In the course of the Pacific War there doubtless have been engagements as fraught with hardship and self-sacrifice as the 130th Infantry Regiment's battle for Bench Mark and Question Mark Hills. But to the men of this unit the four-day battle-simply a steppingstone to victory in a single campaign-represented land warfare at its worst: ninety-six hours of constant close combat capped by periods of intense thirst, hunger, lack of medical aid, and costly stalemate with the enemy. Blackhawk troops received a cruel baptism of fire on the deceptive slopes of Bench Mark. There was no slow introduction to the capabilities of the courageous Japanese, no gradual acquaintance with the ugliness of hand-to-hand combat; instead green troops were committed to a fight which opened on a furious note and mounted in ferocity with each passing day.

A Nature lover might comment on the beauty of Question Mark if he were to survey it from a purely physical standpoint. It rises like a dull green giant out of the gray foothills lying south of the Caraballo Mountains. Fringing the broad Central Plain, its heights provide the dominating terrain feature in the Sison area. The 2,500-foot hill is copiously covered with dry cogon grass, and numerous wooded gullies sharply indent its steep slopes. Between Question Mark and the lush rice paddies strewn along the flatland skirting Sison stands Bench Mark, similar in angle of rise but almost a thousand feet lower. With allaround observation available from both summits each was able to serve as watchdog for the other. A steep 600-foot-wide draw separates the twin citadels.

Bench Mark and Question Mark are the two principal landmarks in the elongated chain of foothills leading into the Caraballo range. These hills provided the enemy with a naturally formidable first line of defense for Luzon's wild mountain country. Individual links in the narrow chain were heavily fortified to serve as guardians for General Tomoyuki Yamashita's Baguio headquarters to the north-actually the Nip nerve center in the Philippines. Baguio, famed Far Eastern resort, was I Corps' prime objective.

Question Mark received its unusual name from 43d Division artillery liaison pilots. When viewed from the air, its semicircular crest seemed to compress itself into the shape of a vast question mark. Bench Mark too came by its title naturally. Maps of the hill area disclosed a surveyor's bench mark-a small triangle denoting a fixed point of height printed atop the network of contour lines representing the hill. In order to suitably describe the terrain to higher headquarters, 43d Division ground commanders dubbed it Bench Mark Hill. When 33d Division troops assumed tactical responsibility for the sector these names passed on to the 130th Infantry.

A unique, if not incredible, tactical situation confronted 26-year-old Lt. Colonel Minton when his 3d Battalion, 130th Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Despite several days on the ground and repeated attacks against the Japs on the summit, the Winged Victory doughboys-veterans of the Solomon Islands jungles-succeeded in taking only the reverse slope of the hill. Large groups of enemy were strongly entrenched on the crest, forward slope, and the remaining two sides of Bench Mark. Here were two forces struggling for possession of a single terrain feature; both on the hill in strength with just a few yards separating the opposing fronts. Immediate action had to be undertaken to remedy this peculiar impasse, not only for the sake of battalion security but because Bench Mark barred the entrance into the mountains. No general advance could commence until the hill was in Golden Cross possession. That meant, too, that Question Mark must fall as part of a single operation. Preparations to achieve both ends began as soon as the riflemen were assigned positions.

In the first disposition of troops, Company K, led by Capt. Elbert J. Hicks, dug in on the reverse slope of Bench Mark just below the summit. Company L, with newly promoted Capt. Norman H. Litz in command, constructed a perimeter around a small knob to the left-rear of the King Company position. Sections of heavy machine guns from Company M followed each unit into the line. Mike Company's 81mm mortars were grouped in defilade almost a thousand yards west of Bench Mark. A grove of ripening mango trees in the sleepy barrio of Cauringan-close to the foot of Bench Mark-was selected as the site for the battalion CP. Company I, under red-haired Capt. Alan J. Kennedy, and the remaining heavy-machine-gun platoon were bivouacked there in battalion reserve.

Combat-reconnaissance patrols began operations at dawn, 16 February. K and L dispatched small groups led by Lts. Robert R. Kimball and Alfred L. Angulo to bring back answers to these vital queries: Strength and disposition of enemy forces on Bench Mark? Number and location of enemy machine guns and mortars? Does the enemy have a reserve to commit in the event of an attack? If so, how large? These questions went largely unanswered. Patrols were unable to force their way through the Jap defense. All they could do was engage the enemy in a fight, hoping to make him commit most of his fire, and then make an approximation of his strength and number of automatic weapons.

