General Krueger, Sixth Army commander, was pleased with the result of the 130th's northward dash along the Luzon coast. A single infantry battalion, making a reconnaissance in force, had effected the long-sought junction with Colonel Volckmann's Northern Luzon guerrillas. Capture of the Aringay and Bauang bridges had consolidated lines of supply and communication between Army headquarters and its most forward elements. From a strategic standpoint-with most of western Luzon in Sixth Army hands-the time was opportune to mount a drive through the mountains to Yamashita's Baguio citadel.

Corps considerably swelled the combat effectiveness of the Division in late March by attaching the 129th Infantry of the crack 37th Division to the Golden Cross. Fresh from victories along the Central Luzon Plain and in shattered Manila, Col. John Frederick's men checked into a Bauang assembly area at noon on 26 March. This attachment was made for two reasons: primarily because the character of enemy opposition along the approaches to Baguio was more fierce than in any Sixth Army sector; secondly, the 33d Division was attempting to roll back the enemy line with only two regiments. The pressure applied against the enemy on Kennon Road necessarily had to be continued even though terrain restrictions made it impossible to reach Baguio along this route. If the 136th removed this pressure which was keeping hundreds of Nips occupied, the enemy would be free to re-group his forces in answer to the new threat from the west.

Troops of the Golden Cross were happy to welcome the 129th back into the fold. Three years before, this colorful Illinois regiment, complemented by the 130th and 136th Infantry Regiments, had composed a third of the Division's infantry strength. In July 1942, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 129th left Camp Forrest and headed for the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. The remaining battalion was employed as the nucleus around which the 123d Infantry was built when it was activated in October 1942. Since going overseas, a reconstructed 129th had piled up an enviable combat record highlighted by bloody campaigning on Bougainville. The remainder of the 37th Division remained in Manila for rest and rehabilitation.

With four regiments committed to the fight for Baguio, higher headquarters readily lifted the mission outside the category of feints and reconnaissances in force. Corps advised General Clarkson that the signal to inaugurate an all-out climax push against the Philippine summer capital would be flashed at any moment. Heavily reinforced by troops and guns, the Golden Cross waited for orders to advance.

But this set-up, whereby the 33d had more in the way of men and weapons than ever before, was destined to be short-lived. In other parts of the Corps sector reinforcements were also desperately required. The 32d (Red Arrow Division, with the vital mission of smashing through the Japs along the Villa Verde Trail, was locked in a costly impasse with the enemy. With Corps it necessarily became a case of fobbing Peter to pay Paul. Unhappily, the Golden Cross was forced into the Peter role.

The 129th went into the line. The 130th came out. No sooner had this relief been effected, on 28 March near Burgos along the Naguilian-Baguio Road, than two battalions of Blackhawks mounted trucks at Aringay for the long haul to the Tebbo area where they in turn took over the positions of two 32d Division battalions. Red Arrow troops were immediately committed along the Villa Verde, a rough jeep trail running through the mountains up the center of Northern Luzon. The Blackhawk move stretched the Division line from Aringay to Tebbo, an airline distance of sixty-five miles.

To complete this Corps-wide shuffling of troops, the 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry, commanded by Lt. Colonel Coates, moved up the engineer-dozed Caba-Galiano road. At the Galiano terminus, these 123d doughs relieved Company G, 130th Infantry, which had been in this area for several days acting as security for the engineer construction force.

With Golden Cross troops spread over half of Northern Luzon, I Corps came out with a field order directing an advance all along its front.

Colonel Cavenee's men redoubled their efforts to drive the Nips back on Kennon Road. The 129th swept forward from Burgos and proceeded to hack its way forward over Highway 9. The Jap reacted violently all along the line.

