Breaking through the canalized Asin Valley and seizing 3000 and Mount Calugong cut deeply into the effective combat strength of the 33d Division, but once these key strongpoints were seized there was no sign of let-up in the drive toward Baguio. On the contrary, Golden Cross infantrymen pushed toward the summer capital with renewed vigor, anxious to erase the remnants of Yamashita's once powerful mountain defenses. Throughout the fighting on Luzon, Baguio had stood out in bold relief as the one word of hope of 33d doughboys. Its capture meant the virtual conclusion of I Corps activities on the island. Now that Baguio lay within striking distance, ground commanders found it unnecessary to fire up their men for the final attacks. The promise of rest and rehabilitation was sufficient incentive.

General Clarkson had reached for the summer capital from four different directions but by 22 April it became clear that only two of these drives would produce large-scale advances. On the Division right flank two battalions of the 136th Infantry encountered determined enemy resistance around Skyline Ridge and Tebbo where the Japanese 16th Reconnaissance Regiment was deployed in force. Five weeks of bloody campaigning were destined for the 136th before it could overpower the Nips in this sector. Colonel Cavenee's 3d Battalion, on the Kennon Road, could do nothing but tie up the enemy troops guarding the canyon route to Baguio. Huge gaps had been blown in the road by retreating Japs, all bridges were out and it was impossible for armor, artillery and supply trains to support a northward thrust launched from this area.

However, no such obstacles encumbered the 123d and 130th Infantry Regiments in the western segment of the Division zone of action. Only scattered pockets of enemy stood between them and Baguio. As Colonel Serff fought his force from Hill 4980 to the shadows of Tuba, Colonel Collins undertook the first step to, the seizure of the summer capital.

During the final day of fighting over the Asin tunnels, "The Ripper" sent his 3d Battalion back through the Galiano Valley to Aringay for a brief rest, hot food and a change of clothes. His plan was to have this unit, together with the 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry (attached to him out of Division reserve for the attack on Baguio) hop on the nowfamous Aringay-Bauang-Naguilian-Irisan "Merry-Go-Round." At the last-named barrio the two battalions were scheduled to detruck, cut southward to a point on the Asin road between the tunnels and Baguio and then attack toward the city astride the road. Lt. Colonel Faulconer, mopping up the tunnel ridge with his 2d Battalion, had orders to advance eastward and make contact with these two battalions. He was also charged with eliminating Japanese stragglers caught between the two forces. The 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, was to remain at Aringay in reserve.

Offensive action in the last phase of the Battle of Baguio began on the morning of 24 April. Quartermaster trucks had picked up the two assaulting battalions at 2200 the previous night and dropped them near Irisan three hours later. Following a brief reorganization "The Ripper's" troops started through the blackness toward the Asin road. After an exhausting descent the force reached the rude, cobblestoned trailway to Baguio at dawn. With the arrival of daylight, Company B, 108th Engineers, began construction of a rough road in the wake of the infantry elements, permitting armor, artillery and self-propelled howitzers to join in the attack.

As Colonel Collins arrived at the jumpoff area he received a radio message from 2d Battalion headquarters stating that Faulconer's companies had met unexpected resistance just beyond the tunnels and would be held up until they could fight on through. Reluctant to halt the drive, the energetic Bostonian directed Faulconer to knock out the enemy and travel forward as rapidly as possible. Lt. Colonel Minton's 3d Battalion, deployed in a column of companies, had already started forward despite the grueling all-night march. The 123d units, commanded by Lt. Colonel Coates, followed close behind in a like formation. Objective for the day: Mount Mirador, a few hundred yards southwest of Baguio.

By mid-day, the regimental commander realized that he could not reach his objective before darkness curtailed movement. The Asin road, treacherous and winding, offered the Japs numerous ambush locations. Maneuver was hindered by the nature of the terrain which rose sharply from the left side of the road and dropped off just as precipitously on the right. Riflemen were forced to take ambush parties by frontal assaults, sweeping in on the heels of a mortar barrage. Casualties were light but forward progress was heavily retarded.

