It did not take a Clausewitz to surmise that Kennon Road would prove to be the slowest and bloodiest route to Baguio. The mountain pass was among the most heavily fortified strips of terrain in Northern Luzon. From cunningly concealed positions high up on the walls of the gorge, the Japanese were able to bitterly contest all 136th Infantry efforts to break through. Maintaining the Kennon Road drive proved a costly proposition for the 33d Division from its inception. More manpower and supporting weapons than the Golden Cross could afford to spare were tied up in the brutal slugging match. Yet with so many of the enemy in position alongside the road, Division had little choice but to engage them. Accomplishment of the Division mission by the 136th-seizure of Baguio-was out of the question, yet the 33d could not quit Kennon Road.

Division headquarters, closely following 136th activities on the road, worked out another plan when it became clear that Colonel Cavenee's regiment could do nothing but contain their adversaries. Even the hard-pressed 136th doughboy, anxious for reinforcement, readily admitted that Division was following a practical course of action. He did not have to be a "big picture" logistician to observe present supply and medical evacuation difficulties on Kennon Road. Too often he had seen Filipino carrying parties reach forward companies in a state of exhaustion after negotiating the near-perpendicular hills with rations, ammunitions and water. He knew also that litter bearers taking casualties to the battalion aid stations were forced to march for a full day in order to cover four hundred map yards.

On 3 March Division selected two new routes for the main effort toward Baguio. One path of advance carried up the coastal road from Agoo through Aringay and Bauang to San Fernando, veering off to the summer capital at Bauang. The other was to start at Pugo and run northeast over the mountains to Baguio. Great risk would be attached to both efforts. The two routes were virtually unexplored by American forces and Division lacked complete data on how strongly the enemy had garrisoned them. Initial advances would have to move slowly until the situation developed.

Corps had no infantry forces with which to reinforce the two moves. Neither did the 33d. The 130th Infantry, chosen for the end run to San Fernando, had but two battalions available at this time. Elements of the 123d Infantry would be tied up with the Pugo phase. Due to its Kennon Road commitments the 136th Infantry could not be counted upon to assist either regiment.

However, the plan had a definite bright side. Securing the coastal road III) to San Fernando meant a junction between the Both Infantry and Col. Russell W. Volckmann's guerrillas who had pushed south-ward into San Fernando and were currently fighting to take the city. Contact with Colonel Volckmann would bring with it consolidation of all American gains on the left side of Northern Luzon. With the coastal road in Division possession, auxiliary flanking moves toward Baguio could be launched to augment the projected drive out of Bauang.

Another point of consideration was the terrain. The fights for Bench Mark and Question Mark Hills left no doubt in anyone's mind that the enemy was toughest when he held and developed commanding heights. What would happen at Aringay and Bauang where the Japanese would be forced to defend comparatively open ground? Division planners retained vivid memories of the early days on Luzon when a "flying column" composed of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 37th Division rolled over the enemy holding the Central Plain. They had made it a matter of record that the enemy was not nearly so successful on open ground as he was in mountain and jungle.

Two weeks of rest since the fall of Question Mark found the 130th Infantry, less its 2d Battalion, freshened and battle-tempered for the end run. Bivouacked in Esperanza as Division reserve, the Blackhawks waited for the completion of reconnaissances and the issuance of attack orders.

Aringay, a small municipality twelve miles north of Damortis on the coastal road, was chosen as the first 130th Infantry objective. Located on the northern bank of the Aringay River, the small barrio of 1,500 persons was distinguished by a huge bridge over which the main highway ran into the town. A triumph of civil engineering, the 22-span, 938-foot-long bridge had been erected at a cost in excess of two million dollars. Capture of this bridge intact would be of inestimable value in assuring the success of the end run.

Pictures taken by artillery liaison pilots disclosed that the Aringay River bridge was in an excellent state of maintenance. Only one of of its spans had been hit by American bombers. Lt. Colonel Kane, Division Engineer, predicted that a Bailey span could offset the damage. Senior commanders became gravely concerned as the time for the attack neared. Seizure of the bridge was paramount in their minds. Should the enemy repel forces trying to take the bridge, a protracted battle for control of the road was bound to develop.