Lieutenant Colonel Coates' battalion ran into a tartar. Galiano, where his battalion had entered the line, is a small power-plant town nestling deep in the Asin Valley. Two huge mountains flank the small barrio: Mount Bilbil on the north, and Mount Lomboy in the opposite direction. The 1st Battalion, with the mission of driving northeast to Asin, sought to weave between these bulwarks. The Jap, able to observe the daily progress of road construction as the engineers neared Galiano, had developed both Bilbil and Lomboy into powerful hill fortresses. These key positions were all-important in his plan of mountain defense. Not only did they look down directly upon the valley, but they also outposted his main line of resistance concentrated two miles away in the steep areas surrounding the Asin tunnels. Enemy troops located on these twin strongpoints smashed every attempt on the battalion's part to advance through the valley. Mountain artillery pieces and heavy mortars ceaselessly pounded all battalion positions, raking the unit from front line to CP. After a few days of relentless shelling, it soon became obvious, even to the most optimistic, that the battalion could not gain an inch.

Switching tactics on the order of their regimental commander, the 123d doughs decided to try and knock the Japs off Hill X, a long knob running down the southern slope of Bilbil and separated into two parts by a thin razor-back ridge. But here, too, the battalion's assaulting elements were stopped cold.

Mile-long Bilbil was formidably fortified by the enemy. Particularly so was Hill X. Seven times the 1st Battalion attempted to scale the heights of Hill X, but on each occasion they were pin-pointed on the exposed razorback halfway up the hill and cut down with small-arms, mortar and artillery fire.

After their final failure to take the hill, it became evident that a fresh, rested force was needed to assault the enemy defensive set-up. Other battalions of the 123d were unable to render assistance to the exhausted troops of the 1st Battalion. Lt. Colonel Hilton and Major Sanford I. Wolff, commanding the 2d and 3d Battalions, were encountering bitter opposition in the advance from Pugo toward Baguio.

Meanwhile, on the opposite flank of the Division, the 130th Infantry noted scant enemy activity in the Tebbo sector. General Clarkson, anxious to bolster his four-pronged pincer movement on Baguio, issued orders to the 2d Battalion, 136th Infantry, then in Division reserve near Sison, directing it to relieve the 130th at Tebbo. By nightfall on 9 April the relief was completed. The following morning, the 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry-fresh compared to Lt. Colonel Coates' battered men-took over in the Galiano sector. Major Richard Askren was in command.

Remaining elements of the 37th Division arrived at Bauang the same day. Anxious to throw two full-force drives against Baguio, Corps released the 129th Infantry from its Golden Cross attachment and separated the area into two sections, giving one each to the 33d and 37th. General Beightler assumed responsibility for the Naguilian-Baguio road and all terrain to the north, while General Clarkson was ordered to confine 33d Division activities to the area south of the highway.

After a look at Bilbil and Lomboy, Blackhawk troops girded themselves for days of brutal campaigning. One glimpse at the haggard faces of the 123d troops going to the rear told them that the enemy on Hill X was prepared to hold out until the last man had been killed. Hill X was garrisoned by elements of the Jap 58th Independent Mixed Brigade. The Blackhawks had met them before. Cunning fighters who asked no quarter and gave none, the 58th IMB was one of Yamashita's prides.

No sooner was the orientation following the relief completed than Blackhawk patrols moved forward, aggressively sawing away at the enemy's defensive alignment in search of a weak link possibly overlooked by the 123d. They found none. There still remained only one way to get at the Jap-the same barren route of advance up Hill X taken by the 123d Infantry in their fruitless smashes.

Major Askren decided to gamble on a bold move. He sent for Capt. William F. Dellinger, Fox Company commander, and outlined an audacious plan of attacking the Hill X garrison without benefit of any preparatory fires. Major Askren based his entire plan on the element of surprise, speculating that his troops could at least secure a foothold on the hill before the enemy fully realized what was happening. Captain Dellinger returned to his CP and briefed his troops. Jump-off time was set for 0900 on 11 April.

Everything came off according to plan. The Jap was hit suddenly and hard. And, as hoped for, he folded in the moment of crisis. until the forward wave of riflemen swarmed over the crest of the hill and blasted their positions with grenades and small-arms fire, the Jap soldiers had no inkling that such an assault was even under way. Bewildered by this startling turn of events, they rapidly pulled out of their fire-swept emplacements and raced up the mountainside toward the main force entrenched on top of Bilbil.

But cooler heads prevailed among the Japanese. Before Fox Company could consolidate its gains and secure favorable fields of fire ranging toward the enemy, the Nips counterattacked.

