Squaring off against the Jap provided no novel experience for Colonel Serff's troops. While not hardened campaigners in any sense of the words, his foot-sloggers had seen enough of the enemy in the slime of the Maffin Bay bush to appreciate the blind courage and cunning which were a major part of the Nip's combat equipment. Trepidation naturally accompanied the 123d doughboys into the line on 13 February. However, a wide vein of confidence was also apparent during the regiment's relief of the 158th RCT on high ground north of the Damortis-Rosario road. This esprit stemmed from one factor: the unit had yet to record its first tactical failure.

Fate was kind to the 123d Infantry for several days after it was first committed in Luzon. Its sector was all but inactive compared to those of other Division elements. Southeast of Rosario Colonel Collins' force, working out of Cauringan, was thrown against a vital strongpoint a few hours after it took its place in the Division line. South of the 130th Infantry, Colonel Cavenee's regiment had the nasty task of clearing a pocket of Nips who constituted a threat to the Division right flank at Pozorrubio. In both instances the enemy struck back with everything at his disposal. Casualties ran high from 15 to 22 February.

Despite the absence of heavy fighting along its line, the 123d was weighted with responsibilities surpassing those of the other regiments. Its sector was easily the most vulnerable in the Division zone of action. The coastal road, running to Damortis from the north, afforded the enemy an excellent avenue of approach in the event he decided to stage a counterattack. If successfully executed such a move could conceivably result in a large Jap wedge through the Division-Army line, currently stretching from Damortis back to Manila. Forced to stand fast until enemy intentions were discernible, the 123d contented itself with aggressive patrolling to its front.

Division G-2 and G-3 exhibited an acute interest in the terrain confronting the regiment. Ever since the Division became operational on Luzon it had received numerous unconfirmed reports from guerrillas and mountain tribesmen describing an abandoned, rough-hewn road which originated in the 123d sector and wound through the Caraballo Mountains to the shadows of Baguio. More specifically, this route began at Pugo, a small town ten miles north of Rosario, and ended at Tuba, a minute settlement a few miles southwest of the summer capital. Maps of the area gave no indication that such a road ever existed. However, should the trailway prove a reality instead of a legend, it could possibly solve the chief enigma currently challenging Division planners: namely, choice of the most rapid passage toward Baguio. A Pugo-Tuba line of advance to the summer capital would certainly be considerably shorter than any other eligible possibility. True, Kennon Road with its two-lane concrete pavement represented the fastest route, but the Japanese had already eliminated it from serious consideration.

Emphasis was placed on interrogation of Pugo residents, and their revelations caused headquarters' hopes to soar. Each additional interview seemed to buttress the legend of the trail. Some Filipinos swore that they'd journeyed over it many times; others offered to trace it on maps. They claimed it was well known throughout the Caraballos as the Old Spanish Trail. Faced with seemingly incontrovertible evidences that a Pugo-Tuba route was more than a native myth, Division prepared to capitalize upon its possibilities. General Clarkson and members of his staff decided to mount one arm of the projected three-way pincer on Baguio from a Pugo base.

Before the operation could emerge from the planning stage however, Division needed detailed information on the roads and trail nets leading to and from Pugo. While the regiment had patrolled ceaselessly from the time it was committed on the Damortis-Rosario line, no parties had made a particularly deep penetration in the direction of Pugo. Equally imperative for tactical success was the selection and reconnaissance of a route by which the 123d Infantry could advance north and form a Pugo line. It was essential that the enemy remain unaware of regimental intentions; otherwise, little surprise could be achieved when the time came to launch a drive through the hills.

Baker Company, commanded by Capt. James J. Itule, got the job of patrolling through Pugo and tracing a concealed route to the barrio which could be used by elements of the regiment leaving the DamortisRosario line. Nominated for the task on Division order, the company was alerted for the five-day-long mission on 16 February. Its projected route ran north from Rosario to Pugo, then east through Tubao to Agoo on the coastal highway, and finally south to Colonel Serff's CP at Damortis. Company B left Rosario at dawn on the 18th.

On 23 February, while Itule and his troops were still circumventing regimental positions, Division gave the 123d Infantry its first combat mission calling for the coordinated action of an entire battalion. Lt. Colonel Coates' 1st Battalion, less Company B, was ordered to pull out of the Rosario sector and drive along the high ground bordering Kennon Road toward a peculiar terrain feature called Twin Peaks.