Left: Benchmark Hill - Division intelligence was unable to add much to the picture. Estimates on enemy strength compiled by the 43d Division ran anywhere from a single infantry company to a reinforced battalion. However, G-2 was able to supply enough information to keep the situation from becoming a complete enigma. It was known that elements of the 71st Infantry Regiment and the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade garrisoned Bench Mark. These units were part of the Japanese 23d Division, a veteran force, but currently suffering from five weeks of continuous heavy action.

Left: Col. Arthur Collins - Enigmatic or not, Bench Mark and Question Mark had to be hit without further delay. Lt. Colonel Minton laid plans for a coordinated battalion attack to take place on 19 February. His scheme called for K and L Companies to advance up the reverse slope of Bench Mark and secure the summit and forward slope. During this phase of the drive, Company I was scheduled to leave its Cauringan bivouac area and follow King Company up Bench Mark. When Question Mark was deemed ready for an assault, Captain Kennedy, commanding I, had the mission of swinging around the right flank of Bench Mark, moving down its side, crossing the large draw and then hitting the second objective. Artillery support would be plentiful. The Division's battalion of 155mm howitzers, together with the 210th Field Artillery Battalion, stood ready to provide fire for both advances.

Left: Lt. James Finn - Patrol actions highlighted the waiting period. Throughout daylight hours, 3d Battalion units continued their probing, seeking to unearth another piece to the Bench Mark jigsaw puzzle. The enemy fought these movements with fire only. His troops never left their strong points. At night it was a different story. Raiding parties harassed the company perimeters constantly. Night-long grenade duels were commonplace. With the coming of dawn, the Nips would collect their casualties and withdraw to their own positions. Few 3d Battalion troops were harmed by these forays, but all soon became accustomed to the fact that combat against the Japanese automatically brought with it tense and sleepless nights.

Left: Capt. Elbert Hicks - Dawn broke hot and hazy on D-day. Artillery pieces opened up with daybreak, heralding the impending assault with fifteen solid minutes of fire. At the conclusion of the barrage a smoke shell boomed into the enemy positions, notifying the infantry that the concentration was ended. During the shelling, Captain Litz moved up until his forward elements were on the same lateral line with Company K. When the white phosphorus round exploded, both companies advanced abreast.

But difficulties cropped up immediately. Visibility was poor and the inside flanks of the two companies gradually drifted apart. In a matter of minutes radio communication was the sole link between King and Love.

Capt. Alan Kennedy - Lack of contact erased any hopes of inter company coordination. Each unit drove forward into its own separate fight. Company L's action developed rapidly when surprise fire suddenly plunged into its left side from a group of Japanese on a knob jutting out of the northern slope of the objective. This small hill-on-a-hill, devoid of cover, was a poor defensive position. It stood out starkly from the rest of Bench Mark and its barren top was clearly silhouetted against the mountain backdrop. Company L veered off toward this source of fire. In a few minutes they were on the knob, mopping up a small enemy unit with rifle fire and grenades. Litz notified battalion by radio that his troops had killed the Nip holding force and secured the knob with less than ten casualties.

Left: Lt. Robert Kimball - Feeling itself safe from enemy fires from the peak of Bench Mark, the company quickly staged a reorganization and continued forward, seeking to provide fire support for Company K. As soon as the assault platoons finished deploying along the military crest, facing Question Mark, machine-gun fire suddenly swept in from across the draw. The first bursts cut down most of one squad. Heavy-machine-gun fire was called for, and Mike Company responded by setting up a heavy on the exposed forward slope of the compact terrain feature. The gunner got off no more than a few bursts toward Question Mark before he was engaged in a mid-range duel with a rapid-firing Nip Nambu. Having the advantage of concealment, the enemy succeeded in sweeping the M Company gun with a single heavy burst. The gunner was killed instantly and two of his crewmen were seriously wounded. Captain Litz, realizing the critical need for automatic fire, quickly crawled up to the gun, passed the two casualties to the rear, lifted the gunner's body from the piece, and manned the Browning.

Left: BG Donald Myers - Litz re-engaged the same Jap gun that had silenced his weapon a minute before. Firing in long bursts, the company commander succeeded in quieting the offending Nambu, but another Jap machine gunner-off to the right--chose this time to switch his fires on to Love Company's knob. His first rounds killed Captain Litz. Command of the unit passed to Lieutenant Angulo, company executive officer. Angulo immediately attempted to move to more tenable positions, but enemy machine-gun and mortar fire was so heavy that every attempt at movement resulted in additional casualties. Angulo finally ordered his troops to cease maneuver and dig in on the knob. A casualty check disclosed five men had been killed and seventeen wounded in the course of the abbreviated fire fight.