In the course of this advance Colonel Collins and his bodyguard, Private First Class Gillespie, almost fell prey to the enemy. Trying to make contact with the 3d Battalion, "The Ripper," accompanied by Gillespie, left the 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry, and struck out at a rapid pace for Minton's headquarters. However, the gap between the two forces was now considerably wider than they had reason to expect. After several minutes of fast marching the two men found themselves alone. At this point, a group of Japanese in a bypassed cave close to the road, opened up on them with rifle fire. Acting instinctively, Colonel Collins and Gillespie dove into a muddy ditch alongside the road, quickly worked forward for a few yards and then broke for a covered position on the hillside. Four Nips left the cave to search for them. Two proceeded up the road toward their hiding place while the other two headed for the deep gully below the road. "The Ripper" and Gillespie permitted the pair of Nips to move within point-blank range and then blazed away, killing them both. A few minutes later they were met by a 3d Battalion searching party which convoyed them to Minton's CP.

Here, gladdening news awaited the 130th's commanding officer. Faulconer had sent on word that he had broken through the enemy pockets and was now moving rapidly to reach the main force. At 1700, however, half of the spearhead-the 1st Battalion o£ the 123d-reverted back to its parent regiment. Colonel Collins immediately alerted his own 1st Battalion to leave Aringay that night so that it could participate in the attack on Mirador the following morning.

Just prior to nightfall the 3d Battalion reached the base of the last fringe of mountains encircling Baguio. Mount Mirador was a hundred yards to its front; a second peak, Observatory Hill, rose a quarter of a mile to its left front. Elements of the 37th Division, advancing along the Naguilian-Baguio highway, were currently engaged in heavy fighting on the northern slope of Observatory which commanded their route of approach to the summer capital. With long-standing orders to effect a junction with the 37th at the earliest possible moment, Minton dispatched a contact patrol toward the base of Observatory Hill. As the patrol proceeded up the road a few men could be seen on the southern slope of Observatory. It appeared to the patrol that this group was composed of 37th Division troops sent out to contact the Blackhawks. So that the two units did not shoot at each other, a couple of 3d Battalion men shouted, "Hey! We're from the 130th!"

The group on the hillside quickly replied-with Arisaka rifle fire and bursts from Nambu machine guns. It was a case of mistaken identity. They were reserves for the enemy unit fighting to keep the 37th from seizing the hill. To further add to the patrol's predicament, Nip machine gunners atop Mirador, to its rear, raked the troops with fire. Luckily, their fires were inaccurate and the platoon was able to withdraw without further difficulty.

Coupled with this unsuccessful effort came news from Faulconer that he was still several hundred yards short of a tie-in with the 3d Battalion. In reply, Colonel Collins notified him to halt, dig in for the night, and continue forward at daybreak. The 3d Battalion stopped and built a perimeter at its farthest point of advance. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry, en route to Tuba to join other regimental elements, stopped its march and dug in on the southern base of Mirador. Despite the stubborn opposition encountered during the day, the doughboys of the three battalions looked forward to a quiet night.

Unfortunately, the Nipponese gave the Blackhawks only a few hours to reflect upon this possibility. As soon as total darkness descended the jabbering of small groups of enemy could be heard from all sides as they worked their way through the draws and gullies attempting to pin-point the different perimeters. At midnight, approximately seventy-five of them stormed the Item Company perimeter, built on a grassy knob overlooking the Asin road. But for the heroism of one man, this attack would have carried through to the heart of the 3d Battalion installation.

Private First Class Clarence Schmidt of Company I, manning a light machine gun at the edge of the perimeter, was the first man to notice the enemy rushing forward. Shouting a warning to his mates, he quickly triggered the light .30, cutting down most of the first wave. Some broke through his fire, however, and flung two satchel charges close to his foxhole. Before they could do additional damage, other Item troops beat them back. Frustrated at their failure to break through, the Japanese withdrew. Men in the 130th position could hear one loquacious officer berate them for their lack of success. Then followed a few soothing phases, some scattered "Banzais!" and the enemy raced forward toward the light machine gun.