The battalion was to eliminate any groups of Japanese along the route of advance and then assault and secure Twin Peaks.

Missions of the other battalions were not altered because of the transfer of the 1st Battalion. Major Wolff's 3d Battalion, on the regimental flank at Damortis, continued to scout out the coastal plain as far as Agoo while the Reconnaissance Troop-also operating out of Damortis-shot motorized patrols to the shadows of Aringay. Attached guerrillas and the 2d Battalion extended its lines to include the ground formerly held by Lt. Colonel Coates' force. Combat patrolling of the high ground to its front remained the battalion mission.

A few hours before the 1st Battalion was due to begin its advance toward Twin Peaks, Baker Company returned from its five-day patrol. Captain Itule's report to Colonel Serff was in the main discouraging. First of all, Itule announced that he could find no trace of the Old Spanish Trail in the vicinity of Pugo. Also, he informed his regimental commander that any straight-line advance from Rosario to Pugo could not be made without arousing enemy suspicions. The terrain was such that supply trains, artillery, and attached armor would be forced to follow a narrow road which cut through a broad, open valley. Hostile observation and harassment appeared inevitable.

On the bright side, however, Baker Company brought back detailed reports on enemy strength between Pugo and the Damortis-Rosario line. According to Captain Itule, organized Nip defenses consisted solely of a string of observation posts and a scanty outpost line facing the 123d Infantry front. At no points covered by the patrol was the enemy known to be holed up in tremendous numbers. Despite its disappointment at the lack of information on the Old Spanish Trail, regiment took comfort from the fact that it would be able to proceed virtually unimpeded once it was told to advance.

Division accepted Itule's recommendation on the futility of a direct move from Rosario to Pugo. On the other hand, its faith in Pugo as a base of operations was not shaken because of the patrol's inability to locate the Pugo-Tuba trail. Major Cregg's battalion received orders to push deeper through the hills on its reconnaissances to the north. It was told that a general advance on Pugo would take place upon completion of this preparatory phase.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion-less Company B which was resting at Rosario-struck out for Twin Peaks. Leaving the regimental line on the 24th, it headed toward its objective across country, using the forbidding Kennon Road as a guide. Able Company, commanded by Capt. Harry L. Ice, Jr., advanced along a 2,500-foot-high wooded ridgeline which ran parallel to the north side of the road some 1,300 yards away. To the left of Company A and separated from it by a gully, moved Charley Company, headed by Capt. Vernon G. Rexroat. Visual contact was possible by day and both forces were able to advance abreast. Howitzers from Lt. Colonel Carlson's 122d Field Artillery Battalion stood ready to render supporting 105mm fires.

The companies encountered scattered opposition during the second day of advance. Small groups of Japanese, doubtless posted as Kennon Road watchdogs, literally infested both A and C Companies' ridges. Luckily, these units acted independently and made no attempt to join into a single, strong band. Invariably they were wiped out by 1st Battalion forces, their only accomplishment being to stall the advance momentarily. Twin Peaks was sighted on the last day of February. It came by its name honestly. Two towering hills swept up from the ridgelines for hundreds of feet, dwarfing the surrounding mountains which lay heaped against their slopes. A gauzy cloud-film hung over both summits while the powerful rays of the sun produced a grayishbrown hue on the hillsides.

However, scenic splendor had long ceased to fascinate A and C Companies' hill-weary riflemen. They regarded Twin Peaks apprehensively, their eyes searching out defiles and approaches in place of spectacular formations of rocks and flora. Ice and Rexroat received orders from Lt. Colonel Coates' CP directing them to advance within five hundred yards of the peaks, dig in for the night, and reconnoiter the objective the following morning. Each company entered its own separate operation at this point with A Company detailed to hit the right hill and C the left. Both were incapable of mutual support by reason of the deep ravine which cut between their ridgelines and continued on to sever Twin Peaks.

A reinforced platoon of Company A, led by Lt. Lloyd M. Bernard, Ice's executive officer, went out on reconnaissance shortly after dawn on 1 March. Bernard had a twofold mission. One was to locate a convenient approach to the summit, where the Japanese were known to be emplaced in large numbers. The other was to seek out the Nip strongpoint and punch at it from several different angles with a view to picking out its weakest links. Backed up by a profusion of BARS and tommy guns, Bernard's group cleared the perimeter without incident and set out on a direct line toward A Company's hill.