Left: Technical Sgt. Charles Whitlock - But, meanwhile, what of Company K's advance to the right? Captain Hicks led his men into a fight that closely paralleled Love Company's experience. Company K encountered little resistance during its climb up the reverse slope of Bench Mark and subsequent attack against the summit. Again, a brief hand-to-hand skirmish and another small defensive force was eradicated. Hicks quickly reorganized on the hilltop prior to pushing down the forward slope. Morale was at its peak at this moment; the doughs could visualize no possibility of failure now. They paused just long enough to reshape their lines.

As the lead scouts edged up to the skyline they could see the forward slope dip down sharply only to rise again a hundred yards away where two towering knobs sprouted out of the hillside like overgrown warts. Anxious to maintain his early morning pace, Captain Hicks ordered his forward platoons to advance on the twin knobs. Nips on these features-cunningly concealed inside caves and bunkers-waited until the rear elements of the company had begun to clamber down the slope before firing at the leading units. The first inkling of the tremendous enemy power contained on the two hills came when Lieutenant Kimball's platoon was suddenly enfiladed by solid bands of machine-gun cross-fire. Japs rose out of their emplacements to throw hand grenades into the ranks of the shocked group.

Heavy machine guns and mortars from the vicinity of Question Mark now entered the fight, adding to the already deafening clamor. Captain Hicks called for all of the supporting weapons at his command in an effort to offset the effects of Japanese fires. Friendly mortars and artillery proved useless; observers could not range in because of the close proximity of riflemen and the extremely high angle of fire necessary to get a round on the target. Company K's caliber .30 light machine guns had to continually shift position in order to stay in the fight.

Kimball's men, closest to the knobs, suddenly rose from the ground and advanced toward one of the knobs under the urging of their platoon leader. Answering machine guns and mortars with rifles and BARS, the troops doggedly fought their way up to the base of the hill. Sharp grenade exchanges took place here and King Company's casualties rapidly mounted. Lieutenant Kimball managed to break loose from the stalemated line and charged up the hill by himself. Disregarding a painful shrapnel wound sustained in earlier fighting, the young Ohioan spotted two machine guns which seemed to have the attack bottled up. Firing as he advanced, Lieutenant Kimball overran one emplacement, killing the entire crew with carbine fire. He tried identical tactics on the second piece and worked up to within a few paces of the position before he was brought down with a rifle bullet. Enraged and awed by this demonstration of gallantry, his men attempted to follow in his wake but an aroused enemy beat them back to the base of the knob. Lieutenant Kimball was honored with a posthumous award of the Distinguished Service Cross.

Twice more K Company rose to assault but on each occasion the Japanese were able to repel them. During the first effort, S/Sgt. William E. Pavlick, a squad leader, almost forced a breach but accelerated mortar fires from Question Mark nullified his gains. Sergeant Pavlick-like Lieutenant Kimball-knocked out a Nip machine gun. He did it in the same manner, moving in on the emplacement and then killing the crew with rifle fire. Pavlick then motioned to the remnants of his squad to join him and together this team accounted for six more Japs and an additional Nambu. Although twice wounded, he continually exposed himself to provide targets for his men. With two guns out of the way, Sergeant Pavlick suddenly keeled over and collapsed from loss of blood. But at this point mortar fire halted the brief advance and Pavlick's squad was forced to withdraw, dragging their unconscious leader with them. His heroism earned him a DSC.

Peculiar GI minds, which were still able to deal in grisly humor despite the discouraging state of affairs, had by this time affixed names to the twin hills. One was called Hooker Hill, after S/Sgt. Gerald W. Hooker who had taken over the platoon when Lieutenant Kimball was killed. After the first unsuccessful attack against the other knoll, the grotesque body of a dead rifleman could be seen lying face down, lifeless arms outstretched toward the enemy. This one, more somber in character, was called Dead Man's Hill.

Late afternoon came and the situation continued unchanged. It already had been a gruelling day for King Company: nine dead, twentyfour wounded, and still no closer to its objective than it had been four hours ago. Captain Hicks told Lieutenant Colonel Minton, who had worked forward to the company, that he could make no further gains until the Jap fires coming from Question Mark were neutralized. Here was a job for the support company.