Regimental plans called for a small group of infantrymen, heavily reinforced, to move toward Aringay as a reconnaissance in force. Once the bridge and town were taken, other more powerful elements of the 130th would pass through and mount an all out drive on Bauang

Units making up the reconnaissance, called Gay Force, included Baker Company; a platoon of heavy machine guns; the 1st Battalion's 81mm mortar platoon; the regimental I&R Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Kenneth Lyon; a few Recon Troop scout cars; and a platoon of M-7s mounting 105mm howitzers from Cannon Company, 130th Infantry. Capt. Bob Batch controlled the howitzer platoon.

Engineer support was provided by the 2d Platoon of Company B, 108th Combat Engineers, and the battalion reconnaissance team. Corps attached the 55th Field Artillery Battalion to support the operation in conjunction with batteries of the 124th. In command of Gay Force was Major Charlie Y. Talbott, executive officer of the 1st Battalion.

A unique part of the plan-one that surprised observers and participants alike-was the decision to capture the bridge and barrio under cover of darkness. The move on Aringay would mark the first time that any element of the 33d Division conducted large-scale offensive operations at night. Earlier in the campaign both the 136th and 130th had successfully experimented with night operations but these were limited to approach marches, medical evacuations and ambushes. Troops of the Gay Force, schooled to fight only during the daylight fours, were impressed with the fact that they were inaugurating a new style of combat for the Golden Cross.

At noon on 6 March all Gay Force elements were assembled at Damortis. Final plans were fully discussed; men were given a last opportunity for hot food and clean clothes.

It was 0300 on the morning of 7 March when the motorized advance guard of Gay Force pulled out of Damortis and pointed toward Aringay. Slowly the column stole along the hard-packed gravel road. An eerie silence hung like a pall over the troops. Less than a thousand yards short of the bridge the small convoy pulled into the brush lining the road and the guard detrucked. There was no noise as the men got into position for the foot march to the objective. Capt. James L. Brown, commanding the advance guard, radioed Talbott that he was prepared to advance. Talbott ordered him to proceed. At this precise moment the main body of Gay Force, on trucks in Damortis, moved out in the direction of Aringay to support the bridge crossing.

Captain Brown's group reached the bridge entrance without alerting the enemy. Reconnaissance Troop scout cars, mounting 37mm guns, quickly found positions on each side of the bridge. Captain Batch's M-7s also dispersed to both sides, ready to fire upon targets of opportunity. When all supporting weapons were in position, Brown signaled the engineers forward. Members of the reconnaissance section, moving in short rushes, sprinted onto the bridge. Efficiently and rapidly they searched each of the spans for hidden demolitions and found none.

Word went back to Major Talbott-who had since arrived with the main body-that the bridge was clear. Talbott did not wait for further developments. He sent Gay Force streaming into Aringay. Once in the town, the column systematically searched every house and street in the barrio. Not a Jap could be found. Still inclined to be cautious despite the lack of activity, Talbott separated his force into several small units, each of which built a perimeter around a different section of the town. Roadblocks went up at all intersections. Still no enemy counteraction was forthcoming. Aringay went to the 130th Infantry without a shot fired.

Gay Force positions were reinforced at daylight when Lt. Colonel Jessup and the rest of the 1st Battalion reached Aringay. Immediately Gay Force was absorbed into the larger unit and the remainder of the mission was turned over to the battalion. Patrols went out to reconnoiter sections of the road and a string of hills north of Aringay and east of the highway. Foremost of these hills was 1,000-foot Mount Magabang which commanded an excellent view of Aringay. The I&R Platoon, under Lieutenant Lyon, was told to reconnoiter Magabang and determine whether it was manned by the enemy.

Lyon, moving slowly in order to search the many draws leading down from Magabang, found no Japanese during his approach march. As he prepared to mount the slope of the objective, Lyon radioed his position and lack of contact to battalion headquarters. The platoon then began the ascent, moving along a densely wooded spur that ran straight to the crest of Magabang. When the last man in the column had been swallowed up in the thick vegetation, two platoons of enemy, located on each side of the spur, opened up on Lyon's force, catching the entire platoon in a murderous crossfire.