Lieutenant Bernard received a cruel rebuff as he neared the end of his ridgeline. From the company perimeter it appeared as though the ridge ran right to the side of Twin Peaks and then up the hill in an unbroken line. Bernard now saw that his route of advance dropped off sharply to the base of his objective. A visual reconnaissance showed him that one half of Twin Peaks was circled by the deep draw which cut off the objective as effectively as a moat surrounding a medieval castle. Disgust was universal within the platoon. It meant more hours of climbing for gaunt, nearly exhausted troops; more opportunity for the enemy to diagnose their move and intercept them.

Bernard had no choice but to mutter a word of encouragement and lead the advance into the draw. Stealth was practically impossible as the doughs fought to maintain their balance on the almost perpendicular ridge side. Finally, the entire platoon emerged into the bottom of the ravine where they rested for a moment and reorganized before attacking the rugged climb ahead. After this brief respite, they slung their gear, posted security in the form of automatic riflemen to both flanks and began the ascent. Scouts were handicapped by the terrain and could see no more than a few yards uphill before patches of tall kunai grass blotted out their fields of vision.

If ever the Nips held an advantage, that time was now. Bernard's force had little observation, no opportunity to pick out pitfalls on the mountainside where an ambush might be waiting. Every man's attention was necessarily devoted to staying on his feet and negotiating the climb. M-is had to be carried over the shoulder so that hands were free to grasp shrubs and vines. At precisely this moment the enemy chose to lash out with fire. Before the scouts had a chance to shout a warning, a party of Japanese rose from the kunai and poured a fusillade of rifle fire into the platoon. Because of the sharp angle of the hill it was impossible to return this fire with any telling effect. Lieutenant Bernard sent his support squad out to the right flank in an attempt to swing around this barrier and blast it from the side, but the enemy saw this move and ground it down in short order. The platoon backed down the slope and tried to come in from the left side, but this too proved unsuccessful. Bernard remained in this position until late afternoon when he withdrew his men and returned to the company perimeter.

Captain Rexroat's company, closing in on the left peak, had no better luck. His troops also were forced to dip to the base of the draw before they could find an approach to the objective. Like the Able force they were beaten off the hillside before they could make much headway.

A second try at fighting up to the top of the peaks was inaugurated by both companies shortly after sunrise the following day. Again Ice and Rexroat entrusted their missions to single rifle platoons heavily reinforced with automatic weapons. Company A's force, led on this attempt by Lieutenant Raymond E. Bailey, was ordered to shy away from the sector explored by Bernard and work over another route. Bailey was forced to descend into the thickly vegetated gully surrounding the foot of his target, but once at the bottom he half-circled the hill and approached it from its northern side.

His platoon had not covered more than a hundred yards before its advance was interrupted by short-range Nip fires coming from the left and right fronts. The platoon got its BARS into action but when riflemen tried to move forward they were picked off by enemy Arisakas. Several Japanese were killed in the close contact fire-fight, but others concealed in mutually supporting bunkers took up the slack and kept the line from cracking. Bailey's men were the aggressors throughout the day but darkness finally stopped them. The platoon, bearing its dead and wounded, hiked back to its base. Charley Company, employing identical tactics on the left side of the dual objective, suffered a similar setback. Battalion was disturbed at reports from A and C but knew of no way to take Twin Peaks other than to ceaselessly pound the enemy strongpoints. Lt. Colonel Coates ordered Ice and Rexroat to resume the pressure at daybreak.

After two fruitless tries, every dough in the 1st Battalion prayed that No. 3 would bear a lucky charm. It almost did. Still employing a single reinforced rifle platoon to insure prompt maneuverability, Captain Ice sent his 3d Platoon out under the command of Lt. William B. Roop, Able's Weapons Platoon leader. Lieutenant Roop left the company perimeter while the sun still struggled to pierce the haze covering the ridgeline. The approach march was made rapidly and the platoon dropped down into the draw and began its advance up the right peak before the terrain was sharply lighted. Moving stealthily but as quickly as the ground would permit, the force knifed upward without arousing the Nip outposts.