Kennedy and Company I were ready to join the fight. In accordance with the battalion plan they had left Cauringan that morning and 1600 found them grouped on the reverse side of Bench Mark. Colonel Minton gave his instructions to Captain Kennedy: "Move your outfit along the southern slope of Bench Mark. Cut down into the draw and attack Question Mark. King Company can't do a thing until the pressure coming from Question Mark is knocked out. Leave as soon as you can." Upon receipt of this order, Kennedy quickly ordered his platoon leaders to make a last-minute check of ammunition, rations and water. Little did he know that water was going to be the controlling factor of his assault on Question Mark.

When Company I began its approach march from Cauringan earlier in the day, all troops carried full ammunition and food loads but only a single canteen of water. At the time this was not a point for anxiety as maps of Question Mark showed a small creek running along the edge of the spacious draw separating it from Bench Mark. Water could be replenished once the force reached the stream. In this way water needs would be alleviated until the following day when carrying parties would assume the burden of water supply. Consequently, when Kennedy received a report that each man was down to a third of a canteen of water he was not alarmed.

As it turned out, lack of water almost doomed the Question Mark operation to failure. When Item Company finally reached the alleged stream, Captain Kennedy found nothing but an arid, rock-strewn bed completely swallowed up by the relentless tropical sun. However, it was too late now for anything but passing regrets: the hour was 164 and it was imperative to move on to the line of departure without further delay. Item Company maneuvered into jump-off position fifteen minutes later. Hoping to catch the Japanese by surprise, Kennedy declined the use of an artillery preparation. His plan almost worked.

Company I drove to within seventy-five yards of Question Mark' heights before the Nips, completely occupied in harassing King Company, woke up to the fact that a full-scale attack against their strong point was under way. Hurriedly they diverted most of their fire from Bench Mark to Kennedy's men. Firing along predetermined lines enemy fire lanes soon cut into the company from frontal, oblique, an( flanking positions. Tactics were quickly altered to cope with this new situation. Although its initial impetus was missing, the drive continued to gain ground. Riflemen resorted to advance by fire and movement. Observers could see doughs spring forward, hit the ground, and then open up with M-1 and BAR fire to cover the move of another small group. It was a show worthy of demonstration troops at The Infantry School. Constant repetition of the fire and movement process pulled the front line to within grenade range of the Japanese emplacements.

But here it stalled. Some men attempted individual charges but they were cut down by supporting riflemen and the profusion of armed grenades which the Japs rolled down the slope toward the company. Overwhelming enemy fire superiority augmented by Item's extreme fatigue and thirst and approaching darkness combined to discourage further offensive operations. Captain Kennedy radioed his situation to the battalion CP. Lieutenant Colonel Minton ordered him to dig in, adjust protective fires and hold on until the following morning when a supply of water and ammunition would be forthcoming.

Several critical problems confronted Kennedy as he planned his defense for the night. None of his casualties had been evacuated to battalion simply because no safe route of withdrawal existed. Some men were seriously wounded and might die if they were forced to spend the night on the slopes of Question Mark Hill. Nevertheless, the weary company commander realized that evacuation attempts made in broad daylight were bound to be disastrous. Japanese machine guns and mortars were zeroed in on every blade of grass on the hillside. Perhaps evacuation could begin after dark, but certainly not before. Lack of water posed a most serious problem. Intense thirst had already cut down Item Company's combat efficiency. Kennedy didn't have to ask his men how they were holding up without the precious liquid. All he had to do was run his own swollen tongue over cracked and blistered lips to supply the answer.

In a move to protect the casualties from further harm, Captain Kennedy decided to construct two perimeters: one just below the crest of Question Mark to encompass most of his troops and another four hundred yards below for litter cases and a squad-sized rear guard. As soon as the front line of infantrymen began to dig in, the enemy naturally perceived the company's intentions. They retaliated with concentrations of machine-gun and mortar fire which hit the troops as soon as they had unsheathed entrenching tools. Friendly mortar and artillery fire was called for to cover defensive preparations. A forward platoon leader, Lt. James E. Finn, took over the job of sensing and adjusting as the digging swiftly continued.

Not content to fight fire with fire, the enemy closest to Lieutenant Finn's platoon left the safety of Question Mark and bore down the hill on the handful of men who by this time had partial protection from flying shrapnel. Finn relayed a call to Kennedy for accelerated fire and stood erect in his partly dug foxhole to adjust it. The Japanese fell back at this point but reorganized and drove forward a moment later. Again Lieutenant Finn rose to his full height to bring friendly bursts into the charging Japanese. The Nips were stopped a second time, but Lieutenant Finn was killed by an enemy rifleman's parting shot. His self-sacrifice was recognized by a posthumous award of the Distinguished Service Cross.

