Morotai Reminiscences
by George Villielm

December 25: Sometime in the a.m. part of Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company loaded into an LCVP landing craft. We had personnel from Communications, A&P, a few drivers, Battalion C.O., Major John FarnelI, Lt. Vickery and myself. We had not been briefed about where we were going, nor had we seen any maps. We had barely got underway when we were hailed by a crewman of a PT boat which had impaled itself on a submerged object. Now, the fun started.

I had always thought that it was the Navy's primary responsibility to get the troops ashore. The next we knew a line was fastened to our craft. It didn't do the job, so another was attached which made it look like a pair of traces.

While this was going on, I kept watching the superstructure of the ramp of our craft banging on the smoke generator mounted on the aft end of the PT boat. Several times the ramp came close to the petcock at the base of the smoke generator.

Sure enough, it happened. A corner of the ramp broke off the petcock and smoke poured out of the tank by the ton, right into the LCVP. What a smoke job we got: eyes burned, throats irritated. Coughing so badly it almost made one vomit.

Finally, a young ensign tried to cut us loose. This is when I and two other men jumped up and grabbed the ropes. I shouted, "If you can't get it loose, cut the rope!" In the confusion one of the men jumped overboard. I yelled, "Hang in there!" as we saw him floating away from the craft. I learned late that he had been picked up as his full field pack had kept him afloat. We were cut free from the PT boat and drifted for maybe ten minutes more trying to recover from the affects of the smoke.

We continued to our landing zone. By this time most of the 3rd Bn. troops had landed and were digging in for a perimeter defense. Major Pate, remember him? I don't really know what he was doing there, he didn't last through the campaign. I asked him if we could have some sort of medical attention for the men affected by the smoke. He rebuffed me with some sort of answer and when night came we were placed so as to define our defensive perimeter. And with all the coughing, we were very helpful to the Japs. They harassed us all night long.

At one point they fired three mortar rounds in quick succession, which was great because they didn't have the range and all three rounds went into the bay.

Back at base camp they were getting a good going over and we in our foxholes and trenches could feel the ground shaking from the impacts at base camp. They were giving us a good Christmas party! By morning we had several wounded.

December 26: Preparations were being made to move out. We had so much crap there was hardly room to move. We had jeeps, drums of gasoline, you name it, we had it. Although we never used it, we even had the Service Company's little gem bulldozer (D-4). One of the L Company drivers, Pfc. Sharpe, showed me where he had spent the night under his jeep. I remember him showing me where all the slugs had ricocheted under the frame and wheels. During the night he was so far into the ground that water came in at high tide. Somehow when the recon was made of this area, it was so bad that no vehicles could be used. The whole beach was 5 to 6 feet above sea level with swamp all around.

Eventually the jeeps were sent back. The dozer remained -- the Japs using it every night for target practice. It was out front of our perimeter with its left side exposed to small arms fire. In spite of all of this, there was not a mark on the fuel tank as the enemy didn't have anything with enough firepower to put a hole in it. The rest of it was so dented and holed that it looked like a cheese grater.

December 27: There we were only two days after Christmas. If my memory serves me right the Battalion moved across the stream to the south. By afternoon, I had a lonely feeling, hardly anyone was left. The beachhead looked like a huge tract of land. We had a 2nd Lt. with a squad of engineers from the 108th, a Capt. with 2 or 3 Sgts., a portable medical tent, and maybe 12 men from various line companies. Maybe 30 men in all along with an F.O. from artillery.

I placed two men back to back on the trail about 100 yards out. Everyone was pretty tired by this time and I was afraid they'd fall asleep. Finding two more a little more awake, I replaced the first two who, indeed, had dozed off. While this was being done, I noticed a lot of trip wires that had been left behind by the troops. Many were inactive but others were ready to go. This was both good and bad. Anyway, we spent the remaining days busting our butts setting up a final line of defense. In the meantime we also acquired a DUK.

December 28: The days passed quickly but the nights were long. Most of the nights were clear with bright moonlight, reducing the Japs' activity. We also knew when the enemy was coming because you could smell them. I don't remember the exact date, but I think a platoon from 130C, led by Lt. Joe Kutys, came ashore. We were now up to reasonable fighting strength. As far as I was concerned Joe was in charge. We continued building our fortifications and were resupplied with hand grenades and 60 mm mortar shells (I had one mortar lanyard). We had to form a human chain from shore to the craft, wallowing in mud with water over our waists; floating the boxes ashore to retrieve them. The boxes had to be opened to dry their contents in the sun.