Backed up by the heavy artillery and mortars on Bilbil, the enemy reorganized on the tree-dotted slopes of the hill and charged down toward Captain Dellinger's doughs. Desperately, Fox Company shifted fires in a determined effort to protect this vital gain they had engineered. But the enemy, screaming "Banzai!" along with vile American epithets, was able to throw plunging rifle and machine-gun fire into their old foxholes. Slowly they gained fire superiority. The crusher was applied a few moments later when Nip mountain guns and mortars slammed shells into the company.

Slowly the Japs got a frontal and flanking attack under way and assaulted their former positions. Fox Company beat them back repeatedly, but accelerated mortar fires from Bilbil soon made the ground untenable. Carrying its dead and wounded, Company F was forced to withdraw.

Remembering the fate of the 123d Infantry, which had absorbed seven beatings such as Fox Company's, Colonel Collins took personal command. His regiment had been given the mission of taking Asin and attacking toward Baguio as soon as possible. The CO quickly realized that he could not hope to take both Bilbil and Lomboy and still maintain a sustained advance against Asin, where the enemy was reportedly stronger than at Galiano. His job now was not necessarily to clear Bilbil and Lomboy, although that was naturally desirable. He had to keep advancing above everything else.

Colonel Collins formulated a plan whereby small elements of his regiment would contain these strongpoints while the remainder of his force took advantage of the diversion to move up the valley. The 1st Battalion was handed the job of knocking out X and neutralizing Bilbil, while Major Askren's troops were to carry out the principal part of the mission by heading for Asin.

Most of the 1st Battalion was at this time engaged in protecting supply installations located near Galiano. It was a distasteful assignment. The power-plant barrio was under daily artillery fire from 75s on Bilbil. Technically "rear area," Galiano was anything but a sanctuary for the weary. In many respects it was just as hot as Bilbil. The story of a Baker Company patrol well illustrates that fact.

This patrol, composed of the company's 2d Platoon, had just completed a routine security check along the battalion's left flank. While moving down the valley road to their bivouac area, they were suddenly hit by a barrage of HE shells. At the same time, a small raiding party of Nips who had infiltrated around the battalion, caught the patrol in a blast of machine-gun fire. Only the self-sacrifice of a single man enabled the platoon to escape annihilation. He was Pfc. Doneivon L. Weeks, first scout.

Weeks took the first burst in both legs and went down. Immediately shouting to his men to seek cover alongside the road, the crippled scout took a grenade from his shoulder harness and painfully dragged himself toward the Japs, leaving a trail of blood in his wake. Unable to resist this helpless target, the enemy brought all of their guns down on Private First Class Weeks, killing him instantly. But the rest of the platoon, prone in the small grooves lining the road, was able to pinpoint the Nip infiltrators. They maneuvered a double envelopment around the Japs and wiped out the raiding party. Private First Class Weeks earned a posthumous award of the DSC.

Actions such as this made it imperative to keep two rifle companies near Galiano. Infiltrations were frequent. Only Charley Company could be spared for the attack on Hill X.

The night of 11-12 April was spent plastering Japanese positions on Hill X with an assortment of high explosives. From 1800 to 0600 the howitzers of the 124th Field Artillery kept up a steady pounding. Early the next morning, Captain Kelly's company moved out in the attack. This time, however, the Jap was not caught half asleep. He knew what was coming long before Charley Company's lead scouts began their painful ascent up the steep slope.

Six machine guns, with clear fields of fire, spat out copper-coated greetings as soon as the Blackhawk doughs hove into sight. Mortars and the artillery section on Bilbil-the same weapons that had ripped Fox Company and the 123d-quickly joined the machine-gun chatter and effectively covered routes of advance. Casualties ran discouragingly high, but Charley Company continued to push into this merciless hail of bullets and shell fragments. Every yard taken came harder than the preceding one. It was simply a case of men against fire and the fire finally prevailed.

Kelly was forced to halt the drive. Progress at this expensive price meant that there would not be enough riflemen to mount an assault even if the enemy fire lanes were traversed. Word went out to the platoons: reorganize and dig in.