With Finn dead and the Japanese back on the crest of Question Mark, Captain Kennedy crawled to the edge of his position and continued adjustment of protective fires. Normally the artillery places these fires at a minimum distance of a hundred yards from the fringes of a perimeter, but now Item's commander insisted on bringing them in much closer. Over the protests of the fire direction center, he tightened the ring of high explosives until some rounds were falling within thirty yards of his troops. Satisfied that the enemy would hesitate before essaying a move through this curtain of steel, Kennedy slowly returned to his CP. Every man he passed en route offered some evidence of the torture caused by the lack of water. Some lay in their foxholes and sucked in huge gulps of air to ease the pain of their aching throats. Others attempted to keep up their strength by downing a D ration, but the sounds of their retching and vomiting were sickening as the rich chocolate clogged their parched throats. The sporadic moans of the wounded only added to the general hellishness of the situation.

Kennedy again called battalion and reiterated his earlier statement that unless water was dispatched at dawn his company could not function as an efficient combat force. Lieutenant Colonel Minton notified him that an air drop would be made the following morning if carrying parties were unable to work their way forward. Regarding casualty evacuation, Company I was told to care for its wounded as best as it could until litter teams came up the next day. Some medical parties had attempted to reach Question Mark when Kennedy made his first report but darkness and enemy patrols forced them to turn back to the battalion aid station.

General Myers, charged with coordinating ground activities in this sector, kept abreast of the situation at the 3d Battalion CP on Bench Mark. He was quick to recognize the severity of the situation and to realize that continued high casualties and lack of water would greatly jeopardize operational success. So bleak was the picture that the Assistant Division Commander felt it necessary to make an immediate first-hand report to General Clarkson. He left Bench Mark at dusk of 19 February and reached the Division CP near Rabon a few hours later.

This was the 33d's first combat crisis. Bench Mark and Question Mark were vital cogs in Jap defensive strategy. Higher headquarters wanted them at once, regardless of cost.

As a result of the conference between the two generals, the 3d Battalion was reinforced that same night. Able Company, 136th Infantry, in Division reserve near Sison, was ordered to proceed to Bench Mark without delay. Commanded by Capt. James W. Cavender, Company A arrived at the 3d Battalion CP at 0200. Here, Lieutenant Colonel Minton gave Cavender the details of his mission which was to attack at dawn and relieve Company I on position.

General Clarkson personally undertook to solve the water problem. First, he instructed G-3 to establish an advance CP at Cauringan the next morning. Since air drops held little promise of success, he scoured the Division for a carrying party, finally settling on the Engineers since all infantry and field artillery was committed to the fight. Coincidental with the orders to Cavender, Lieutenant Colonel Kane, Division Engineer, was told to form a 100-man carrying party and to personally report it to General Clarkson at Cauringan at dawn. At the same time, G-4 was sent out in search of 100 water cans and a like number of pack boards. Filled water cans were to be at the advance CP when the Engineers arrived.

Men and equipment came in on schedule. However, the Engineer detachment made no attempt to conceal its disgust at being assigned such a menial chore. No one wanted to sidestep a fight, but few relished the task of serving as pack mules in the oppressive heat. Detecting this discordant note, General Clarkson grouped the Engineers around him and discussed the importance of their assignment. In low subdued tones he mentioned their infantry comrades up front, many already semi-conscious for lack of water and others requiring immediate evacuation. He stressed that this party carried with it the Division's chance for victory on Question Mark. A transformation overcame the group as the General spoke. The Engineers realized that this mission was infinitely more important than any they could accomplish in the normal pursuit of their duties. They gallantly shouldered their heavy loads and lined up behind Company A, prepared to follow it until Company I was contacted.

Item spent a quiet night on the slope of the objective. Friendly artillery kept the Nips in their own positions, preventing them from harassing the listless unit. But without combat activity to occupy them, the men were left to concentrate on their maddening need for relief. Although the night was cool, no one could sleep. Speech was restricted to a minimum. Orders issued by officers and noncoms sounded more like animal noises than commands. Food too was out of the question. Arid systems were incapable of retaining the solid rations. Cracked lips presented constant sources of discomfort. One thing only prevented morale from crumbling: water would be dropped at 0830.