Where the riflemen making the two previous attempts had barely cleared the gully before receiving heavy small-arms fire, Roop's men somehow managed to evade the enemy sentries. Their speed and silence paid off handsomely. Now well up on the side of the peak, lead scouts suddenly raised their rifles horizontally overhead and dropped to the ground. Roop crawled forward to investigate and saw a sprawling banana grove cut into the hillside. Jap conversation could be heard. The platoon leader summoned his second-in-command, T/Sgt. Alfred W. Johnson, and outlined a plan whereby one squad would work around to the right and bear in on the enemy while the remaining elements rushed the grove from the front.

At Lieutenant Roop's signal the assault was on. BARS and M-1 s crackled as the doughs swept forward. A dozen Japs fell before the fire as the platoon completed its sprint through the clearing. Security went out to the front and both flanks as the troops were reorganized to defend the ground. A bulky Nip radio emplaced in a foxhole was destroyed by a grenade. However, the Japanese were now thoroughly aroused. They reacted immediately, dispatching strong investigating forces from positions on the crest of the objective. Able's single platoon was soon spotted and the Nips quickly inaugurated a double envelopment behind knee-mortar support that threatened to crush the American unit. Roop realized that his command lacked the numbers and guns to stem the oncoming Nip tide. He radioed the 122d Field Artillery fire direction center and asked for 105mm fire to blanket the grove and cover his withdrawal. No further casualties were sustained during the move down into the ravine.

Now the battalion was in bad shape. Three solid days of action plus fever and fatigue combined to rob the two companies of a major part of their combat strength. Tortuous hill-climbing left the rest of the outfit tired and listless. Luzon's mountains were something new to these riflemen who had trained to fight in sand and jungle: it took weeks to condition one's self to the rigors of hill campaigning. But Lt. Colonel Coates still had one card left to play. Gambling on an allor-nothing basis involving both of his assault teams, he alerted A and C for a coordinated two-company strike to take place the following morning. Batteries of guns from the light 122d and medium 123d Field Artillery Battalions registered in at dusk to assure sufficient fire support. Chemical mortars from the attached 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion were ready to back the attack.

Promptly at dawn the 4.2s shrouded all of Twin Peaks in a pall of white phosphorus smoke. Artillery thundered against the enemy-held slopes, pausing only to elevate their fires as the doughboys came closer to the impact areas. Advancing in columns of platoons, A and C disappeared into their respective draws and went into the attack. Lieutenant Roop, familiar with the terrain as far as the banana grove, moved with the Able spearhead and guided the force toward the clearing. Meanwhile Company C succeeded in skirting several Nip strongpoints on the left side and managed to move at the same speed as Ice's force.

Once past the grove the axe fell on Company A. Confronting it was a strong, albeit hastily constructed, line manned by scores of Nip infantrymen. Platoons gamely tried to shoulder their way through the center of the line. When that failed, pressure was shunted out to the flanks. But the Jap stayed powerful at all points. At his CP Captain Ice could hear a sudden outburst of high-pitched Nambus coming from the left peak where Charley Company had bumped into the heart of the Japanese defense. Furious fighting went on all day but the situation did not change. Back at battalion Lt. Colonel Coates got a mournful "We're stopped" from each of his company commanders. When it appeared inevitable that continued punching would reap no dividends the battalion CO ordered his forces to hold what had been gained and await further orders.

Three consecutive reverses made it painfully evident that the Nips on Twin Peaks had a line of resistance powerful enough to withstand the attack of an entire battalion. With no trump cards left, Lt. Colonel Coates' sole alternative was to drop back and wait while air and artillery assumed the task of applying pressure to the hills. Then, once Napalm and high explosives had dissipated the Jap's cover, depleted his ground reserves, and shattered his indisputable advantage of terrain, 1st Battalion troops with Baker Company now available, could again move forward to apply the crusher.

Just prior to dusk on 3 March, as Coates was readying his recommendations for the approval of higher headquarters, his radio operator received a priority message requesting the battalion commander to report to the regimental CP at Damortis without delay. When the tall Peorian strode into the operations office he was surprised to see all battalion commanders, the entire regimental staff, and Colonel Serff grouped around a large-scale wall map. Seeing Coates, Colonel Serff looked up and curtly announced: "The 123d Infantry has been alerted to drive northward. All battalions will be needed in this show so ready your outfit for relief as soon as you return to your CP. Major Askren's 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, will take over the Twin Peaks job tomorrow at noon. As soon as his force is in position take your battalion to these coordinates, an assembly area north of San Luis. You'll pick up Company B there. S-3 will fill you in on happenings of the past week and handle your questions. Last stop on this line is Baguio."

