelled the 172d Infantry (43d Division) on a horseshoe-shaped line running from Rosario to Sison. Two battalions were concentrated in and east of Rosario while the 3d Battalion inherited positions along the foothills near Cauringan. Lt. Col. Ernest D. Jessup, Major Richard Askren and Lt. Col. Orville Minton commanded the 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions, respectively.

Last to leave the initial assembly areas was the 136th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Cavenee. On 15 February two of his battalions relieved four 43d Division battalions on positions east of the SisonPozorrubio road. Lt. Colonel Sauser's 2d Battalion, shock troops on Morotai, was given another hot spot in Hill 600 which ran from the center of the regimental zone of action to the Pozorrubio flank. Three 136th companies secured the Pozorrubio sector which also formed the Division's right flank. They were Baker Company, commanded by Captain Kissel; Cannon, under Capt. August J. Duchala; and Antitank, led by Capt. William D. Garland. The 3d Battalion, commanded by Major John M. Farnell, assumed responsibility for the area extending southward from Sison to the edge of Hill 600. Major Milton Ehrlich's 1st Battalion remained in bivouac near Sison with the designation of Division reserve.

Supporting arms and services followed the regiments into the line. The 122d, 124th and 210th Field Artillery Battalions, all serving 105mm howitzers, were emplaced to best support their combat team complements. Lt. Col. Roland P. Carlson's 122d augmented the 123d Infantry; the 124th under Lt. Col. Harold O. Carlson-the Carlsons are brothers-provided fires for the 130th Infantry while the 136th received support from the 210th Field Artillery, commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas Truxtun. General support for the Division came from Lt. Col. George McClure's 123d Field Artillery Battalion, composed of 155mm howitzers.

Medics and engineers filled out the combat teams. The 108th Engineer Combat Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Francis P. Kane, gave each regiment one of its letter companies. Able went to the 123d, Baker to the 130th and Charley was assigned to the 136th. Collecting Companies A, B and C of the 108th Medical Battalion were likewise attached to the infantry elements. Clearing Company, under Major John Savage, prepared to receive Division casualties at Damortis. Battalion commander for the medics was Lt. Col. Durand Smith, a Chicago physician.

With the beginning of Division operations in the Philippines, the Division command and staff organization was as follows: General Clarkson, commanding; General Myers, Assistant Division Commander; Colonel McAnsh, Chief of Staff; Lt. Col. Frank S. Singer, G-1; Lt. Colonel Sackton, G-2; Lt. Col. William M. Haycock, G-3; and Lt. Col. Leslie Ireland, G-4.

Special Staff members included: Lt. Col. Joseph Martz, Adjutant General; Lt. Col. Ernest Bauman, Inspector General; Lt. Col. Jacob M. Arvey, Judge Advocate General; Lt. Col. Fred M. Curl, Chemical Warfare Officer; Lt. Col. Ralph P. Wagner, Signal Officer; Lt. Col. Anthony Strak, Ordnance Officer; Lt. Col. Russell K. Kuhns, Division Quartermaster; Lt. Col. William H. Delihant, Finance Officer; Father (Lt. Col.) William J. Rogers, Division Chaplain; Major Eli J. Paris, Special Services Officer; Major Victor Warner, Provost Marshal; Lt. Col. Timothy J. Mullen, Surgeon; and Major George Jenkins, Jr., Headquarters Commandant.

A formidable host of enemy faced the Golden Cross at every point along its front. Opposing the Division were the Japanese 23d Division and the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, both veterans of the China campaigns. Mainstays of Yamashita's 14th Area Army, they were sworn to prevent a repetition of the Leyte fiasco. Their flaming desire to halt the American military machine was reflected in a captured document written by one of Yamashita's division commanders shortly before the D-day landings:

... if the battle situation develops unfavorably for us [it read] and we find ourselves under continuous enemy pressure, we must be able to hold a route of withdrawal to the mountainous terrain around Baguio. Therefore, in order to hang on doggedly in the Philippines and await the plans of later years, it is necessary to organize quickly and in such a manner as to be able to establish permanent installations which can hold out for months and years. The mountainous terrain in the vicinity of Baguio is suitable for this purpose.