Even though this fire was pouring into their ranks from point-blank range, members of the platoon could see no enemy or guns. Only after they deployed and brought answering fire to bear on suspected

gun positions could they correctly diagnose the situation. Barring the platoon's path to Magabang was the most cleverly camouflaged group of Nips yet encountered by the 130th on Luzon. Light machine guns had been dug deep into the cogon grass on the hillside and Japanese gunners were firing along wafer-thin fields of fire cut through the grass. Each emplacement had a cloak of cogon shrouding it to blend with the background. In the same manner, enemy riflemen protecting the machine guns were clothed in caps and capes of matching cogon grass. After a short fire fight Lyon's men were forced to gather their casualties and withdraw back to Aringay.

As soon as Lt. Colonel Jessup received Lyon's report he alerted Company C to advance on Magabang that same afternoon. Charley Company left at 1400 with its commander, Captain Kelly, accompanying the lead platoon. By dusk the unit was grouped just below the point on the slope where the I&R Platoon had run into so much trouble. Certain that he would become engaged in a sharp fire fight, Kelly decided to dig in for the night and hit the mountain at dawn.

In the next day's early morning haze an artillery-mortar preparation pounded enemy positions for several minutes before jumpoff. Kelly himself adjusted this fire, first getting Cannon Company on target and then bringing in artillery and mortar fires on top of the M-7s. As soon as the barrage lifted, two Charley Company platoons swept forward as rapidly as the terrain would permit, anxious to assault the Japanese before they recovered from the heavy shelling. Artillery and mortar effects were amazing. Only sporadic fire greeted Company C during its drive to the top of the mountain. All resistance was smashed before it could be effectively organized and in a matter of minutes the entire garrison had been wiped out. With this high ground in 130th Infantry hands Aringay was secure.

Next step on the regimental agenda was the seizure of Bauang, key road junction and vital intermediary point along the enemy supply and communications line running from San Fernando to Baguio. Like Aringay, the small barrio of Bauang was situated on the northern bank of a river. It too had a large highway bridge leading into the heart of town. Actually, the Bauang bridge was two separate bridges joined by a short causeway. Each section was constructed of eight concreteand-steel spans. The overall length of the structure was 1,790 feet. In planning for the capture of Bauang the same problem faced the regimental commander that had confronted him at Aringay: seize the bridge intact.

While the 130th waited for the word to move on Bauang, two events of great consequence highlighted the slack period. One was the start of construction on a road from Caba, two miles north of Aringay, east to Galiano where the cobblestoned Asin road to Baguio had its beginning. Opening a possible new route to the summer capital became Gay Force's major accomplishment. Fifteen days after the engineer bulldozers left Caba the thirteen-mile mountain road was completed. The 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry, was quickly committed at Galiano in an effort to develop this avenue of approach to Baguio.

Another important occurrence was the establishment of liaison between the 130th and Volckmann's guerrillas. On 15 March, Antitank Company's CO, Capt. Leonard Beechinor, volunteered to slip around the enemy forces between Aringay and San Fernando via sailboat and establish physical contact with Volckmann's headquarters. Colonel Collins listened to Beechinor's plan and then granted him permission to make the attempt. Placing his faith in a lone Filipino familiar with the terrain around San Fernando, Beechinor and his guide struck out for the guerrilla zone of operations.

For eight hours the two men piloted their small vessel along the Northern Luzon shoreline, skirting several enemy installations along the beach. Finally they sighted San Juan harbor, twenty miles north of Aringay and adjacent to San Fernando. Beechinor brought the abbreviated craft into shore. Filipino guerrillas who had secured the town several days before were not hard to find, and, after making proper identification, Captain Beechinor was escorted to Colonel Volckmann's CP. This courageous trip by Beechinor allowed establishment of close radio liaison between the 130th Infantry and Northern Luzon guerrilla forces. It resulted in a bloodless junction five days later.

Since the 130th Infantry was well out ahead of other Division elements and extremely vulnerable in the event of an enemy counterattack, Corps was reluctant to flash a green light until further intelligence data on Bauang were amassed. These few days of grace permitted 130th planners to schedule an attack which followed the precepts of ground combat prescribed in the field manuals. Numerous reconnaissance patrols scoured the roadway leading into the Bauang bridge. OPs were established to watch for Jap movement around the barrio while additional patrols actually crossed the Bauang River at several points to determine its fordability and the hours when the tide was lowest.