Again Schmidt caught them on their way in, working his piece at full cyclic rate. An enemy grenade found his foxhole and sprayed him with fragments but Schmidt disregarded his multiple wounds to keep the gun in action. Just as this assault began to disintegrate, a couple of Japs worked in on his flank and poured rifle fire into his emplacement. Hit several times, Schmidt refused to slacken his fire. For the second time he forced the enemy to back up. This accomplished, he collapsed across the light machine gun, mortally wounded. At dawn other members of the company found nineteen dead Nips heaped around Schmidt's position. He was posthumously awarded the DSC for his courageous devotion to duty.

While the 3d Battalion was warding off the enemy attacks, Lt. Colonel Talbott's 1st Battalion was on the Bauang-Naguilian-Irisan "Merry-Go-Round." Talbott reached the other regimental elements at daybreak after a six-hour march. Despite the swift pace the battalion had maintained during its hike from Irisan to the base of Mirador, it was still fresher than the other Blackhawk troops. Consequently, when the attack on Mirador began at 0800, Talbott's men went out in front as the regimental spearhead. They met surprisingly slight resistance, and Baker and Charley companies were able to reach the 4,900-foothigh summit before 1030. It was apparent that the enemy, seriously weakened by his costly attacks of the previous night, had packed up and fled to the summer capital.

Equally important gains had meanwhile been registered by the three 123d Infantry battalions. Scarcely an hour after the seizure of Mirador, Lt. Colonel Coates' troops entered Tuba and eliminated a handful of Japanese defenders to secure the barrio. At 1700 elements of the 2d Battalion completed their Calugong-Tuba trek and made contact with one of Coates' detachments. Major Wolff's battalion had moved over the Naguilian road that morning with the mission of driving southeast from Irisan to Loacan Airfield south of Baguio. This move was to coincide with the combined attack of the 123d and 130th on the city.

Both regiments concentrated on a single intermediate objective, Hill 24-A, also called Dominican Hill-once Tuba had been secured and Golden Cross doughboys were entrenched on the crest of Mirador. Overlooking the business district of the summer capital, 24-A was the key to the entire Baguio puzzle. Possession of this mountain meant possession of the city. Located three hundred yards east of Mirador, only a sharply sloping gully separated this 5,100-foot-high bastion from "The Ripper's" troops. Colonel Serff's force, racing northeast from Tuba, was scarcely a mile away from 24-A's southern base.

With so enticing a target confronting them the two regimental commanders were reluctant to cease operations on 25 April until the first strides from Mirador and Tuba toward 24-A had been taken. Once the mop-up of Mirador was completed, Colonel Collins sent his 1st Battalion down the reverse slope in the direction of the next objective. The steepness of the mile-long decline, coupled with effective smallarms fire from 24-A, considerably slowed the pace and Lt. Colonel Talbott ordered his men to halt and dig in for the night at 1930. During this move the 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry, fought its way from Tuba to a point less than 250 yards from the hill. Here, however, Coates' companies came under fire from five Jap light tanks clustered on the side of 24-A in hull defilade. They were also forcecl to go into an overnight permiter.

Preparations for a climax double envelopment of Hill 24-A began as soon as the forward infantry units drew to a halt. Each regimental commander realized that fine coordination was imperative to tie in the actions of the two regiments. The onus, however, rested particularly with the two battalions of field artillery following the front-line troops in close support. So close were the enveloping prongs that it was conceivable that a slight inaccuracy on the part of the 122d Field Artillery -working with the 123d RCT-might damage Colonel Collins' effort. By the same token, "The Ripper's" supporting howitzers would need only a minor deviation from the target to cripple Coates' drive.

To insure proper coordination, General Paxton, in command of Division Artillery, strongly recommended to General Clarkson that the envelopment be effected under a single ground command. Recognizing the value of General Paxton's request, the Division Commander gave Full responsibility for the success of the operation to Colonel Serff, senior regimental commander.

Shortly after dawn on the 26th, Division 105s and 155s threw a devastating preparation against the objective. To the doughboys waiting ig to jump off it seemed as though this barrage carried more authority than any other previous artillery concentration in Northern Luzon. Infantry-artillery coordination in the perpetration of the envelopment was a thing of beauty to watch. Always covered by howitzer fire the doughboys made a rapid ascent to the top of 24-A, against very light opposition.

Lieutenant Colonel Coates and his force passed the five light tanks that had proven so troublesome the day before. Now they lay shattered and abandoned by their crews. These armored vehicles seemed mutely symbolic of the Yamashita Line in its current state. Once the 123d and 130th met near the battered monastery on top of 24-A, Baguio was doomed.