Much had occurred on the Rosario-Damortis line while the 1st Battalion was fighting in Kennon Road country. Major Cregg had received a change of assignment and went from 2d Battalion CO to regimental S-3, a post he had held throughout the regiment's training. Lt. Col. James W. Hilton, no stranger to the 33d Division, had meanwhile been assigned to the 123d and given Cregg's old command. Lt. Colonel Hilton had gone through World War I with the Golden Cross, earning the British Military Medal and the Silver Star for gallantry in action in France. Again a member of a fighting unit, he held the distinction of being the only 33d Division man to actively campaign in both wars with the same unit.

During a recess in the conference, Major Cregg thoroughly oriented Lt. Colonel Coates on the overall tactical situation. Briefly summed up, this was it: Constant combat reconnaissance had finally disintegrated the enemy outpost line overlooking regimental installations between Damortis and Rosario. Higher headquarters persisted in maintaining a check rein on the regiment but permitted Colonel Serff to pull stakes from the Rosario-Damortis road and build positions along the series of ridges formerly manned by the Japanese. In the main, 2d Battalion troops and guerrillas held these points. On the right flank of the 123d's zone of action, Major Wolff's 3d Battalion and the Reconnaissance Troop-coordinating with the doughboys-had swept along the coastal highway to Agoo. Enemy opposition, fierce in some cases, was usually scattered and ineffective.

However, gradual liquidation of these Nip groups had readied the regiment for its northward advance. Patrol reports, mostly from Rule's five-day reconnaissance and from Lt. James M. Garrity's I&R Platoon, had soundly established the fact that the bulk of Japanese defenses was centered in the mountains northeast of Pugo. Everything south of the deserted barrio reputedly consisted of observation post personnel and nuisance forces pushed out from the enemy's main line of resistance to hinder and harass invading troops. Pugo was the 123d's current aiming point. Division had made the decision to take the town and employ it as the regiment's base of operations for a Baguio drive. It was hoped that once all elements of the regiment converged on Pugo the legend of the Old Spanish Trail would rapidly be substantiated. If it were finally proven that the trail was a myth, the 123d Infantry would blaze its own trail and fight through to the summer capital.

Before the capture of Pugo could be effected, Colonel Serff first had to comb out and clear a huge tract of low, rolling hills which sprawled between Pugo and the ridges held by the regiment. It was impossible to ignore this preliminary. Not only would an open back door invite hostile ground action, but more important, the Japanese would have an unimpeded view of all regimental moves out of Pugo and be able to communicate them to the main Nip force holed up north of the barrio. Two hills in particular stood out as definite threats to regimental security. One, called Y, was located on the eastern fringe of the 123d's sector, approximately a mile and a half north of San Luis. The other, named X-the unknown quantity-rose on the opposite side of the regimental zone of action some two miles east of Tubao.

Standing only five hundred feet high, both X and Y were admirably suited to serve as observation posts. From Y's crest, the approaches into Pugo and the ridges currently housing the regiment were clearly visible. Observers on Hill X could easily view any strike toward Pugo made by way of the coastal highway and then relay pertinent data on strength and disposition of American troops to Nip headquarters. With this information, Japanese artillerymen could conceivably block off the regimental advance.

Once his subordinate commanders had received complete intelligence and operations briefings, Colonel Serff was ready to go into his plan of attack. Hills X and Y were first on the combat agenda. Once these hills had been seized and the regiment's rear sealed off from enemy view, the drive would swing toward Pugo. Although earlier reconnaissance had made it plain that no strong enemy force held the area of low hills, the capture of X and Y posed a delicate tactical problem. It was inadvisable for the 123d Infantry to bear down on X and Y from their present positions. While such a move would have had local success, its futility would become apparent several days later when the regiment encountered an alerted and aroused enemy at Pugo and the mountains beyond. A quick surprise thrust into the Nip's open flanks was the only logical answer.