December 29: We were getting low on drinking water and I didn't want to use the nearby stream. We used the DUK to get to the island of Raoe. Every night our artillery would give us protective fire when needed. Since part of our beachhead included a coconut grove, tree bursts were a regular occurrence. If the range was not correct, watch out! Just about nightfall we would get word from the artillery F. O., "On the way!" That meant take cover from possible tree bursts which, one night slightly wounded two men from the 130th. The next day, their regimental commander came out in his private yacht to issue Purple Hearts.

Finally, we set out for Raoe Island for water which would take about two hours. The water was so shallow you could see bottom. With the huge blocks of rock it looked like a quarry. No wonder the PT boat speared itself!

When we returned in the afternoon, we found a group of GIs fishing with hand grenades in the stream. They didn't appreciate it too much when we stopped this activity.

December 30: The day's events were much the same as the day before. We spent time improving our defenses and tried to catch a few winks of sleep. So far, we had not lost anyone and no one had become sick. Although coughing from the smoke had stopped, many still had sore throats.

December 31: The last day of 1944 began as usual. It was a bright sunny day. Most of the day we observed white phosphorous artillery rounds falling on the distant hills to the south and east and the impact zone was moving north toward us. Without communications we were unsure what was happening. The only news we had was through our F.O. who had a line to the artillery base at Ngelengelle.

About mid-afternoon the artillery liaison plane flew over our position and dropped a note at our feet in a weighted down mini-chute. Lt. Kutys and a few others also were there.

And, what a surprise! We knew the artillery was shelling the enemy, but didn't know the number. The note said 300 were in one location, 400 in another, and several hundred more in a third -- all were heading north! The note ended with: "Happy New Year!" Would they come here? We didn't have too much to offer. Evidently they continued on their way to the north end of the island.

We began making preparations. Most of the mortar rounds were in my hole and everyone got extra ammo. Toward evening, I set a booby trap (grenade with tripwire) on the trail and zeroed in on it with the mortar. It was almost dark and as I followed the round, I almost thought it was coming back on me. It was on target, knocking out the booby trap. 1 thought about setting up another but it was beginning to get dark so I decided against it. Next to me was Pfc. Henderson, an I Co. driver. He had a foxhole dug right under a tree stump, one side allowed him to observe the enemy opposite the ocean.

Shortly after firing the mortar round, I noticed movement out front. I told Henderson to watch carefully. Sure enough, we saw two men carrying another on a stretcher who was wounded, and another man with the rifles. We held our fire while some of our men went out to guide them to our mud tent. This was the event that I have lived with all these years and will never forget. For some reason, this particular evening our artillery had not zeroed in on our front! And, some people do not believe in God.

The article by Col. Sackton entitled "Hill 40," which was written about the Morotai campaign, doesn't say much about the Japs that got away. How successful was the operation? They got some, but many got away. (Michael Kaehler note: It is a known and recorded fact that the war continued on many of the "secured' islands in the Pacific up to and including VJ Day, however, these actions do not appear in the published histories read by the general public. Though significant, there is no mention of 136th Infantry operations on Morotai in the U.S. Army's published work "The Approach to the Philippines" by Robert Ross Smith.)

The next account first appeared in the Mar 1995 issue of the 33rd Infantry Division newsletter, pp 1 and 3. Used with permission.

A Christmas Gift for the 33rd: An Ocean Cruise from New Guinea to Morotai

General MacArthur's staff knew that if U.S. Forces held an airstrip in the Molucccas group of islands in the Netherlands East Indies, they would have a strategic base from which to launch operations against the Philippines about four hundred miles away.

To meet MacArthur's timetable for the return, in September troops of the 31st Dixie Division streamed ashore, After dispersing the enemy, the 31st built airstrips for B-24s of the Thirteenth Air Force. A strong perimeter defense of the new base was adequate protection against the small disorganized elements of the Japanese forces remaining on Morotai. But the enemy was impatient with the state of affairs and acted. While troops of the Golden Cross were enroute to take over from the 31 st , the Japanese put an infantry colonel ashore on Morotai for the purpose of organizing their remaining strength there. Also, by a series of nightly shore-to-shore movements from Halmahera, the colonel reinforced Morotai in preparation to launching a counterattack. Running the gauntlet of Navy PT boats cost the Japanese heavily, but they took their losses and by December, when the 33rd set sail for the island, the bulk of the Japanese 211th Infantry Regiment was in place.