Actually, the fighting on 24-A and the Division's subsequent entry into Baguio was in the nature of an anticlimax. Capturing the hill held nothing of the pain and sweat it had taken to carry the Division from the Caraballo foothills to the gates of the city. After eliminating a few stragglers hiding in the caves which honeycombed the hill, men of both regiments crowded to the northern crest, anxious for a view of the famous city. Baguio appeared as a perfect example of the chaos and destruction wrought by war. Its once beautiful Spanish-style buildings had been crumbled into rubble. Its streets were strewn with debris. The gray smoke of battle and the stench of death hung over the summer capital like a shroud. Across the city on the northern fringe of the plateau 37th Division patrols could be noticed picking their way through the pitiful ruins.

But through the mosaic of disaster that stretched before them, doughboys could see the twin spires of the Baguio Roman Catholic Cathcdral rise proud and erect like a priceless orchid in a patch of nondescript weeds. It seemed as though some Divine hand had protected the holy edifice from the tons of high explosive which had fallen on Baguio since February.

In the process of exploring Hill 24-A, a group of riflemen discovered the abandoned headquarters of General Yamashita. Tunneled in from the eastern slope of the hill, it consisted of more than forty rooms, all protected from American air and artillery bombardment. Residing underground did not reduce the high standard of living to which the Japanese had become accustomed since their seizure of Baguio in 1942. Each room was outfitted with fine furniture looted from Filipinos; electrical outlets had been installed; refrigerators were in abundance; and the dirt floors of these caves were covered with expensive Oriental rugs.

Motorized reconnaissance patrols were organized on the afternoon of the 26th to comb the city before the Division's entry. However, shortly after the fall of Hill 24-A, word was received from General Swift, I Corps commander, to postpone the actual seizure of Baguio until 27 April. The general's reason for this order was purely psychological. Emperor Hirohito's 44th birthday fell on 27 April and the Corps commander could visualize added Jap demoralization if Baguio were wrested away on such a sacred occasion. Troops on 24-A had to be satisfied with digging in and training their automatic weapons on the summer capital.

Elsewhere in the Baguio zone of operations other elements of the 123d and 130th Infantry Regiments were quite active. Lt. Colonel Hilton's 2d Battalion had companies scattered from Mount Lomboy to Mount Santo Tomas engaging sizable enemy pockets bypassed in earlier fighting. The 3d Battalion, 123d Infantry, under Major Wolff, had branched off the Naguilian-Baguio road and was now in action around the Baguio terminus of Kennon Road and Loacan Airfield. Both areas were southeast of the summer capital.

First Division patrols into Baguio left the 24-A area on schedule the following morning. Colonel Collins dispatched a heavily armed force consisting of one rifle platoon, a section of M-7s from Cannon Company, heavy machine guns from How Company, a platoon of light tanks and a group of armored cars from the 33d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. Commanded by Lt. Robert G. Farmer, executive officer of Company F, this unit had the mission of clearing the southern half of the city. Charley Company, 123d Infantry, walked into Baguio at the same time that Farmer entered with his vehicles. Capt. Robert W. Moffett's men were charged with reconnoitering the outlying residential districts.

Scattered contacts were made by both patrols but neither found itself enmeshed in a serious skirmish. Enemy opposition was restricted to the inevitable handful of Japanese stragglers. For the first time in the campaign, prisoners were taken with ridiculous ease. Most of them were sick and wounded who had been left to perish by their comrades during the retreat from the summer capital. Highlights of these excursions came when Farmer's force made contact with a platoon from the 129th Infantry near the center of the city. This physical tie-in of 33d and 37th Division representatives officially marked the fall of Baguio.

Farmer's motorized group then veered eastward to Camp John Hay, formerly a popular United States Army rest camp. The once-immaculate installation was now an unrecognizable shambles. The few buildings which had managed to survive American bombing and strafing had been burned and gutted by the withdrawing Nipponese. Jap dead were found in countless cellars. In the basement of one partially destroyed residence fifty-five bodies of the enemy were discovered, all in advanced stages of decomposition. The rotting remains of Rising Sun battle flags were draped over each decaying figure. These corpses, lying face-up and in perfect alignment, provided the Division its most macabre sight in the Battle for Baguio.