Colonel Serff outlined exactly such a move. His plan called for all companies of the 1st Battalion to be thrown against Hill Y. Lt. Colonel Coates received orders to quit Kennon Road at night and move to San Luis under cover of darkness. Once there, the battalion was to go into bivouac until the early morning hours of 7 March when the approach march on the hill would begin. Hill Y was to be hit at dawn. X became a joint 2d and 3d Battalion objective. Lt. Colonel Hilton's men were to abandon their ridge positions on the night of 6 March and backtrack to the Rosario-Damortis road to await trucks which would take the battalion across to Damortis, up the coastal road to Agoo, and then along the Agoo-Tubao road to its terminus. Major Wolff's force, operating behind the 2d Battalion, was to follow the same route to Tubao except that it was to pick up its 21/2-ton trucks on the highway north of Damortis. Upon detrucking, both units were to close in on Hill X, reach its base at dawn, and then attack.

One important factor remained to be worked out before preparations could be completed. The Agoo-Tubao road, necessary for the success of the operation, was still in Japanese hands. A narrow passage cut through a series of low ridges, the road was known to be heavily mined and defended by enemy units dug in on the overlooking hillsides. Unfortunately, unearthing mines and eliminating Jap defenders made up but half of the problem. The Agoo-Tubao road was dotted with almost a score of bridges which carried the road over numerous creeks and streams. Many of the spans had been totally destroyed while others had been so badly damaged that they could not bear combat vehicles.

Antitank Company, commanded by Capt. John D. Jones, and Company A, 108th Engineers, were jointly assigned the mission of clearing the pass of enemy and readying it for 2d and 3d Battalion traffic. Jones' company had been fighting as a rifle unit since it was first committed on Luzon. Like the other antitank units in the Division the terrain had removed the potency from its 57mm guns. Rarely attached to a battalion, it fought out of regimental headquarters as Colonel Serff's select "trouble shooters."

With a mine-detecting team from the engineers leading the way, the push out of Agoo began on the morning of 4 March. Nip resistance was met as soon as the company cleared the barrio but the riflemen smothered it and kept moving. Directly behind the infantry came the engineer company, their vehicles laden with Bailey spans which had been dismantled from less pressing sites and rushed to this vital bottleneck. Once Antitank Company had gained the far end of a bridge, the engineers, tools and weapons in hand, came on to either strengthen the existing bridge or to sweep it aside and replace it with a Bailey span.

Sniper and machine-gun fire from the ridges inflicted many casualties but Antitank Company managed to overrun every organized Jap strongpoint. Two days of close combat and steady repair of bridges finally brought the force to Tubao shortly before dark on 6 March. No more mines, no more ruined bridges and no more Nips remained to block 2d and 3d Battalion moves through the pass. Colonel Serff breathed a sigh of profound relief when he received Jones' message that the mission had been accomplished. He received the news only a few hours before his companies were scheduled to enter the pass.

Back in the 1st Battalion area near Kennon Road, Lt. Colonel Coates turned over the Twin Peaks puzzle to the 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, and organized his force for the trek back to San Luis. One platoon of Baker Company and a wire-laying team from battalion headquarters moved out well in front of the column as an advance guard. The rest of Company B, now commanded by Lieutenant Bernard, led the main body with Able, Dog, Headquarters and Charley following in that order. It was close to midnight when the column finally began to move. Luckily, the moon provided enough illumination for the troops to pick out pitfalls in the terrain and there were no casualties from the night move. The cool of night made the steady pace bearable.

Bernard's advance guard came upon San Luis early the next morning. Normally inhabited by a few farming families, the village was completely deserted. Tall clumps of unruly tropical grass almost obscured the rundown nipa shacks from sight. Warily the platoon circled the barrio and closed in to search the few rickety huts. One squad, under Sgt. Roman L. Wesolowski, systematically probed them while other riflemen covered them from the rear. As Wesolowski led his men toward the last of the huts, grenades and machine-gun fire suddenly swept out of one of the shrub-covered windows toward the squad and its covering group. Sergeant Wesolowski and his two scouts each caught grenade fragments.

Picking himself from the ground, Wesolowski ordered his squad to back up, form a firing line and pelt the shack with M-1 fire. Only after he was in position did Wesolowski notice that one of his scouts still lay close to the Japanese-held hut, unable to move due to his wounds. Disregarding the pain of his own injury, the sergeant rushed out through the fire, gathered the man up in his arms and raced back to the line. Minutes later, the platoon assaulted the but and wiped out the five-man Japanese ambush. Sergeant Wesolowski later received the Silver Star for saving the life of his scout. After a short while, the rest of the battalion reached San Luis, reorganized, and marched a thousand yards northeast of the barrio where the companies halted and branched off into separate, hidden assembly areas. Lt. Colonel Coates notified Colonel Serff that his unit was in position for the attack.