A new cycle of anguish began at dawn. Heat waves danced on the grass as the sun beat down with unusual force. As Company I rose to survey the situation, bursts of machine-gun fire cut into the perimeter from altogether new angles. Thoughts of the air drop vanished for the moment. Reports from the farthest point of the position quickly reached Kennedy at the CP: the Nips had reinforced their position, emplacing a platoon midway between the two company perimeters. Kennedy risked a quick visual reconnaissance to ascertain whether the enemy held full control of the wide stretch of open terrain separating his forces. He could pick out three or four machine guns on each of his flanks, all well dug in and capable of throwing impassable bands of fire across the hillside.

If such a thing were possible, Company I was in sadder circumstances than the day before. If an effort were made to knock out this new force, the troops would fall prey to the large number of Japanese still entrenched on Question Mark. On the other hand, if a decision were made to resume an attack against the crest of the hill, it invited severe casualties from the flanks and rear. Company I was isolated for all practical purposes. Kennedy knew, however, that Company A, 136th Infantry, had been detailed to fight through to him. He had no choice but to remain within the confines of his defensive position and leave his other group to its own devices.

Some measure of cheer enveloped Item Company at 0825 when the C-47 was sighted as it jockeyed into position for the drop run. Every eye followed the twin-engined cargo plane as it roared across the hillside. Numerous crates and containers poured out of the open cabin door. Half-crazed riflemen braved enemy fire to sprint out and recover the precious supplies. As the last piece was carried to the CP, a collective cry of sorrow escaped every man's lips. Not a drop of water had been kicked out of the plane. Disgusted with this ineptness, Kennedy radioed the battalion CP and angrily demanded that another drop be made at once. He was placated with the response that a misinterpretation of orders had caused the foul-up and that the plane would be re-loaded as soon as it returned to its base.

During this interim, the company's command group debated on the use of supporting fires against the Japanese dug in below them. Artillery was out. Long rounds would explode in the main perimeter, short ones on the wounded. Instead a decision was made to employ Company M's 81mm mortars, easier to control than the high-velocity howitzers. Capt. Arthur L. Wallace, Mike Company leader, was called and given an extensive description of the disposition of friendly troops surrounding the target area. He notified the Item CP that he thought rounds could be worked into the enemy without endangering friendly forces. A few seconds later, with every man in Company I below ground-level, the 81s began to fall. Wallace made good his prediction. Preliminary rounds were near-misses and it took only minor adjustments to bring them onto the target. A constant harassing fire was maintained.

Sensitive ears picked up the sound of the C-47 a short time later. Again the large plane hedge-hopped over the slope and disgorged its supplies. It was water, all right; troops could see the five-gallon cans oscillate at the ends of supply chutes. But this time the billowing aerial umbrellas carried all of the cans directly into Nip positions. Men wept unashamedly at this cruel trick of fate. It would have been the spark needed to touch off a general panic had not Captain Kennedy risen to the occasion. Swollen and parched like everyone else, the Item commander put on a show of calmness and confidence impossible to ignore. He cockily reassured his infantrymen that Able Company would break through shortly with every needed commodity.

Throughout these developments Captain Cavender had led his company across defiladed portions of Bench Mark until he reached the valley separating the two hills. During a reconnaissance to determine the most advantageous route of approach to Company I, riflemen of the lead platoon sighted Kennedy's smaller perimeter. Able Company was prepared to attack shortly after the second unsuccessful air drop. Cavender contacted Lieutenant Colonel Minton by radio to arrange for fires to support the breakthrough. Again artillery was deemed inadvisable and the task of providing fire support fell to mortarmen. Company A's light mortars hammered the slope of Question Mark with a brief barrage while battalion mortars dumped a volley of smoke shells into the draw to screen the attack from Nips on the forward slope of Bench Mark.

Technical Sergeant Emil B. Weber's 2d Platoon, designated as the assault force, jumped off as soon as preparatory and masking fires were completed. No opposition was apparent until the thin skirmish line passed through the group of Item casualties. As soon as the enemy sighted the green uniforms through the smoky backdrop, they opened up along protective lines. Weber's men were caught in the apex of the cross-firing machine guns. Before he could decide on a counter action, Sergeant Weber was felled by a burst which caught him in the head. S/Sgt. Alphonsus L. Leary, platoon guide and second-in-command, quickly moved up from the rear of the column and assumed command. Despite the heavy fire, Leary was able to lead his unit in a gradual advance that took it within grenade range of several enemy pieces.