Later in the afternoon of the 27th, General Swift apportioned responsibility for the Baguio sector between the two divisions responsible for its capture. General Beightler's unit was ordered to move north in pursuit of the enemy while the 33d Division was instructed to complete the occupation of the summer capital and its close-in suburbs. "The Ripper's" 2d and 3d Battalions poured into the city on the morning of 28 April, leaving the 1st Battalion on Hill 24-A as a security force. Faulconer's companies marched across the plateau and mounted Topside and Tiptop, a pair of 6,000-foot-high mountains which covered the northern entrances to Baguio. Lt. Colonel Minton's men turned to the east and moved on to high ground adjacent to Camp John Hay.

Occupation of these prominent terrain features completed the isolation of the Corps objectives. Now was the time to tie up all loose ends in the Division zone of action: effect contacts with 136th Infantry elements at Tebbo and Kennon Road, and sweep bypassed Japanese from their Bilbil strongpoint. With these points in minds, General Clarkson issued Division Field Order No. 19 on 27 April shortly after establishing his CP in Baguio.

Highest priority was given to the reduction of Japanese installations in the Tuba-Asin-Mt. Bilbil-Hill 4980 areas. Secondary priority went to the consummation of junctions between the 136th and other Division elements. Colonel Collins' regiment was assigned the mission of eliminating enemy resistance at Mount Bilbil and the Asin area in addition to reaching Colonel Cavenee's troops at Tebbo. As its 2d Battalion was engaged in and around Tuba and the 1st Battalion garrisoned Dingalan Bay outposts, the 123d's only new task was to join forces with the 3d Battalion, 136th Infantry, on Kennon Road.

Little difficulty attended the 123d's move down the road. Some die-hard Japanese, still holed up in the craggy bluffs overlooking the canyon, were encountered but easily dispersed by this pressure from the rear. On 1 May Major Wolff's riflemen met a platoon from Company K, 136th, near Honey Creek. Missions accomplished, both battalions returned to Baguio. With this phase closed out, Colonel Serff was finally able to assemble the better part of his regiment in the vicinity of Loacan Airfield.

Final junction was the one effected at Tebbo. Lt. Colonel Minton's 3d Battalion, 130th Infantry, driving south from Baguio via Itogon, established contact with 136th Infantry elements near Skyline Ridge on 5 May. To do this, it was first necessary to overrun the Japanese strongpoint at Tebbo which had withstood 136th efforts to push through to the summer capital. However, by hitting this position from the rear Minton's force experienced little trouble in knocking it out. Jap defenses had been geared to repulse only frontal and flanking attacks. The 3d Battalion remained in the Tebbo area, prepared to assist the 136th in the impending assault on Skyline Ridge.

Mount Bilbil was the one thorn remaining in the Division's side. Since mid-April a small detachment from Company A, 130th Infantry, augmented by a few Filipinos, had been able to contain enemy forces there from positions on Hill X. However, Bilbil Nips had gone virtually untouched throughout the fighting around Galiano and Asin. Colonel Collins realized that they would be rich in weapons and manpower. As a result, the force he created to return to Bilbil was bolstered with much of the assorted fire power at the regiment's command. Capt. William L. Mills, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, was given command of the composite group recognized operationally as Zebra Force. Mills' assault elements consisted of Company A, commanded by Lt. Albert J. Debnar; a Philippine Army rifle company; Antitank Company under Captain Beechinor, functioning as a regular line unit; the regimental I&R Platoon, led by Lt. Leonard L. Sharpe; and heavy-machine-gun and mortar sections from Dog Company.

Supporting elements included the 1st Battalion Medical Detachment; elements of Cannon Company in the role of service troops; Baker Battery, 124th Field Artillery Battalion; an air support group of sixteen P-51s with a ground liaison crew; and an additional artillery battery made up of two 90mm antiaircraft guns and a pair of captured Japanese mountain howitzers.