The Japanese colonel assembled his strength in the area of Hill 40 where it was a serious threat to our air and naval installations. He began with reconnaissance and harassing activity against our perimeter, and kept up these tactics until December 14 when it became apparent that he was capable of an attack in force, and actually was planning such a move against our airstrips. U.S. garrison forces were tied down to perimeter defense when the 33rd landed. The 136th Infantry was to bear the brunt of the task.

Col. Ray Cavenee, 136th Infantry regimental C.O., ordered the inland movement to begin on December 26. Two columns were to approach the enemy. The regiment, less the 3rd battalion, moved to the Pilowo River, while the 3rd battalion stayed at Radja. Supporting artillery moved to Ngelengele Island.

The jungle trails, as they were, were unimaginable. Packboard loads of heavy mortars, machine guns and ammunition exhausted the carriers and required transfer of loads every fifteen minutes. A mile inland the SCR-284 radio blanked out. An artillery liaison plane with an SCR-300 facilitated inter-column communications by flying overhead relaying messages.

Col. Cavanee, recognizing a strongly fortified enemy, decided on a coordinated attack for the morning of January 3. To achieve this goal, the 2nd Bn, commanded by Lt. Col Arthur Sauser, was ordered west to facilitate an enveloping movement while the 1st. Bn. was ordered to attack from the south.

An artillery concentration from Ngelengele provided support prior to the order to move out. At 1000 hours the battalions attacked simultaneously. Two hundred yards from enemy positions, where patrols roamed at will a day earlier, the attackers came under fire from tree snipers.

Closeness of the terrain prevented use of heavy machine guns and mortars. Cannon and anti-tank companies also had to be held

The Morotai Campaign may have received little recognition, but the sacrifice of those who died there will long be remembered in coastal areas. Every attempt to use mortars resulted in tree bursts. Lack of fields of fire (in some places barely 20 feet visibility) made heavy machine guns of little use. Heavy weapons companies were withdrawn and became responsible for receiving air drops, re-supply of front line troops, and casualty evacuation.

As dawn came on the morning of January 4, 1st and 2nd Bns. of the 136th moved out to the north. But before they had advanced forty yards, harassing fire from tree snipers and Nambus began plucking at the underbrush. Fighting quickly broke down to squad level. Close infighting precluded the use of artillery. Individual enemy troops that were dug in were flanked and destroyed by hand grenade.

The element of re-supply wasn't without its problems. Only medical supplies had been parachute dropped; the rest just had been pushed out hatches of C-47s as they made a pass at 200 feet. All communication wire spools were damaged beyond use. Ingenuity aided in evacuation. Bamboo rafts were devised to float the wounded down the Pilowo River to the coastal area. Flotation was adequate for a wounded man, yet the raft was light enough to permit the four bearers to lift it and its load over the shallow spots. The trip now took one day instead of two and required only four litter bearers instead of the previous eight.

An alert was sounded the morning of January 5 as Company B, commanded by Capt. Kissel, started moving to the right of the 1st. Bn. A banzai attack was bearing down on the extreme right flank. The Japanese soldiers were cut down in their tracks. The sword waving officer in command charged to within

ten yards of the position when a BAR burst stopped him as suddenly as if he had hit a brick wall. Still upright, his last act was to throw his Samurai sword into the position.

The main attack by all three battalions began on schedule at 0700 after a final artillery barrage. Company B was on the right and advancing rapidly over a slight rise. There, just to the front was the enemy position. Without realizing it, one squad moved directly into the path of a cleverly concealed Japanese machine gun. Within five seconds, eight members of the squad lay dead or wounded. Four men to the right of the squad flanked the gun emplacement, finishing it off with a couple grenades.

West of the left flank, Company G, commanded by Lt. John Weatherwax, also was affected by this action. When the machine gun opened up on Co. B, a machine gun opposite Co. G also began to fire, prematurely disclosing its position. The two machine guns proved to be the last of organized defense. The 1st and 2nd Bns. then rushed the remaining enemy riflemen and mopped up the position.