Across the regimental zone, movement of troops did not begin until twelve hours before jumpoff time. Lt. Colonel Hilton and his men reached the Damortis-Rosario highway at the appointed time and entrucked for the ride to Tubao. Major Wolff's battalion arrived at Tubao close behind them. While the troops detrucked and reorganized, the two battalion commanders made a last-minute check of the coordinated plan. The 2d Battalion was to lead the approach march followed by the 3d. Several hundred yards short of the base of Hill X, the 3d Battalion was to branch off, move behind the hill and drive forward to the north. Lt. Colonel Hilton's doughboys were to stay on their original line and attack from the west. A platoon from Company G, led by Lt. Arthur B. Mathies, was selected to act as the advance guard.

Silence gripped the column as it moved through the night. All went according to plan. Minutes before dawn Major Wolff separated from the two-battalion column and curved his force around the southern slope of the hill. Only a single untoward incident occurred and that was smashed before it could do any damage. Observing a grass shack just to the right of his battalion's route, Lieutenant Mathies left his platoon and cut across to investigate. As he neared the shack three Nips inside opened up at him with point-blank rifle fire. Miraculously unhurt, Mathies whirled around and dove into a ditch a few feet away. Propping himself up on his elbows, he threw a clip of M-1 into the shack, heaved a grenade through a window and raced around to the opposite side of the hut, which he also grenaded. When he entered the shack all three of the enemy lay dead on the floor. Lieutenant Mathies earned the first of his two awards of the Silver Star for this action.

At dawn the regiment moved into action all along the line. With Fox and George Companies in the lead, 2d Battalion troops swarmed up the side of Hill X at a dead run. No one paused for breath as the doughs swept over the ground at top speed, finally slowing down at the crest where they joined forces with 3d Battalion riflemen. Opposition was negligible. No more than a dozen Nips held the hill and they went down before the first blast of rifle fire. Things were scarcely different on the 1st Battalion objective. Able, Baker and Charley Companies took Hill Y without firing a shot.

Meanwhile, from a vantage point between his two widely separated forces, Colonel Serff watched the perfectly executed double envelopment close in on X and Y. Shortly after completion of the regimental maneuver he was joined at his CP by Lieutenant Garrity and the I & R Platoon, just returned from a long-range patrol in the foothills north of Pugo. Garrity notified the colonel that Pugo was virtually clear, the bulk of enemy troops having withdrawn the day before. Armed with this information, the regimental commander decided to occupy Pugo without delay. He issued orders to the 2d and 3d Battalions directing them to leave Hill X and sweep through the ridges flanking Pugo on the west. Instruction went to Coates to comb out the terrain on the opposite side.

Colonel Serff then organized a composite force to attack through the valley between the flanking forces and effect the seizure of Pugo. The group was made up of regimental headquarters personnel, the I & R Platoon and a few medium tanks out of the 775th Tank Battalion, attached to the 123d for the X-Y envelopment. With Colonel Serff, in direct command of the makeshift unit. riding in one of the point vehicles, "Task Force Pugo" moved out at noon. No enemy were met during the ride to Pugo but once inside the barrio the regimental commander's troops were fired upon by a small delaying force concealed inside a few flimsy huts. A sharp skirmish ensued during which twenty Japs were slain and three captured. However, once this initial resistance was crushed, remaining enemy broke for the safety of the mountains.

Pugo was quickly out-posted from forces available while the regimental forward CP was set-up in the town's badly damaged church. Since landing on Luzon, the CP had found a rice paddy, a town hall, a brothel and now a church from which to direct 123d operations. Each battalion was contacted and informed that Pugo was in friendly hands. Commanders were told to advance until sundown and then construct a horseshoe-shaped perimeter around the newly captured barrio.

By dusk the rifle companies were in positions roughly a thousand yards north and northeast of Pugo. It took no grandiloquent orientation to tell the infantrymen what was in store for the immediate future. Ahead of them they could see a seemingly endless range of mountains with tree-covered peaks so high they seemed to be part of the heavens. They knew too that in days to come they would live and die on those peaks, fighting to rid them of enemy until Baguio-the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow-shone below the last hill.