Casualties were heavy. Most of the noncommissioned officers had been hit by the initial fires. Sgt. Walter Shadley was killed at Weber's side. His assistant squad leader, Sgt. Harland Lee, was wounded by a bullet in the neck a few seconds later. But Leary, a 37-year-old Iowan who had declined several opportunities to attend Officer Candidate School in the States, took up the slack with an inspiring example of calmness and quiet confidence. During the hand-to-hand fighting, Leary located a machine gun which had caused many of the platoon's casualties. Moving forward alone, Leary charged the position. Nearby grenade explosions failed to deter him and he finally disposed of the crew with M-1 fire delivered from point-blank range. As he turned to relay orders to his platoon, another Nambu turned on him and brought him down with a burst through the chest.

Now the issue was clouded. For a moment panic threatened as no one stepped forward to succeed Leary, later posthumously awarded a DSC. Order was restored when Lt. Samuel B. Harbison left his Weapons Platoon-held in the rear in general support-and took charge of the shattered assault unit. Cajoling, threatening and encouraging in turn, Lieutenant Harbison, an Oregon attorney in civilian life, collected the platoon and closed in on the machine-gun positions for the second time. Cavender strengthened this move by committing another rifle platoon to the action. At this point, however, hitherto silent Nips on the crest of Question Mark made their presence felt by lobbing mortar shells over the heads of Item Company into Able's ranks. When Cavender saw several men go down under this barrage, he realized that present tactics would avail him nothing.

Despite the danger to friendly forces from the use of artillery, the Company A commander felt that the howitzers, if properly adjusted on the multitude of targets, could rapidly turn the tide of the engagement. He radioed the fire direction center and asked the artillery to undertake the fire mission. Company A disengaged itself from the enemy and withdrew to covered positions while Kennedy was notified to have his men lay flat in their foxholes. The first rounds were on the way in a few minutes. Painstaking computation of firing data brought them to within a few yards of the designated area. Cavender took the responsibility of fire adjustment and slowly walked the rounds onto the enemy line.

Upon cessation of these fires, the company resumed its advance. Again machine guns greeted the unit as it stepped from behind its cover, but now the fires were not so effective. With three platoons on line, the company finally broke through the Japanese cordon after an afternoon-long fight. It was 1700 when Cavender's men converged on the Item perimeter. A pitiful sight greeted them there. Several men were delirious from thirty-six hours without water. Others lay unconscious in their holes. The Engineer carrying party came up in a few minutes and gave Item all the water it could drink. Kennedy then received notice to return to the battalion CP. Another smoke screen was laid down to conceal movement and the company and Engineers managed to effect their withdrawal without suffering additional casualties. At the smaller perimeter Item paused to collect its litter cases, leaving the dead on the scene until the ground was secured and they could be properly removed and interred.

Among the dead was T/Sgt. Charles L. Whitlock, a platoon sergeant who had served with the 130th Infantry since it was first federalized. Whitlock had sacrificed his life the day before in a gallant attempt to carry his platoon over the summit of Question Mark. Far in front of his closest squad, this Mount Vernon (Illinois) noncom knocked out two machine guns with rifle fire and grenades before a Jap in a covered emplacement raised a grass-covered trapdoor and brought Whitlock down from the rear. One of the wounded, Sergeant Joseph O. Emery, accounted for another machine gun in the same action. Emery, then an automatic rifleman, rose from the ground when his squad was pinned down by a Nambu and slaughtered the crew with several bursts of fire. As he was wiping out the emplacement a Nip grenade exploded a few feet away, maiming his right arm.

Sergeant Emery-an Illinois Guardsman like Whitlock-quickly squatted and slid the heavy rifle across his knees. Actuating the weapon with his left hand, he continued to place effective fire on the strongpoint. Later when Company I began to dig in, Emery noticed a wounded doughboy lying in the fire-swept area outside of the perimeter. He raced forward through Jap machine-gun fire, grabbed the casualty by the leg and commenced to drag him to safety. When he was five yards away from his comrades, Emery suddenly released his hold on the wounded man and slumped forward unconscious. Other doughs quickly pulled the two inert men into the perimeter. Sergeant Whitlock joined Kimball, Finn and Leary as posthumous recipients of the DSC, while Emery and Sergeant Pavlick of Company K became the only living men to earn the award in the Question Mark-Bench Mark battle.

By midnight of 20 February General Myers, Colonel Collins and Lt. Colonel Minton were able to start planning for an attack that would result in the seizure of both Bench Mark and Question Mark. Many difficulties still remained to be hurdled, but Item's relief and Company A's tactical success had resolved several problems. On Bench Mark the situation likewise had improved. By dusk, Captain Hicks and Company K held all of the summit and reverse slope with the exception of Hooker and Dead Man's Hills.