Still displaying the tactical know-how and esprit that made it one of the finest units in the Division, the company quickly consolidated its gains. Half of the force threw voluminous fire against the Nips while the remainder dug in. As soon as their slit trenches were dug, the men in holes became the base of fire. In this fashion the entire company was able to gain protection. No additional casualties resulted during this procedure.

Battered as it was, Charley had the foothold that the 123d and Fox Company had both failed to secure. But the razor-back entrance of Hill X still lay ahead. The enemy, obviously under orders to hold at all costs, did not leave his positions during the hours of darkness and the company spent a quiet night on the slope of Hill X.

At dawn the attack was resumed. It assumed its former proportion of ferocity the moment the scouts moved out. Again the enemy doused the hillside with every type of fire at his command. Again the company had to wade through fire in order to gain ground. Moving slowly, Captain Kelly and his men fought their way up to the razor-back. The enemy immediately shifted some of his fires from the men onto the narrow ridge. Bullets could be seen snapping into every yard of its top and sides. It looked at this point as though Hill X completely defied assault.

But the actions of one man broke the stalemate. That man was Pfc. Dexter J. Kerstetter, a lead scout with the 3d Platoon who had spent the first two months of the Luzon campaign as a cook's helper in the company mess. Shortly before entering the Galiano sector, the company strength was depleted to seventy men. Realizing the need for manpower where it would do the most good, the 37-year old Washingtonian gladly swapped his field stove for an M-1.

Well ahead of his squad, which was in the forefront of the attack, Kerstetter was the first man to approach the razor-back. Lt. George W. Campbell, his platoon leader, takes the story from here:

Inspired by this display of courage, all platoons of Charley Company raced across the ridge and charged into the enemy stronghold. Pfc. Joseph Papez, Jr. rushed a pair of mutually supporting Nambus and wiped out both weapons and crews as Nip grenades exploded around him. Keyed to a white-hot fighting pitch, Captain Kelly's troops blasted every emplacement and pumped bullets into every Jap with a breath of life remaining in him.

In a few moments this pent-up fury abated. All that remained on the hill was Charley Company, a thin haze of smoke, the acrid smell of cordite, and fifty-seven dead Japanese. Of the fifty-seven, Kerstetter accounted for sixteen and Papez for five.

For his intrepidity, Pfc. Dexter J. Kerstetter was presented with the Medal of Honor by President Harry S. Truman in a ceremony staged on the White House lawn in September 1945. Papez got the DSC. To the company went the Nation's highest award to a combat unit-the Distinguished Unit Citation.

Nips on Bilbil counterattacked Captain Kelly's doughs for three solid days and nights but the company held fast even though casualties had cut them down to less than half strength. Ironically, among the wounded was Kerstetter, hit in the leg by a sniper's bullet. But the entire purpose of the attack against Hill X had been achieved. On the first day of the fight, when the Nips were throwing everything they had against Charley Company, the 2d Battalion took advantage of the diversion and drove through the valley to Asin.

On both Bilbil and Lomboy the enemy continued to hold the dominating terrain, but with Blackhawks on Hill X the Bilbil Nips were virtually isolated. With the hill in Golden Cross hands, the Japs would first have to retake Hill X before they would be able to sweep down the slope into the valley where the war was currently passing them by.

In accordance with "The Ripper's" plan to contain the Japs on Lomboy in the same manner as those on Bilbil, a provisional force composed of the I & R Platoon and Antitank Company seized a position halfway up the steep side of the mountain but directly between the Japs and the valley below. Again, Blackhawks could prevent the Japs from harassing and raiding vital lines of supply, communication and evacuation. This action freed most of the 130th's footsloggers for the strike against the Jap main line of resistance near Asin.

Only small pockets of enemy contested the 2d Battalion's entry into Asin, and elements of the battalion were able to maneuver around these defenders. By pinching these pockets between frontal and flanking moves, the Blackhawks were able to wipe out all opposition, and Major Askren had a CP set up in Asin by nightfall of 12 April.

Early the next morning combat patrols from the rifle companies, led by Lts. James Huckaby, George Proudfoot, Douglas M. Hylton, and James L. Fleming, moved toward the towering ridgeline east of Asin. These first patrols were all administered a severe taste of the character of the Japanese defense. All returned to headquarters with identical stories. The Jap had all approaches covered with an abundance of automatic weapons. He let you get in close, and just when you thought you had him, he opened up.