Zebra Force assembled in the vicinity of Galiano on the afternoon of 28 April. Here, Mills outlined his plan of attack to his subordinate commanders. Aerial photographs familiarized each leader with the peculiar formation of mile-long Bilbil whose crest gave growth to five towering knobs, unevenly spaced and separated by deep, bushy saddles. Running generally north and south, the forbidding mountain had Hill X for its southernmost knob. Mills quickly discounted the idea of a frontal assault aimed at running astride the long axis of Bilbil. Such a move was bound to be costly and probably unsuccessful. Companies F and C had tried it twice before-when the rest of the regiment was at Asin-and had been easily repulsed on both occasions.

Mills' scheme was to mount the ridge from its western side with the center knob as the force's first objective. Once there, the doughboys were to pivot and swing north, turning their strength against the two northernmost knobs on the mountain. With the far tip of Bilbil secured, Mills planned to return to the center of the ridge, reorganize, and then strike the one intervening knob separating his men from the 130th installation atop Hill X.

Under cover of darkness the Zebra Force left Galiano at 1900 on the 28th and moved toward the center of Bilbil's western slope. Field artillery pieces were already in position prepared to support the attack. The softening-up process had started earlier in the day when supporting fighter-bombers doused the knobs and draws with HE and Napalm. At 0200 on the morning of the 29th, Able Company, scheduled to spearhead the first attack, reached the base of its objective. Wearied by the seven-hour march, Debnar's men deployed and took turns sleeping until jumpoff time at 0600.

No supporting artillery fires prefaced Able's approach march up the mountainside. Captain Mills sought to gain his first objective by capitalizing on the element of surprise. Debnar's lead platoon actually negotiated the climb without being discovered, but as the first doughboys crossed the crest of the ridge they were observed by two enemy lookouts. Immediately, Company A opened fire on the Japanese guards thereby alerting the entire enemy garrison on Bilbil. A Nip light machine gun turned its fire on the intruders, but the platoon quickly smothered it and gained the tip of the knob. A short but furious battle took place here during which a second Nambu and a knee mortar were overrun. In securing its first objective, Company A accounted for three crew-served weapons and fifteen Jap riflemen. Zebra Force suffered two casualties.

Preparations for the defense of the center knob were under way as soon as it was cleared of enemy. The regimental I&R Platoon followed in the wake of Able Company and formed the nucleus of the installation. Since the force had sliced into the middle of the Japanese positions it was imperative that northern and southern flanks be given equal protection. Company A's light machine guns were trained on the hill to the south separating Hill X troops and Zebra Force. Heavies from Dog Company pointed northward, ready to support the attack on the next objective.

Able Company reorganized quickly and swept down into the saddle separating the knobs. As soon as the first men emerged, they were greeted by Nip Nambus but the Dog Company heavies were alerted for a situation such as this. Before the enemy gunners could squeeze off more than two or three bursts they were riddled by fire from the center knob. Moving in under sustained overhead fire, Lt. Perry H. White's 3d Platoon rapidly fought its way to the top of the second objective, killing ten more Japs in the process.

One more knob remained to be taken before the force could retrace its steps and hit the southern part of Bilbil. Pausing only to regroup, a fresh platoon from Company A moved out in front of Zebra Force. Meanwhile, Company D's heavy machine guns had displaced forward and were in position to back up this latest assault. But here Able's luck ran out. The Nips, cognizant of the fact that they were next on the agenda, had all approaches to the hill covered with fire from automatic weapons. They waited until the platoon was only a few yards from its objective before opening up. In a matter of minutes the platoon suffered severe casualties and found itself pinned to the ground.

In this situation Captain Mills called upon his artillery forward observer for howitzer support. After a short preparation he again sent A Company forward. At the same time the Filipino company was committed to the fight. Members of this unit attempted to swing out to the right and drive in against the enemy flank, but the ridge side was too steep to permit such a maneuver. Both efforts were stopped cold. A platoon from Antitank Company, several yards to the rear, attempted to distract the Japanese with a display of fire power but the enemy refused to be taken in by this ruse.

Artillery seemed the force's only salvation. The FO with the task force directed heavy howitzer fire against the suspected machine-gun positions, but the Nambus resumed their staccato beat as soon as the barrage lifted. In desperation the FO asked his fire-direction personnel back at the guns to supply a rolling barrage for the infantry. This turned out to be the answer to the problem. By following the artillery fire as closely as possible the assault platoons were able to storm up the knob and catch the enemy gunners huddled inside their emplacements. The third attack yielded one Jap heavy machine gun, two lights, two mortars and twenty enemy dead.