Reconnaissance operations produced the required information. Attached guerrillas reported that Bauang was heavily garrisoned by the enemy. Elements of the 378th Independent Infantry Brigade were scattered throughout the town and its environs. Also identified as being active in the locality was the Hayasaki Detachment. These units had previously occupied Aringay, but evacuated their installations there just before the Blackhawk attack, obviously choosing to make a defensive stand at Bauang. OP personnel notified regiment that a 24-hour guard was maintained on the Bauang side of the bridge. Japs there were under orders to touch off previously planted demolitions in the event that the 130th Infantry attempted a bridge crossing.

Here too was a mission which could be accomplished only under cover of darkness.

Again, the 1st Battalion was selected to carry the ball on Phase Two of the end run. Another task force was organized consisting of the entire 1st Battalion; Cannon Company; one platoon from the Recon Troop; a platoon of tanks from Company B, 775th Tank Battalion; and the same engineer units that had so expertly checked the Aringay bridge. Supporting fires were to be plentiful. In addition to 130th RCT artillery-Lt. Colonel Carlson's 124th Field Artillery-the task force was backed up by a squadron of P-51 fighters and a Navy destroyer cruising two thousand yards off Bauang. This multitude of units was called Boy Force, commanded by Lt. Colonel Jessup.

Before the attack order was issued ground commanders made several aerial observation flights. Lts. Ellis A. Pickett and Frederick G. Hoffmann, veteran Piper Cub pilots, alternated in flying Jessup, Talbott and Colonel Collins over the prospective battleground. Lt. Colonel Jessup had this to say after his first air reconnaissance: "Hoffmann came up to Aringay to pick me up. With no suitable landing strip close by, he just parked the plane on a sweeping curve of the concrete highway right outside of Aringay. When we looked over the bridge, Hoffmann did everything but fly under the thing. It was fairly simple to pick out trouble points around the town."

All arrangements were completed on the afternoon of 19 March, and late that night Boy Force trucked to an assembly area about 1,500 yards south of the bridge. As the force counted greatly on the factor of surprise, too large a group could not be initially committed against the objective. In accordance with the plan it was decided to send the engineers across the bridge, supported by Cannon Company, Recon and the M-7s, while Able, Baker and Charley Companies swung off to the west, forded the river near its mouth and then cut back toward Bauang proper. The two efforts were coordinated so that the bridge crossing and the flanking attack would coincide.

It was 0230 when the engineer detachment neared the southern entrance to the bridge. Attached weapons following in their wake silently veered off to both sides of the bridge. As the reconnaissance team prepared to search the structure, the 2d Platoon of Company B, 108th Engineers, deployed at the bridge entrance, ready to provide covering small-arms fire. Behind them, riflemen of the 1st Battalion had already begun the flanking maneuver. The tomblike silence served as a tonic to the troops for they knew that as long as there was no shooting the enemy was unconscious of their presence.

At 0430 the engineers cautiously moved onto the first section of the bridge, probing and listening for demolitions and mines. The span was clear. Next came the paved causeway which the engineers also negotiated without alerting the enemy. When they hit the second span a few men stopped and worked feverishly to dislodge a 250-pound aerial bomb which was found strapped on the underside of a steel girder. With a noisy splash the projectile hurtled into the river below. The engineers crouched and waited, fearful that the sound of the bomb striking the water might have aroused the Japanese.

Still no enemy reaction. A hand signal was given, barely visible in the pre-dawn gloom, and the reconnaissance team resumed its advance across the bridge. A few feet farther on they discovered another bomb. Again willing hands disarmed the electrical connections and this bomb too fell harmlessly into the river. Now the engineers did not pause to see if they had been detected. Turning around, the handful of men raced for their line at the bridge entrance.

Suddenly out of the night a hail of machine-gun fire raked the bridge. One engineer fell dead while two others were hit. The Japanese, after minutes of debate, had finally decided to open up. When the first shot split the night, the Baker Company engineer platoon at the bridge entrance retaliated with M-1 and BAR fire. Under this covering volley the reconnaissance team was able to withdraw from the bridge with its casualties.