Without doubt, this was the line selected by the Nips to halt the regimental advance.

From these early skirmishes, Colonel Collins and his staff were able to estimate correctly the enemy's capabilities and his tactical attitude. Since the Blackhawk entry into Asin, the Jap confined his counter-activity to harassing mortar and artillery fire. Gone were his raiding parties and fanatical Banzai attacks.

The obvious deduction was that the enemy chose to husband his forces until the regiment actually attacked his positions. With Baguio a few scant miles behind him he could not afford to deplete his ranks with the senseless counterattacks characteristic of his fighting in the earlier days of the Pacific War. If he could hold east of Asin, the drive up the valley would have necessarily gone for naught. In effect then, his feelings could be summed up in four words: "Come and get me!"

Everything favored him: terrain, lines of supply, location of supporting weapons. The Asin Valley here was more a gorge than a valley. Nowhere was it more than a hundred yards wide. The large ridge to the east, so ferociously defended by the Nips, could not be negotiated unless men pulled themselves up its sides, using small limbs and bushes as handholds. The vegetation on the hillside was exceedingly thick and visibility was limited to a maximum of six or seven yards.

Carved into the southern tip of this 2,000-foot-high ridge which ran north and south between the Naguilian road and the Asin road, were two tunnels about five hundred yards long and eight hundred yards apart. The 130th Infantry was charged with the seizure of the ridge and the two tunnels, known as the Asin tunnels.

Patrols continued to search the ridge. However, they turned out to be expensive affairs as even the smallest ones generally returned to their bases with casualties. The Aringay-Bauang open-ground "rabbit-hunt" days were ended. At Asin patrols paid dearly for just a glimpse of their objective. What would happen when the Blackhawks finally attacked?

A prisoner taken by one of the first combat patrols substantiated "The Ripper's" belief that the enemy garrison was a large one composed of crack troops. This Jap volunteered the information that a battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment had been sent down from Baguio on 13 April to reinforce Asin after Jap commanders realized that Bilbil and Lomboy had failed to halt the 130th's drive.

Anxious to maintain the initiative and to keep fresh troops at the most forward positions, Colonel Collins brought up Lt. Colonel Minton's rested 3d Battalion from Division reserve at Aringay. It relieved the 2d Battalion on 14 April. "The Ripper" did not intend that this drive should fail.

Lt. Colonel Minton's men spent the remainder of the 14th and all of the 15th acquainting themselves with the country around Asin. Still seeking to keep the enemy off balance with continuous ground pressure against his installations, regimental headquarters ordered the 3d Battalion to initiate an attack against the ridge.

A long spur leading to the main ridge housing the tunnels was selected as the first objective. With this spur in the battalion's hands, the outer line of the enemy defense could be punctured. King Company was handed first crack at the Jap's Asin line. The Distinguished Unit Citation winners from Bench Mark, still led by Captain Hicks, were briefed for an attack to be made on the morning of 16 April.

Further reconnaissance determined that capture of the spur might possibly split the Jap line. If a wedge could be driven into the Japanese positions at the point where the spur made a junction with the main ridge, it would then be possible to drive both north and south from the salient.

King Company jumped off on schedule. The approach march, up terrain so steep that forward progress was limited to a few hundred yards an hour, passed without incident. Slowly the company beat its way toward the objective, looking like on oversize snake unwinding itself on the slope. Captain Hicks wondered at the absolute lack of opposition. Lead scouts reported back that they could see the crest of the spur. Still not a sign of resistance. The scouts continued to edge forward.

Fifty, forty, and then twenty yards separated the lead platoon from the objective. The only sound to be heard was the panting of the King Company doughs fighting their way uphill. A few seconds later, with the lead scout only five yards shy of the objective, the enemy acted.

Ten machine guns covering King Company's front and flanks suddenly opened up in a full-throated roar. Surprised doughs stood transfixed with shock for a fleeting moment and then dove for cover. They Could do nothing to combat this overpowering deluge of fire. Every attempt to move was met with point-blank fire. In the first fusillade more than twenty men were hit. Again the Jap had paused until the Blackhawks had walked into his muzzles before cutting loose.