The devastation of the Japanese perimeter was spectacular. The aid station and CP had been blown to pieces by our artillery. Tree bursts were much in evidence, which had taken a terrible toll. The two battalions continued north, pursuing remnants and to link up with the 3rd Bn. Shortly thereafter, it was verified that the Japanese 211 th Infantry, less its 3rd Bn, had constituted the resistance on Hill 40; and that an estimated forty of the enemy, some wounded, made their escape.

In the Second Battle of Morotai, one of the roles of the 130th Inf. also was recalled by Edward Rosenfeld, Co. B platoon leader: "Our mission was to secure the airfield's perimeter and to conduct recon patrols. In one particular action we suffered several casualties. But, with reinforcements from Company A, were able to assemble a recon column of nearly 200 men, including an artillery forward observer and an engineer."

General Clarkson also highly commended the field artillery for its performance during the campaign. When the 136th and the enemy were at a costly standoff on Hill 40, it was the howitzers of the 123rd and 210th F. A. Battalions that shifted the balance of power.

Homer Foster 210FA/A seems to sum it all up when he says, "The ones who lost their lives, or were wounded, were just as important as in the Battle of the Bulge. The difference was we were sweating on the equator and they were in a cold climate. The Japs lost 870 at Morotai. We lost 46, had 104 wounded, and 23 injured in action."

The following account first appeared in the Jun 2000 issue of the 33rd Infantry Division newsletter, pp1 and 7. Used with permission.

Kennon Road
by George Villielm

Kennon Road - After chasing the Japanese off the flatlands, our next move was up the Kennon Road; one of the roads leading to Baguio and designated to the 136th. It was in the spring and leaves on the trees were just beginning to sprout. We were occupying the ridges on the uphill side of the roadway, which zig-zagged in such a way that sometimes it was partial defilade, and at other times exposed to enemy fire. The Japanese, of course, held the commanding ground, and the position we then held was about 100 yards of exposed roadway. We were using about 400 Filipino carriers, and had to unload them on the same very congested area. This was a concern to me. The antitank company had roadblocks at the top and downside of the sector. And there was only one spot by the lower roadblock where we could turn the trucks around. We would back them up as far to the upper side of this area as possible, using the mountain side as a shield. Service Company trucks were used, with some Headquarters' Co. trucks, to transport food, ammunition and personnel. We would bring all these up in the morning and the trucks would return in the afternoon to pickup the Filipinos. My concern was that this activity was being observed by the enemy. The worst part was that when we loaded up at night, the trucks would have to pass through the 100 yards of exposed roadway. To lessen exposure to enemy fire, we moved the trucks all at once, standing a better chance of getting through before the enemy could respond.

Luzon - March 1945. Filipino carriers start the steep climb to 1st  Bn units on Bue Bue.

The next morning, the same technique was used to drop off men and supplies for the day's operation. At the spot where we turned our trucks around was a large banyan tree where the A-T group had their gun position. The leaves were all stripped off the tree from a Japanese shell that had landed on the hill about 50 feet from the gun position. I asked the sergeant,* "What happened here?" He said that as the last truck in the convoy rounded the turn that a Japanese shell landed on the hillside about 50 feet from his gun position. It skip leaving 2-3 skid marks before it finally exploded, leaving scars on the hillside.

The artillery sent up an observer who was able to determine by the skid marks the approximate position of the Japanese gun. For the remainder of that day and all that night, we were watching that spot on the mountainside for a gun flash. We took turns at watch, using a small line-of-sight guide I had fashioned from a few sticks.

Finally, at 1000 the next day, the Japanese fired their artillery piece. What ensued thereafter was unbelievable.

The barrage of artillery shells resonated like a volcanic eruption. They had bracketed that position in with the heavy artillery pieces the day before, and surely there was no way that any living thing could survive that.

Several days later we were in the vicinity of that action and I ascended the hillside. The trees in the area were all but destroyed as was the Japanese artillery piece. Spokes protruded in all directions from what had once been its wheels. The horse that was used to move the gun had been cut in half and in the crotch of a tree limb about twenty feet off the gound, I recognized the lower half of a puttied leg.

This is the ugliness of war. To this day I vividly recall the site.

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