During this exchange of small-arms fire the flanking companies reported by radio that they were in position to storm the town. Quickly, Lt. Colonel Jessup gave them his approval, at the same time directing the engineers to push across the bridge. Aided by the paralyzing attack driven against the enemy flank, the engineers were able to cross without sustaining additional casualties. They linked up with the infantry at the far entrance to the bridge. Bauang was overrun by dawn. Only east of the barrio did the Japanese offer stiff resistance. Firmly entrenched in a labyrinth of caves on high ground they elected to fight to the last man.

Due to the time spent in preparation, the seizure of Bauang went off as smoothly as if it had been a maneuver. Every man knew his own particular task and performed it well. The expected resistance did not materialize for two reasons. First, guerrillas had overestimated the number of Japanese in the town. Secondly, Volckmann's Filipino force had exerted strong pressure from the north, causing large numbers of the enemy to abandon Bauang and move inland toward Baguio.

General Clarkson and Colonel Collins both barely escaped death during the mop-up around Bauang. The Division Commander, anxious to observe this vital phase in the Division's drive on Baguio, crossed the bridge with Colonel Collins scarcely twenty minutes after its seizure. Once in the city they followed the advances right up to the caves east of Bauang. While they watched the gradual reduction of this strongpoint, a lone Jap straggler, supposedly dead, suddenly sprang from the interior of a cave directly behind General Clarkson and the colonel. The click of his rifle bolt was the only thing that gave him away as he tried to bring down the Division Commander with a bullet in the back.

Quick thinking on the part of Pfc. Frank Gillespie, Colonel Collins' bodyguard, saved the lives of the two officers. Standing a few paces from "The Ripper," Gillespie whirled around at the sound of the Arisaka bolt, unlimbered his submachine gun and cut the Nip down with one burst. A grateful General Clarkson promoted him on the spot. Gillespie was later awarded the Silver Star for this and numerous other actions involving the safety of his regimental commander.

By noon the small hills east of Bauang had been taken. The essential Japanese line of communication and supply from Baguio to San Fer-nando was slashed since the Golden Cross had complete control of Bauang. For all practical purposes enemy remnants who had escaped slaughter at Bauang and San Fernando were isolated. Six short miles now separated Volckmann's gallant guerrillas and the 130th Infantry. On 20 March the 130th's energetic leader personally led an infantrytank force over the debris-littered highway into San Fernando. Guerrillas received the column with shouts of joy. For them, the Blackhawks represented the first American soldiers they had seen since the fall of the Philippines in 1942.

During the night of 20 March a battalion of reorganized enemy remnants, ignorant of the fact that passage on the road was denied them, attempted to follow the San Fernando-Bauang-Baguio highway into the summer capital. They provided a field day for 1st Battalion roadblocks set up north of Bauang. As the Japanese casually strolled down the road in a closely bunched column, 130th Infantry machine guns suddenly cut loose, mowing down the enemy by scores. The few who escaped these fires dropped their equipment and fled for the hills in panic. At the crack of dawn combat patrols took up the pursuit. Three days of this activity accounted for more than two hundred Nips.

Anxious to pursue every advantage, Colonel Collins ordered a reconnaissance in force from Bauang to Naguilian where a small party of Japanese guarded Naguilian Airfield. Major Barry A. Ryan, executive officer of the 2d Battalion, was placed in command of this force, made up of Fox Company motorized, a platoon of tanks, and the fast Recon Troop scout cars. Three hours after he left Bauang on the morning of 21 March Major Ryan radioed "The Ripper" that Naguilian and the airfield had both been secured against light enemy resistance. Engineers immediately took over the strip and in a few hours Naguilian Airfield was receiving Division Artillery L-4s.

So wound up the end run. The 130th lost but four killed and thirteen wounded in the ten-day Bauang-Naguilian sweep; counted enemy dead totalled 306. Revenge was sweet to the Blackhawks who still remembered the exhausting, oppressive days around Rosario and Cauringan when well concealed Japs on high ground picked them off mercilessly. On open ground members of the 130th missed no chance to harass and kill. With their footing secure, the terrain familiar and with superior weapons augmenting their thrust for vengeance, the Blackhawks more than made up for the tortures of their first combat days on Luzon.