Captain Hicks had but one choice: break contact and pull out.

But the enemy intended to forestall this move too. Taking advantage of the shock created by the tremendous volume of surprise fire, a platoon of Nip riflemen quickly raced down the two draws flanking the company and converged on King's exposed rear. More men went down before the company commander was able to muster what strength remained and direct a breakthrough. Fighting for their lives, Company K doughboys overran this enemy platoon hacking at their rear, And withdrew down the ridge.

In a fire fight lasting only a few minutes, the company lost almost half its strength in killed or wounded. Regiment and Division, in constant communication with the 3d Battalion CP, knew even before Hicks returned with his thirty casualties that further efforts along this route would prove equally destructive.

Patrol actions along other probable routes of approach met the same fate. While Captain Hicks and King Company were fighting to break out of the Jap ambush, a combat patrol from Item Company was caught in a similar situation. Led by T/Sgt. Paul D. Sterling, an Illinois Guardsman who had been with Item Company for more than four years, this platoon-sized unit had the mission of checking trails and enemy defenses in the area close to the tunnels.

Again the Japs held their fire until the Item troops were practically walking up their Nambu sights. Concealed by huge clumps of thick cogon grass, the enemy suddenly blasted the platoon as Sergeant Sterling led it across a patch of open ground near the Japanese position. While the first bursts of fire were shredding his outfit, Sergeant Sterling went into action. Seeing the muzzle of a machine gun which had the unit enfiladed, the sergeant pulled the pin from a fragmentation grenade and charged the emplacement. Miraculously he reached it unharmed. He followed one grenade with another and the gun was destroyed.

There remained two Nambus which kept the platoon locked inside the ambush by short-range flanking fire. Sergeant Sterling, instead of seeking cover, heroically exposed himself to the fires of the flanking guns, in the hope that his men would be able to spot the pieces and neutralize them. Both guns turned their fires on him and he fell, mortally wounded. But his plan worked. The platoon split into two sections and enveloped both guns as the Japs swung their fires upon the sergeant.

Sergeant Sterling's sacrifice enabled the platoon to break contact and continue on its mission without additional casualties. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The facts were hard to swallow but at the same time childishly simple. The Japanese had the western approaches to the ridge nailed down under a curtain of steel. Like so many others, this too was destined to be a fight to the death.

"'The Ripper" decided to keep infantry activity at a minimum during the next few days and plaster the enemy with artillery and air strikes. From 17 to 20 April guns of the 123d and 124th Field Artillery Battalions hurled hundreds of rounds against the ridge. Supporting P-51s flew numerous sorties in ground support and the Lingayen based fighters augmented the artillery output with tons of HE and Napalm.

Every strike was followed by patrol activity. The Blackhawks lived in the hope that the enemy might quit under this incessant bombardment. But as each patrol was thrown back the men slowly got the idea that the bayonet, rifle and grenade were the only weapons that could force the Nip to yield Asin.

Colonel Collins, refusing to admit defeat in the face of his regiment's superior combat record yet unwilling to waste lives in futile smashes against a well entrenched enemy, doubled his efforts to discover a less costly route from which an attack could be renewed. He made daily reconnaissance flights with Lt. William Brisley, veteran artillery liaison pilot. Meanwhile, reports reached his CP that the 129th Infantry, advancing along the Naguilian road, had bitten off huge chunks of ground and was now at a point just outside Irisan.

"The Ripper" was told of this advance at once. "Irisan," mused the (;O, consulting his operations map. Irisan! Why Irisan was northwest of his objective-and a thousand feet higher!

Radioing Brisley to land and pick him up, "The Ripper" again went up on aerial reconnaissance. He thought aloud as he slowly circled the enemy ridge, map in hand: "Why can't we come in behind them? Or on their right flank? What's to stop us? We can't make a yard from the west but now we've got high ground to the northeast. Why not that way?" The solution to the problem was obvious.

Soon after landing at the Cub strip, Colonel Collins sent for Lt. Colonel Jessup, commander of his workhorse 1st Battalion, and asked the stocky Kansan to go up, mull over his idea, look over the ground and then return for a comparison of notes. Two hours later the battalion commander checked into the regimental CP with a huge smile wreathing his features. "Ripper," he commented, "it can't miss. It'll be nice to be on top of them for a change."