Much mopping up had to be done on this hill as the Japanese had woven an intricate pattern of tunnels which stretched far inside the knob. Antitank passed through Able and accomplished most of this work. It was now 1300 and the first time since the jumpoff that the force had not been under Nipponese fire. Captain Mills took advantage of this lull to contact Cannon Company with a request for water, ammunition, and medical supplies. He also asked for Filipino carriers to remove the dead and wounded. Next Mills moved his troops back down the ridge to the center knob to prepare for the attack on the one remaining barrier.

Native carriers, accompanied by Cannon Company security detachments, reached Zebra Force at 1600 bearing the needed supplies. They hauled the dead and wounded back to Galiano on their return trip. As soon as water and ammunition had been distributed, Mills dispatched a platoon from the Philippine Army company to reconnoiter the dense woods covering the final objective. Again the enemy refused to react until the doughboys were scarcely a few feet away. Suddenly sustained fire from three machine guns snaked out toward the Filipinos, enfilading most of the column. Five riflemen were instantly killed and six others were knocked out by .31 caliber rounds.

Bilbil Japs switched their fire to the main force once the Filipino platoon had been crippled. From prone positions Captain Mills and his FO called back for artillery. During the shelling one platoon of Antitank Company inched forward and set up a base of fire while another tried a flanking attack. Unfortunately, the Nips recuperated in plenty of time to throw back this drive. Advance was impossible. Well directed overhead fire from the main body of troops enabled the attacking antitank Platoon to withdraw safely with its wounded. However, darkness was now but a few hours away so Mills decided to halt offensive operations for the day and dig in his force on the center knob. I le again established contact with his rear echelon requesting that a second carrying party be sent forward to evacuate the casualties incurred in this last assault.

Captain Mills took stock of his force as it prepared to bed down for the night. Company A was exhausted to a man after a full day of climbing and hard fighting. His Filipino troops had been badly cut up earlier in the day and he hesitated to commit them on so vital an objective in their present battered condition. Mills realized that a fresh company could take the hill with much more facility. He radioed regimental headquarters, reported directly to Colonel Collins on the day's action, and asked for immediate reinforcement to insure the success of the operation. "The Ripper" promptly dispatched Company C, under Captain Kelly, to join Mills on Bilbil.

Carriers came up minutes before nightfall, collected the force's casualties and began the return trek to the Galiano area. Once they were out of friendly artillery range, Mills asked his FO to place intermittent howitzer fire on the target throughout the night. The close proximity of the explosions prevented the Blackhawks from getting sorely needed sleep, but they took solace from the thought that the Japanese had things much worse.

Kelly contacted Zebra Force shortly after daybreak. He and his men were veterans of Bilbil campaigning and needed little orientation from Captain Mills to acquaint them with the situation. It was quickly decided that Charley Company would make the main effort, supported by Company A ready to flank to the right if necessary. A heavy mortar and artillery concentration smashed into the objective as Company C deployed into its approach march formation. When supporting fires were halted Charley began to move to the thickly wooded knob.

Once the attacking company was swallowed up by the woods, Mills had no way of maintaining visual contact with Captain Kelly. From its position the task force could hear scattered rifle shots and an occasional burst of BAR fire. Less than half an hour after it cleared the line of departure, Charley Company radioed back to Mills' CP that the hill was in 130th hands. Scarcely believing his ears, the task force commander organized a small patrol and moved through the woods toward Kelly's men. It was not a false report. Stunned and shaken by the night-long artillery pounding, the enemy had abandoned his wounded to flee from Bilbil.

Elements of the task force wasted no time in moving southward, and establishing contact with friendly troops manning Hill X. With this junction, Captain Mills was able to radio Colonel Collins that Zebra Task Force had accomplished its assigned task. "The Ripper" ordered Mills to conduct a final mop-up of Mount Bilbil for the rest of the afternoon and then evacuate the ridge. At 2000, 30 April, the force was on its way back to Baguio for a deserved rest.