As the first move in assuming positions for an all-out blow against Question Mark, Company L was told to abandon its positions adjacent to Bench Mark and return to the 3d Battalion CP. At the same time Company C, 136th Infantry, was ordered out of Division reserve and instructed to join Company A. Both moves were made at night, not only to escape Japanese detection, but also to avoid the intense heat of day which was keeping pace with the enemy in inflicting casualties. Lieutenant Angulo rested Company L at the CP for several hours before continuing on to Question Mark.

Capt. Clifford E. Fox, in command of Charley Company, made the long trek from Sison to Able Company with no prolonged halts. At 0400 on 21 February the three companies were entrenched on the slope of the objective. Coincident with their arrival, a supply and evacuation route was secured. Working around the clock, a detachment from Company B, 108th Engineer Combat Battalion, had completed a bulldozed jeep trail which stretched from the base of Bench Mark Hill to the rim of the draw separating Bench Mark and Question Mark. Now, supply and medical evacuation would be able to function at their normal pace.

Ground commanders were able to formulate final plans since all barriers between friendly forces and the enemy had been stripped away. Lieutenant Colonel Minton recommended that the attack take place the following morning, 22 February, at dawn. General Myers and Colonel Collins, using the battalion forward CP-on top of Bench Mark-as headquarters, concurred. As soon as company commanders had checked in at the CP on 21 February with reports of recent happenings, the plan of attack was completed. It called for Company A, 130th Infantry (newly arrived in the sector, Company L, 130th Infantry, and Company C, 136th Infantry, to attack abreast in an assault wave. Elements of Company E, 130th Infantry, and Company A, 136th Infantry, were to constitute the reserve.

In an arrangement aimed at lending more power to the attack, all machine guns belonging to the force were to be massed on Bench Mark's crest under battalion control. Captain Wallace was designated on-the-ground commander of the crew-served pieces. Three battalions of artillery, the 123d, 124th and 210th, were assigned firing positions. Of all Division Artillery, only the 122d Field Artillery Battalion-on the Division left flank with the 123d Infantry-was not in position to back the attack.

Infantry activity was restricted to a minimum throughout the day preceding the final thrust. Not so with the artillery. Because of the large number of troops massed on the slopes of Question Mark, utmost care was essential in registering concentrations. To lessen the chance of injury to friendly forces, each howitzer was separately adjusted by artillery plane on its part of the target. By nightfall, the last gun had completed its adjustment and all was in readiness. The sole enemy response to these obvious preparations was limited to occasional mortar and machine-gun fire. No casualties were sustained.

Washington's Birthday of 1945 broke hot and clear. Massed machine guns on Bench Mark, twenty-four 105mm and twelve 155mm howitzers thundered their fires against the objective at precisely 0650. For the next ten minutes Question Mark Hill was an inferno, buried under a maze of flame, dust and smoke. To the left-rear, prone doughs could see thousands of tracers race across the draw and rebound into the sky after striking the hilltop. So powerful was the relentless stream of high explosives that it seemed as though the summit would be literally blasted from the face of the earth. At 0700 a smoke shell landed on the center of Question Mark. This was the prearranged signal to the infantryman that the show had passed on to him.

Like a tremendous green-clad wave the three rifle companies leaped forward and rolled up the hillside, destroying everything to their front in a single mighty surge. Opposition was nil. The artillery had done a superb job. The enemy, trying to regain his equilibrium after the tremendous barrage, could do nothing to stem the savage onslaught. Grenades poured into each emplacement, M-is cut down shocked Nips who staggered across the hilltop, and flamethrowers turned their caves into blazing furnaces. It was literally a slaughter. In exactly thirtytwo minutes from the time the smoke shell landed, the only men on Question Mark were grim, satisfied doughs. Not a Nip was seen to move off the hill alive, not a prisoner was taken.

It was now a simple matter to engage the enemy still holding Dead Man's and Hooker Hills. Company K moved down the slope of Bench Mark in the wake of heavy fires from Question Mark and swarmed over the ground it had fought so bitterly to secure. In a few minutes, the assault on the hills was over. But troops of the Division learned one lasting combat lesson in the fight for the two hills: real estate came high on Luzon. For the 460 Japanese slain in the four-day engagement the 130th and 136th Infantry Regiments traded 33 killed, 2 men missing in action and 82 wounded.