That was all the convincing Colonel Collins needed. After action filled days of costly stalemate, the 130th Infantry was getting another chance. If this projected drive from the north failed it looked as though V J-day would see the Blackhawks still at Asin.

Regimental staff members spun out a scheme for the movement of troops and the subsequent attack. The finished plan was dubbed "The Blackhawk Merry-Go-Round" by the staff. It consisted of withdrawing one battalion from the Asin-Galiano area and moving it by truck to Aringay where regimental rear was set up. There mobile showers were available, company kitchens put out hot food and canvas cots were on hand. After a night's rest here, the troops were to head north to Bauang, swing east toward Naguilian and then follow the 129th's route of advance to Irisan.

Accordingly, on 19 April, under cover of darkness, Lt. Colonel Jessup's battalion, less Able Company which remained on Hill X, was withdrawn from its positions and moved forty-eight miles via Aringay, Bauang, Naguilian and the Baguio road. The 2d Battalion, now commanded by Major James B. Faulconer, was released from Division reserve at this point and followed behind the 1st Battalion. The 3d battalion remained at Asin with the mission of continuing pressure f from the west.

Jessup's battalion completed its truck trip without incident, immediately taking up positions on the high ground south of the highway. Dawn came and eager eyes peered through the mist in search of the objective. But-the objective was below them a thousand yards away! below! That word danced through 1st Battalion minds even as unit commanders began to mass their supporting weapons. It tasted good in their throats. For the first time in the 130th's combat history, Blackhawks were looking down a few hundred Japanese throats.

Cannon Company rumbled up. An attached antiaircraft battalion manning multiple .50s and 40mm Bofors guns dug in their weapons and pointed toward Asin. Dog and How Companies set up heavy mortars in defilade and eight heavy machine guns were trained on the objective.

At dawn, 21 April, little more than a day after the first troops jumped on the "Blackhawk Merry-Go-Round," the 1st Battalion drove south the attack. With Captain Brown's Baker Company spearheading the thrust, the 1st Battalion, in a column of companies, followed by the 2d Battalion, executed the most brilliant maneuver yet performed by the 130th Infantry.

Jap defenders were caught by surprise. Never expecting an attack from the north, they could bring only limited forces to bear on the advancing Blackhawks. Quickly, the forward elements of Baker Company surged forward up the main Jap ridge behind a rolling barrage of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. Befuddled Japs could offer only token resistance as Baker Company reached a small banana grove just short of the high point on the entire ridge. Here they paused while heavy cannon and mortar fires slammed into the enemy defenses. As soon as the fires moved on, the doughs sprinted to the high point and wiped out the Nip garrison. From there the route of advance was all downhill.

But the enemy gradually recuperated from the combined effects of surprise and the devastating HE fires. Resistance became stiffer. Casualties occurred with greater frequency as the Nips effected a slow reorganization.

Lieutenant Colonel Jessup, with the forward company, took an active part in the fight, bringing supporting fires to bear on enemy strong points. Suddenly he fell to the grass-covered slope, hit by a burst of machine-gun fire. A Jap gunner, seeing the husky ex-wrestler adjusting howitzer fire, figured he had a prime target. Two bullets ripped through Lieutenant Colonel Jessup's chest close to the heart. He fell in an exposed position. The Jap gunner triggered another burst and 7.7mm slugs tore into the battalion commander's left arm and legs before Captain Kelly managed to crawl close enough to drag him to a covered position. Despite his wounds, Lt. Colonel Jessup continued to direct cannon fire against a small knob. The M-7s, firing on his orders and from his sensings, killed twenty-three Japs and destroyed three machine guns and four knee mortars. Several months after his evacuation to the United States, Lt. Colonel Jessup was presented with the Distinguished Service Cross for his extraordinary heroism on the Asin ridge.

Major Talbott came forward and assumed command. Continuing the attack, the 1st Battalion seized its initial objective-the first of a series of large knobs on the downgrade towards the tunnels-at 1500. Here elements of Major Faulconer's force, following the 1st Battalion advance closely, passed through Major Talbott's weary men and drove another three hundred yards before impending darkness forced them to dig in for the night.

With defeat staring him in the face, the Jap resorted to his old night infiltration tactics in an effort to push the 2d Battalion off the ridge or else kill off its personnel to a point where further advance would prove impossible. Gambling on this possibility the Japanese commander detailed a considerable force to carry out this night counterattack.

Making plans is one thing; executing them another. The Japs smashed against the Easy and Fox perimeters all night. Tired doughboys, realizing that if they were pushed off now that they'd only have to return and do the job again, retaliated with crushing fires. They refused to yield so much as an inch. The Japs suffered considerably from their ill-advised move. Troops of the 2d Battalion cut them down in wholesale lots. By morning the last of the attackers had been dispersed.

Shortly after dawn, Division artillery units prefaced the continuation of the attack with a fifteen-minute barrage of high explosives. When men of the 2d Battalion finally moved out aligned in a column of companies, it was against an enemy who had foolishly stripped himself of much manpower during the night.

Judging from the character of enemy resistance, however, the Jap seemed to have suffered little by his loss of men and weapons. Every yard was as tenaciously defended as it had been the previous day. The Jap was slowly being overrun, but in every instance he defended to the death. By 1100 hard-hitting Easy Company, under Capt. Gerard Unrein, had secured the second intermediate objective, another small knoll some nine hundred yards from the southern tip of the ridge. The Japs confronting Easy Company in its advance to this point gave way before the impetus of the drive and melted into small pockets on each side of the axis of advance.

Captain Maniatty's George Company, on the heels of Easy, methodically annihilated these small groups of Japanese. Frequently, in order to heave grenades into the many caves honeycombing the steep slopes of the ridge, George Company riflemen were forced to use small sapIings to lean over the side of the ridge and parcel out heir lethal greetings.

Major Faulconer handled his troops masterfully. Just when it appeared as if one company would be stopped, the lanky Kentuckian spelled it with another and thus managed to sustain his battalion's momentum. Easy Company rolled on another four hundred yards to the edge of the third intermediate objective, a large banana grove five hundred yards from the end of the ridge and first tunnel. The company seemed to have shot its wad after more than four hours of spearhead duty and continuous hand-to-hand combat. Major Faulconer quickly Assigned the seizure of the grove to Captain Maniatty.

Before pushing on, the George Company leader asked for preparatory mortar and machine-gun fires. As soon as the last round left the gibe riflemen raced across the grove, covering the entire objective area without suffering a single casualty. This time when the Nips poured out of their holes to reoccupy their gun positions they ran directly into accurate fire of George Company riflemen determined to prevent just such a move. With the banana grove in 2d Battalion hands the seizure of the rest of the ridge turned out to be a complete rout. By dusk George Company had secured the regimental objective; the high ground on top of the westernmost tunnel.

The southern tip of the Asin Tunnel ridge was shaped like an inverted U, the curve of the U representing a deep, wooded gorge referred to on the map as Windy Gulch Creek. The arms of the U were eight hundred yards apart and each housed one of the tunnels. Realizing that the enemy was beaten in the Asin sector, Colonel Collins, anxious to administer the coup de grace, ordered Major Faulconer to seize the remaining hill and tunnel the following morning. The 2d Battalion was given a secondary mission of combing the southern portion of the ridge in a mop-up designed to catch any survivors of the previous lay's action.

Scheme of maneuver for this final move called for a double envelopment with Company F attacking from the north and Item Company, attached to the battalion for this action, moving from the south. Early on 23 April the attack was resumed with the aggressiveness character istic of all Blackhawk activity along the ridge. Although the I resisted fiercely, these two companies gradually threw a ring of steel around his strongpoints and within a few hours the handful of Nips guarding the second tunnel and the hill above had been killed or driven off.

"The Ripper's" Blackhawks were over the hump. Baguio was a hop, and a skip away.

In eleven days of action since they came up the Asin Valley through Galiano and past Bilbil and Lomboy, troops of the 130th Infantry accounted for more than 350 enemy killed in action. Blackhawk casualties totalled 72, with 13 dead.